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 In the United States, exclusionary discipline, including out-of-school suspension 
(OSS) and expulsion, is disproportionately administered to students of color and special 
education students. Exclusionary discipline is associated with lower academic achievement 
and higher risk of dropout, grade retention, and involvement in the juvenile justice system, 
but there is little causal evidence on this topic. 
 This dissertation reports on three analyses on school discipline, using administrative 
data from Arkansas public schools. The first study estimates racial disproportionalities in the 
use of exclusionary discipline. Controlling for reported behavior and student characteristics, 
my co-author and I find that Black students are 2.4 times as likely as White students to 
receive exclusionary discipline. Within schools, this race-based gap is insignificant, 
suggesting the gap is driven by differences across schools. 
 In the second study, my co-authors and I use student fixed effects within dynamic 
panel data models to attempt to estimate a causal effect of exclusionary discipline on student 
test scores in the following year. Counterintuitively, we find almost zero evidence of 
negative effects, suggesting that reductions in OSS, without additional supports or 
interventions, will likely not improve student achievement. 
The third study examines the implementation and outcomes of a statewide policy 
eliminating OSS as a consequence for truancy. That study tests which school-level factors 
predict policy compliance and whether there were any policy-related changes in test scores, 
attendance, chronic absenteeism, truancy rates, or other student disciplinary outcomes. I find 
that compliance was low in high-minority, high-discipline schools, and there was no policy-
related change in school-level test scores, attendance, and chronic absenteeism. Reports of 
truancy and the use of OSS for truancy declined following the new policy, but part of this 
result may be due to changes in how schools report discipline. 
 In summary, my research indicates that real disparities in exclusionary discipline 
exist, but they are primarily between schools, and the negative impacts of the exclusionary 
discipline on its own may be minimal. What is likely more important is focusing on 
prevention and building positive school climate, rather than setting high-level policies and 
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There is much concern in the United States education community about the 
disproportionate use and potentially negative outcomes of exclusionary discipline such as out-of-
school suspensions (OSS) and expulsions, as well as zero-tolerance policies, which remove 
students from school for a variety of offenses including violent misbehavior and less serious 
offenses such as dress code violations and truancy (Losen & Skiba, 2010; Skiba, 2014; Skiba & 
Peterson, 1999). Beginning in the early 1990s, many U.S. schools adopted zero-tolerance or 
exclusionary discipline policies in response to concerns about violence in schools, but there is 
now concern that this movement went too far. The arguments against exclusionary discipline are 
driven by three main factors. 
First, there is a lack of evidence that these policies are effective disciplinary 
consequences that prevent future misbehavior. State zero-tolerance laws are not associated with 
decreases in principal perceptions of problem behaviors (Curran, 2016), and school suspension 
has been found to predict higher rates of misbehavior and suspensions in the future (Costenbader 
& Markson, 1998; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Tobin, Sugai, & Colvin, 1996). 
A second concern is that exclusionary discipline is associated with a variety of negative 
student outcomes including lower academic achievement (Beck & Muschkin, 2012; Raffaele-
Mendez, 2003; Skiba & Rausch, 2004), higher risk of grade retention or drop-out (American 
Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; Marchbanks, Blake, Smith, Seibert, & Carmichael, 2014; 
Swanson, Erickson, & Ritter, 2017), and involvement in the juvenile justice system (American 
Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; Fabelo et al., 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, Birchmeier, & Valentine, 
2009). While this body of evidence paints a dreary picture about the educational outcomes of 
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highly disciplined students, it does not necessarily follow that eliminating or reducing 
suspensions without additional interventions or supports would improve student outcomes. In the 
third chapter of this dissertation, we aim to estimate a causal impact of exclusionary discipline on 
student test scores (Anderson, Ritter, & Zamarro, 2017) and find almost no evidence of a 
negative impact. Thus, we conclude that we should not expect improvements in student 
achievement to follow from a reduction in OSS, on its own. 
A third major concern is the disparate exposure to exclusionary discipline for students of 
color and students with special education needs. Black students represent 15% of U.S. students, 
but 35% of students suspended once, 45% of students with multiple suspensions, and 36% of 
expelled students (U.S. Departments of Education and Justice, 2014). Similarly, students with 
disabilities represent only 12% of students in the country, but they make up 20% of students 
suspended out-of-school once, 25% of students suspended more than once, and 19% of students 
expelled (U.S. Departments of Education and Justice, 2014). These findings are neither 
surprising nor new: many researchers have documented stark differences in suspension and 
expulsion rates between White and non-White students in the U.S. (Losen & Gillespie, 2012; 
Losen, Hodson, Keith, Morrison, & Belway, 2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010; Sartain et al., 2015; 
Skiba et al., 2014; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002; Sullivan, 
Klingbeil, & Van Norman, 2013). 
The best estimates of the racial disparities in the use of exclusionary discipline account 
for the type of misbehavior a student was cited for, their behavioral history, and other student 
characteristics (Skiba et al., 2014; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et al., 2002). In addition, some 
studies have incorporated school-level factors to understand whether these disparities are 
primarily driven by differences across schools (Sartain et al., 2015; Skiba et al., 2002). Still, even 
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the most careful of these analyses are limited in size and scope. Thus, there is still more to be 
learned about the sources and drivers of these disparities. This topic is the focus of Chapter 2, in 
which Dr. Gary Ritter and I conduct the first large scale analysis of disparities in exclusionary 
discipline using detailed data allowing infractions to be connected to specific consequence types, 
as well as to the discipline infraction history and demographic characteristics of students. In 
particular, we estimate the conditional disparities in the use of exclusionary discipline across the 
entire state as well as the average within-school disparities. 
 Driven by these three concerns of a lack of the intended deterrent effect, correlations to 
other negative outcomes, and racial disproportionalities – but without causal evidence of the 
actual impact of exclusionary discipline on students – many states and school districts are 
moving away from exclusionary discipline. According to Steinberg and Lacoe (2017), as of May 
2015, 22 states and the District of Columbia had revised laws to limit exclusionary discipline and 
implement more supportive, non-punitive strategies. As of the 2015-16 school year, 23 of the 
100 largest school districts had implemented similar reforms (Steinberg & Lacoe, 2017). These 
policies include reducing the length of suspensions as in Chicago (Stevens et al., 2015) and New 
York City (Eden, 2017), limiting suspensions for certain, minor misbehaviors as in California 
(Loveless, 2017; Public Counsel, 2014) and New York City (Eden, 2017), eliminating 
suspensions for truancy as in Arkansas (Chapter 4 of this dissertation), reducing suspensions for 
young students as in Seattle (Cornwell, 2015), or completely eliminating the use of suspensions 
as in Miami (O’Connor, 2015). Other reforms require principals to obtain written permission to 
suspend students for certain behaviors (Eden, 2017). 
 Many of these reforms are quite recent, and given the variety of policy reforms and 
contexts, there is little systematic, empirical evidence on their effectiveness. Yet, some 
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researchers have expressed concerns about the ineffectiveness and unintended consequences of 
these reforms. For example, while OSS was officially eliminated in Miami-Dade, some students 
are still reportedly sent home from school, and teachers have concerns that the reduction was 
attempted without sufficient staff buy-in and support (Gerety, 2016). California’s efforts to 
reduce suspensions have apparently decreased the rate of suspensions overall without actually 
closing the racial gaps in OSS (Loveless, 2017). Educators in California and New York City 
have expressed concerns about declines in safety and learning because misbehaving students 
remain in school (Eden, 2017; Loveless, 2017). In addition, certain schools may be more 
burdened by these unintended consequences: in New York City, declines in school safety in the 
wake of disciplinary reforms were the highest in schools with high concentrations of non-White 
students (Eden, 2017).  
Thus, the issue is complicated, and policies may not always lead to the intended 
outcomes. Therefore, in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I study a policy that intended to eliminate 
the use of OSS as a consequence for truancy, and test whether this policy was associated with 
any changes in important school outcomes including test scores, attendance, chronic 
absenteeism, truancy, and other disciplinary outcomes. I find no evidence that the policy reform 
improved school-level outcomes related to attendance and test scores, and instead, there is the 
possibility that schools changed how they report truancy and discipline following the reform.  
For this dissertation, I dig deeper into questions related to racial disparities in disciplinary 
consequences, the impacts of exclusionary discipline on academic performance, and recent 
attempts to reform school discipline policies. Specifically, I conduct three studies on the 
implementation and outcomes of school discipline policies in Arkansas. Next, I provide a 
summary of each of the three studies included in this dissertation. 
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In the first study (Anderson & Ritter, 2017), which was published in Education Policy 
Analysis Archives, Dr. Gary Ritter and I use seven years of infraction-level data from all 
Arkansas public schools to build on the body of evidence documenting racial disparities in 
exclusionary discipline. Our key contributions are the ability to connect individual infractions to 
their corresponding consequences, cover an entire state for a period of seven years, and utilize 
school fixed effects analysis to distinguish between within- and across- school 
disproportionalities. We find that Black students are more likely than White students to receive 
exclusionary discipline, even after controlling for the type and frequency of disciplinary 
referrals, but that most of these disparities occur across rather than within schools. Across the 
state, Black students are about 2.4 times as likely to receive exclusionary discipline conditional 
on reported infraction type and frequency as well as observable student characteristics. Within 
school, however, this same conditional disparity is generally not statistically significant. In other 
words, the average within-school disparity in the conditional likelihood of exclusionary 
discipline between Black and White students in our fullest model is not significant. Within 
schools, the disproportionalities in exclusionary discipline are driven primarily by non-race 
factors such as free- and reduced-price lunch (FRL) eligibility and special education status. We 
also find that schools serving an above average share of non-White students tend to give out 
longer punishments, regardless of whether the school was above or below the state average FRL 
rate. In other words, the minority share in the school is a statistically significant and large driver 
of consequence severity, while FRL share is not. In combination, the results from this first study 
indicate that racial disparities in exclusionary discipline do exist, but that this race gap is driven 




 In the second paper (Anderson et al., 2017), my co-authors and I estimate the impact of 
days of OSS on student achievement as measured by test scores. We use six years of de-
identified demographic, achievement, and disciplinary data from all K-12 public schools in 
Arkansas to estimate dynamic panel data models (Anderson & Hsiao, 1981) incorporating 
student fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservable student characteristics. The goal 
of this approach is to better control for background characteristics of students to reduce the 
influence of reverse causality or other confounds in our estimates. We find, counterintuitively, 
almost no evidence of a negative impact of OSS on student test scores. Therefore, while 
policymakers may have other reasons to limit exclusionary discipline, we conclude that we 
should not expect academic gains to follow from a reduction in OSS alone without additional 
interventions or supports. 
 Finally, the third paper (Anderson, 2017) studies the implementation and outcomes of a 
state-level policy reform that prohibited OSS as a consequence for truancy. While the law 
instituting this policy was passed in 2013, there was a lack of full compliance, even after three 
years. I study, using eight years of student- and infraction-level data for K-12 public school 
students across the state of Arkansas, which school-level factors are associated with the use of 
OSS as a consequence for truancy prior to the policy and which are associated with policy 
compliance. Further, I utilize comparative interrupted time series analysis to estimate whether 
school-level outcomes such as math and English Language Arts test scores, attendance, chronic 
absenteeism, truancy, and other disciplinary outcomes changed more in policy-affected 
“treatment” schools than their comparison schools. I find that schools serving more minority 
students, schools with higher truancy rates, and schools with higher OSS rates were less likely to 
comply with the policy, all else equal. This suggests that the types of schools likely targeted by 
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this policy are the same ones not fully complying. Combined with a lack of evidence that the 
policy improved student achievement, attendance, or chronic absenteeism, these findings suggest 
that the potential impact of policy changes may be limited if policy changes are not 
communicated well, if there is not accountability to ensure compliance, and if there is not school 
capacity to handle discipline effectively. 
 These three papers fill significant gaps in our knowledge about how discipline policies 
are implemented and what impact these policies may have on students. The first and second 
papers also seek to highlight the fact that gaps in the literature still do exist, despite what may be 
interpreted by some as a vast amount of evidence. For example, many in the education 
community appear convinced that exclusionary discipline harms students without citing causal 
evidence to make that claim. In these papers, I use careful descriptive analyses to address an old 
problem in a new way (Chapter 2), aim to estimate – for the first time - a causal impact of 
exclusionary discipline on student test scores (Chapter 3), and assess the implementation fidelity 
and outcomes from a recent state-level policy change (Chapter 4). These types of analyses are 
necessary to inform effective public policy in the best interest of students, by moving the 
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There is much discussion in the United States about exclusionary discipline (suspensions and 
expulsions) in schools. According to a 2014 report from the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights, Black students represent 15% of students, but 44% of students who were 
suspended more than once and 36% of expelled students. This analysis uses seven years of 
individual infraction-level data from public schools in Arkansas. We find that Black students are 
more likely to receive exclusionary discipline, even after controlling for the nature and number 
of disciplinary referrals, but that most of the differences occur across rather than within schools. 
Across the state, Black students are about 2.4 times more likely to receive exclusionary 
discipline (conditional on reported infractions and other student characteristics) than White 
students whereas, within school, this same conditional disparity is not statistically different from 
zero. Within schools, the disproportionalities in exclusionary discipline are driven primarily by 
non-race factors such as free- and reduced-price lunch (FRL) eligibility and special education 
status. We find, not surprisingly, that schools with larger proportions of non-White students tend 
to give out longer punishments, regardless of school income levels, measured by FRL rates. 
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Background on Issues in School Discipline 
Since the early 1990s, many schools across the United States have adopted zero-tolerance 
and other harsh disciplinary policies in response to fears of violence in schools. The zero-
tolerance philosophy is an approach that removes students from school for a variety of 
violations, ranging from actual serious offenses like violent behavior to dress code violations or 
truancy (Losen & Skiba, 2010; Skiba, 2014; Skiba & Peterson, 1999). While it is necessary for 
school leaders to do what is reasonable to maintain a positive learning environment and ensure 
the safety of the school community, these so-called zero-tolerance policies have been opposed by 
a growing number of researchers and observers who fear that this movement has gone too far.  
Opponents of harsh disciplinary practices have voiced numerous concerns. First, there is 
some evidence that these policies do not have the hoped-for deterrent effect. For example, 
Curran (2016) recently found that state zero-tolerance laws are not associated with decreases in 
problem behaviors as perceived by principals. There is evidence that school suspension predicts 
higher rates of misbehavior and suspensions in the future, rather than reducing misbehaviors 
(Costenbader & Markson, 1998; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Tobin, Sugai, & Colvin, 1996). 
Moreover, critics fear that zero tolerance might have other unintended negative 
consequences (Skiba, 2014). Zero-tolerance policies and exclusionary discipline practices, such 
as expulsions and suspensions, have been associated with lower academic achievement (Beck & 
Muschkin, 2012; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Raffaele-Mendez, Knoff, & Ferron, 2002; Skiba & 
Rausch, 2004), school dropout (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; American Psychological 
Association, 2008; Ekstrom, Goertz, Pollack, & Rock, 1986), and involvement in the juvenile 
justice system (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; Balfanz, Spiridakis, Neild, & Legters, 
2003; Fabelo et al., 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, Birchmeier, & Valentine, 2009).  
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This active opposition to exclusionary discipline has made an impact and influenced 
some high-profile changes in school disciplinary practices. Chicago public schools enacted a 
policy in 2012 to reduce the length of student suspensions, and researchers from the University 
of Chicago’s Consortium on Chicago School Research have been analyzing the impacts (Sartain 
et al., 2015). In September 2014, California became the first state in the nation to enact limits of 
student suspension for minor misbehaviors (Public Counsel, 2014). One of the nation’s largest 
school districts, Miami-Dade, also eliminated out-of-school suspensions (OSS) ahead of the 
2015-16 school year (O’Connor, 2015). In Seattle, the School Board declared a one-year 
moratorium on suspensions for elementary students in September 2015 (Cornwell, 2015).  
Perhaps a key reason that disciplinary policies have been revised is the concern that zero-
tolerance policies and exclusionary practices have been applied disproportionately to minority 
students. A 2014 national report from the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
focused on the racial disparity in exclusionary disciplinary policies. The authors reported that 
although Black students represent only 15% of students across the nation, 35% of students 
suspended once are Black, 44% of students suspended more than once are Black, and 36% of 
expelled students are Black (U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice, 
2014). Indeed, over the past decade (and beyond), numerous researchers have documented 
differences in suspension rates between White students and non-White students across the nation 
(Children’s Defense Fund, 1975; Costenbader & Markson, 1998; Losen & Gillespie, 2012; 
Losen, Hodson, Keith, Morrison, & Belway, 2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010; Raffaele-Mendez, 
2003; Skiba et al., 2014; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002; Sullivan, 
Klingbeil, & Van Norman, 2013). In addition, non-White students were more likely to receive 
suspensions for relatively subjective offenses such as disrespect; the result is that non-White 
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students were disproportionately missing school time, often for non-violent or trivial reasons 
(Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002).  
In reaction to these circumstances, there is a growing - but limited - research base 
examining the racial disparities in the incidence of exclusionary discipline in schools across the 
country. Some studies rely on aggregate school- or district-level data and do not connect the 
actual student infractions to the disciplinary consequences (Children’s Defense Fund, 1975; 
Losen et al., 2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010); such studies are informative but do not shed light on 
whether students are being treated unfairly. Others have utilized student-level data, but focus on 
disproportionalities in outcomes, without connecting them to the type or severity of infraction 
reported (Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Sullivan et al., 2013). Some more recent studies utilize 
student-level or infraction-level datasets to address a more important issue: whether particular 
groups of students are treated differently for committing the same type of infraction (Skiba et al., 
2014; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et al., 2002). While these analyses advance our knowledge on this 
issue, these studies are hampered by a variety of issues such as limited samples of students - one 
study (Skiba et al., 2002) involved only middle schools in a single district. In addition, certain 
studies do not incorporate school-level information or school fixed effects to assess whether 
disparities exist within certain types of schools (Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et al., 2002). 
Thus, in this article, we examine all disciplinary infractions and the resulting 
consequences for all K-12 students in a single U.S. state over a seven-year time period. We are 
able to connect individual student characteristics to specific infractions and to the resulting 
consequences. Using this rich dataset, we can carefully examine disparities in disciplinary 
outcomes by race and other student characteristics, while controlling for the infraction 
committed and for the school attended. By identifying the extent to which students of different 
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racial groups are punished more or less severely for the same offenses, even within the same 
schools, we hope to make a meaningful contribution to the growing evidence base on this 
important and timely issue. Specifically, we ask three key research questions: 
1) Across schools in Arkansas, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use of 
exclusionary discipline for non-White students, low-income students, special education 
students, or English language learners? 
2) Within schools, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use of exclusionary 
discipline for non-White students, low-income students, special education students, or 
English language learners? 
3) What school characteristics are associated with harsher (longer) disciplinary 
consequences? 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the literature 
on the topic of disparities in school discipline. Then, we describe our data and sample and outline 
our analytic methods. Following that, we present the results, and finally, we conclude with some 
discussion of our results. 
Evidence from the Literature 
We describe the relevant research in two sections. First, we present the evidence on the 
racial disparities in student discipline on a national level. Studies addressing this broad question 
generally rely on school-level data and provide only an overview of the consequences levied on 
groups of students. While these analyses are important, they leave many questions unanswered 
because they do not examine the drivers of these differences. For example, if particular groups of 
students are punished more severely than others for serious but similar infractions, this is likely 
an indication of implicit or explicit bias in disciplinary practice at the school. Thus, the second 
17 
 
set of studies we present are particularly informative as they investigate the student- and school-
level characteristics that are associated with the racial disparities in discipline.  
National Overviews of Disciplinary Disproportionalities 
In 2015, Dan Losen and colleagues from the Civil Rights Project at UCLA published a 
comprehensive report asking “Are We Closing the School Discipline Gap?” The authors focused 
on out-of-school suspension rates in every school district in the nation through the 2011-12 
school year. The data revealed an overall increase in suspensions over the past 40 years, as well 
as an increasing gap in the suspension rates for White students and students of color. In 1972-73, 
only 6% of Black students were suspended during the year, as compared to 3% of White students 
and 3% of Hispanic students. By 2011-12, 16% of Black students were suspended; this rate was 
more than twice as great as for Hispanic students (7%) and more than three times as great as for 
White students (5%). Moreover, the authors also examined rates within states and districts and 
found much variability, indicating that district and school policies could strongly influence 
exclusionary discipline outcomes (Losen et al., 2015). While the authors did not mention “family 
fragmentation” (Pearlstein, 2011) or the decline of the two-parent family structure as factors 
contributing to this rise in the disciplinary gap, some scholars have argued that the rise in divorce 
rates and illegitimacy rates (particularly among African-Americans) during this time likely 
contributed to gaps in educational opportunities and outcomes including student discipline 
(Pearlstein, 2011). This trend was noted relatively early on (Moynihan, 1965). 
 Several years earlier, Losen teamed with noted discipline researcher Russell Skiba on a 
national study of suspension rates in middle school, using an earlier (2006) version of the Civil 
Rights Data Collection (CRDC). In this study, the authors analyzed suspension rates for students 
in more than 9,200 middle schools across the nation, as well as a sub-sample from 18 large urban 
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districts, from the years 2002 to 2006 (Losen & Skiba, 2010). This analysis also revealed stark 
racial gaps in suspensions; for example, while only 10% of White male students in middle school 
were suspended in 2006, 28% of Black male students were suspended in that same year. In the 
urban sub-sample analysis, the authors found many schools in which more than one out of every 
three students in a particular racial group had been suspended during the year. 
 Overall, these and other analyses confirm that there are indeed systemic racial disparities 
in out-of-school suspensions. But, what factors drive these disparities? And do these differences 
persist even after controlling for infractions and referrals? In the next section, we summarize the 
emerging research literature addressing these questions. While we have not conducted a full 
systematic review of the literature, we searched thoroughly for literature on racial disparities in 
school discipline, with a focus on the use of exclusionary discipline, and used a snowball search 
to identify additional studies to include. We do not include theoretical or philosophical 
arguments for or against exclusionary discipline, but rather focus on studies that quantitatively 
assess the number of infractions or incidences of disciplinary consequences and the demographic 
characteristics of the students receiving these consequences. In general, we focus on articles 
since the year 2000. 
Studies Examining the Drivers of Racial Discipline Gaps 
 In Chicago, where there has been a great deal of focus on exclusionary discipline in 
recent years, researchers from the Consortium on Chicago School Research scanned discipline 
data from roughly 85,000 high school students in the district in 2013-14 (Sartain et al., 2015). 
Using descriptive analyses, the authors have shown that Black students were three times as likely 
as Hispanic students to be suspended, and four times as likely as White and Asian students. 
While there was some evidence of students of different racial backgrounds systematically 
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receiving more suspensions within the same schools, the primary driver of the differences was 
the school. That is, Black students attended schools, on average, that reported larger numbers of 
suspensions. While this investigation did consider some factors that play a role in the disparities, 
the authors were unable to account for the infractions allegedly committed by the students. 
Moreover, suspensions were the only consequence analyzed here. Nevertheless, this study 
moved the field forward by putting forth the idea that differing school environments or practices 
may be one driver of the racial discipline gap. 
Welch and Payne (2010) further examined what drives the discipline gap by considering 
the “racial threat hypothesis” from criminal justice research. The authors posited that school 
leaders in buildings serving more Black students would be more likely to use punitive discipline 
and less likely to use restorative approaches. Analyzing data from a 1998 nationally 
representative survey of students and school personnel in 294 public middle schools and high 
schools, the authors used multivariate regression techniques and found that principals in schools 
with higher proportions of Black students were more likely to report using punitive disciplinary 
styles. Next, the authors considered the influence of differential student behavior by controlling 
for student reports of delinquency and teacher reports of school safety, and their findings suggest 
that students in schools serving high concentrations of Black students are subject to stricter 
discipline measures despite similarly safe and orderly environments. The weakness here, of 
course, is that the study is based on self-reports of disciplinary strategies rather than on actual 
disciplinary outcomes. Moreover, the data are all school-level and do not indicate whether Black 
students themselves are punished more severely or more frequently.  
The studies discussed up to this point do not provide much information related to the 
causes of the observed disproportionalities. The disproportionalities may be due to more frequent 
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misbehavior by Black students or a greater willingness of school staff to refer these students to 
the office for subjective offenses. While many of the studies described in the previous section 
utilized student-level data, other researchers have advanced the field by using infraction- and 
referral-level data to further analyze the disciplinary outcomes for certain infraction types.  
Russell Skiba and a variety of colleagues have published studies that assess the drivers of 
actual racial disparities in discipline. First of all, Skiba et al. (2002) used student-level data on 
more than 11,000 students from 19 middle schools in one of the largest U.S. school districts in 
1994-95 to explore what factors drive discipline disproportionalities. While this analysis did not 
consider the variation in disciplinary strictness between schools, the authors did pay attention to 
infraction type and assessed whether differential bad behavior might play a role by analyzing the 
reasons for the disciplinary referrals. Specifically, the authors found that White students were 
more likely to be referred to the office for objective infractions such as smoking or vandalism 
while Black students were more likely to be referred for more subjective offenses such as 
disrespect and noise. Thus, the authors concluded that the observed disproportionalities are not 
due to more “serious” or “disruptive” behavior by Black students, but rather to the higher rate of 
referrals for these subjective infractions (Skiba, 2002, p. 335). 
Skiba et al. (2011) investigated the issue more deeply using student-infraction-level data 
from 364 elementary and middle schools across the United States using School-wide Positive 
Behavior Supports in 2005-06. Using logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression, the 
authors found that (1) Black students were more likely than White students to be referred to the 
office for a large variety of disciplinary infractions, and that (2) for the same referred infractions, 
Black students in all grades were significantly more likely to be given out-of-school suspension 
or even expulsion. Thus, even after accounting for the reported infraction type, Black students 
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were more likely to be given exclusionary discipline. The main limitation in this analysis is that 
there is no control for school fixed effects; so, we do not know if the disparate strictness is 
occurring within or between schools. 
 Next, Skiba et al. (2014) used Hierarchical Linear Modeling to predict punishment as a 
function of infraction type and incorporated a third level to the model by incorporating school 
characteristics. Using information from all students in the disciplinary database in a single 
Midwestern state in 2007-08, the authors found that the odds of being suspended or expelled 
were predictably influenced by the severity of the infraction. Importantly, even after controlling 
for the infraction, Black students remained more likely to be given out-of-school suspensions, 
but were no more likely to be expelled. This analysis extends beyond the prior work due to the 
inclusion of level three, in which school-level characteristics, such as student race and poverty 
and the principal’s attitude toward discipline, are incorporated into the model. When these school 
level variables are included, the race of the individual student was no longer significant; school-
level variables, including the concentration of Black students in the school, drove the severity of 
the punishments allocated. Thus, these results are consistent with the “racial threat hypothesis” in 
schools suggested by Welch and Payne (2010). One potential weakness of the Skiba et al. (2014) 
study is the setting and context – the data represent a single year in a single U.S. state that serves 
relatively few FRL-eligible students (fewer than 40%) and very few Black students (8%). Our 
current study expands on this work by incorporating seven years of student-level panel data in a 
state that contains a more diverse population (21% Black, 12% Hispanic, and 61% FRL as of 
2014-15). 
 Overall, evidence indicates there are racial disparities with respect to exclusionary 
discipline outcomes. Indeed, the Office for Civil Rights has recently demonstrated nationwide 
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racial disparities in rates of suspensions and expulsions, and moreover, a couple of recent studies 
have concluded that Black students have been given disproportionate consequences for the 
infraction committed. However, it is still not clear whether in most cases, this disparity is due to 
students being treated differently within the same school or to the fact that Black students attend 
systematically different schools where the disciplinary practices are abnormally strict. To date, 
the most thorough assessment of the extent to which non-White students are more severely 
punished for similar disciplinary referrals, considering also whether these disparities occur 
within certain types of schools, has been published by Skiba et al. (2014).  
Thus, although questions surrounding the sources of disciplinary disparities are critically 
important, the best evidence to date comes from a single school year in a single state serving 
relatively few FRL-eligible and Black students. Therefore, we believe it is valuable to conduct 
such analyses in additional settings, ideally with greater levels of student diversity and a longer 
study period. Our current study expands on previous work by accounting for specific infraction 
information (type, frequency, etc.) and school-level fixed effects whenever possible, using 
multiple years of data within a single U.S. state serving a student population that is 
approximately 61% low-income (FRL eligible), 21% Black, and 12% Hispanic. 
Data and Sample 
Arkansas Student Sample 
First, it is important to show whether the patterns in the Arkansas data utilized in this 
study mirror the OCR data mentioned previously. In Table 1, we calculate the percentage of 
students in various subgroups, the percentage of students who received OSS at least once who 
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were in these subgroups, and the percentage of students who were expelled in these subgroups.1 
The odds of a student in a given subgroup being in a consequence category (e.g. expelled) is the 
percentage of expelled students in that group divided by the percentage of total students in that 
group. For example, White students represent 65% of students in the state of Arkansas, and 38% 
of students receiving OSS, so the odds ratio is equal to (0.38/0.65) or approximately 0.58. Odds 
of less than one indicate that a certain group is underrepresented in a certain category, relative to 
their prevalence in the state, and odds of greater than one indicate that a certain group is 
overrepresented in a certain category. 
Then, we calculate disparities (relative odds) between groups, which can be compared 
across different subgroups. In terms of the disparities for Black students, relative to White 
students, the Arkansas disparities are larger than the nationwide disparities for OSS, but smaller 
for expulsions. We can also see that, overall, the Black-White disparities are much larger than 
any other disparities, including those for special education students relative to non-special 
education students. In both the OCR data (nationally) and the Arkansas data, the odds indicate 
that Hispanic students and English language learners are somewhat underrepresented in these 
types of exclusionary discipline practices. Comparing the relative odds of Hispanic students to 
White students, however, Hispanics students are still over-represented relative to White students, 
at least in the OCR data. Arkansas Hispanic students are actually under-represented relative to 
White students in terms of expulsions (disparity = 0.76). 
The Arkansas and OCR disparities are compared by simply subtracting the disparities 
                                                 
1 We report differences between Black and White students, Hispanic and White students, ELL 
and non-ELL students, special education and regular education students. The Office for Civil 
Rights does not report disciplinary rates for FRL and non-FRL students separately, and the 
Arkansas dataset we used did not include gender, so those differences are not reported here. 
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(like a simple difference-in-difference). These indicate that the ELL/non-ELL disparities are 
quite similar, and that the Hispanic-White disparities are smaller in Arkansas than the nation. 
The Black-White disparities in OSS are larger in Arkansas than the nation, and Black-White 
disparities in expulsion are smaller in Arkansas than the nation. While Arkansas is only one of 
50 states in the United States, these data indicate that, with the exception of the Hispanic-White 
disparities in expulsion, the pattern of disparities in Arkansas are generally similar to those in the 
nation as a whole. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The study uses seven years of de-identified demographic and disciplinary data from all 
K-12 schools in Arkansas provided by the Arkansas Department of Education (2008-09 through 
2014-15). Student demographic data include race, grade, special education status, limited 
English proficiency (LEP) status, and free-and-reduced-lunch (FRL) eligibility. Discipline data 
include indicators for 19 infraction types and 13 consequence types, the date of the infraction, 
and the length of the consequence. To simplify the analysis, we collapse infractions involving 
handguns, rifles, and shotguns into a single category, resulting in 17 distinct categories. The 13 
consequence categories are collapsed into 7 (in school suspension (ISS), OSS, expulsion, referral 
to an alternative learning environment (ALE), corporal punishment, no action, and “other”).2 
                                                 
2 Our measure of out-of-school suspension includes two separately reported OSS types: Out-of-
School Suspension (when the incident did not result in physical injury) and Out-of-School 
Suspension (when the incident did result in physical injury). Our measure of expulsion includes 
five separately reported expulsion types: Expelled, Expelled for Weapons (as defined by Federal, 
State, and Student Discipline Policy), Expelled for Drugs (does not include alcohol or tobacco), 
Expelled for dangerousness (the incident did not result in physical injury), and Expelled for 
dangerousness (the incident resulted in physical injury). Our measure of ALE referrals includes 
two separately reported consequence types: Alternative Learning Environment (full year) and 







Comparison of Arkansas and National Office for Civil Rights (OCR) Data 
 
Note: ELL = English language learner. FRL = Free-and reduced price lunch eligible. Percentages reflect the number of students 
receiving OSS or expulsion at least once in a school year that are within a certain subgroup. Odds are the percent of students in a 
subgroup suspended or expelled divided by the subgroup’s proportion of enrollment. Odds indicate over- (> 1) or under-representation 
(< 1). Disparities (relative odds) are the odds for one group divided by the odds for another. These indicate over- (disparities > 1) or 
under-representation (disparities < 1) relative to another group. The Arkansas-OCR Diff-in-Diff is an AR disparity less the 
corresponding OCR disparity and represents whether the AR disparities are higher or lower than the OCR disparities. 
a Special-education students include those with an IEP, under the IDEA. Does not include handicapped students under Section 504. 






















% Enrollment 93% 7% 89% 11% 40% 60%
% Stud. Receiving OSS 96% 1.03 4% 0.57 0.55 81% 0.91 19% 1.69 1.85 21% 0.52 79% 1.32 2.52
% Stud. Expelled 96% 1.03 4% 0.55 0.53 81% 0.91 19% 1.76 1.94 21% 0.53 79% 1.31 2.48
% Enrollment 90% 10% 88% 12% N/A N/A
% Stud. Receiving OSS 94% 1.04 6% 0.60 0.57 78% 0.89 22% 1.83 2.07 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
% Stud. Expelled 95% 1.06 5% 0.50 0.47 81% 0.92 19% 1.58 1.72 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
% Stud. Receiving OSS -0.03 -0.22 N/A
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% Stud. Receiving OSS 38% 0.58 54% 2.53 4.32 38% 0.58 6% 0.61 1.05
% Stud. Expelled 48% 0.75 44% 2.06 2.75 48% 0.75 6% 0.57 0.76
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% Stud. Receiving OSS 35% 0.67 38% 2.38 3.56 35% 0.67 22% 0.91 1.37
% Stud. Expelled 36% 0.70 36% 2.25 3.20 36% 0.70 22% 0.90 1.28
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% Stud. Expelled -0.46 -0.53
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A couple of these consequence types are worth elaborating on. An alternative learning 
environment is an “an alternate class or program within a public school or school district that 
affords all students an environment that seeks to eliminate barriers to learning for any student 
whose academic and social progress is negatively affected by the student's personal 
characteristics or situation” (AR Code § 6-48-104). 
While the use of corporal punishment in schools is on the decline in the United States, as 
of 2017, it was still legal in 19 U.S. states, primarily in the South, Southwest, and Midwest 
(Langille, 2017). In Arkansas, school districts may use corporal punishment as long as the 
discipline policy includes “provisions for administration of the punishment, including that it be 
administered only for cause, be reasonable, follow warnings that the misbehavior will not be 
tolerated, and be administered by a teacher or a school administrator and only in the presence of 
a school administrator or his or her designee, who shall be a teacher or an administrator 
employed by the school district” (AR Code § 6-18-503). As long as corporal punishment is 
administered in “substantial compliance” with the district’s written policy, teachers and 
administrators who administer corporal punishment are immune from civil liability (AR Code § 
6-17-112). Each school district is responsible for collecting documentation that the discipline 
policy was received by all parents and students (AR Code § 6-18-502), and many school districts 
allow parents to opt-out for their child. Many schools in the state no longer use corporal 
punishment, with small, rural school districts most likely to continue this practice. The 
commissioner of the Department of Education has referred to it as a “local control issue” 
(Caputo, 2017). 
The unit of analysis is the student-infraction level, so students can and often do have 
multiple observations within the same year. After removing duplicate entries (same student, 
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discipline date, infraction type, consequence type, etc.), 1,243,555 total observations remain over 
the seven-year period. These observations were recorded for 240,999 individual students, which 
would represent about 35% of the individual students expected to attend Arkansas schools during 
this time period (thus, the other 65% of students in the state’s public schools received no 
disciplinary referrals or consequences during this time period.) The breakdown by infraction and 
consequence, by year, can be seen in Tables 2 and 3. The vast majority of infractions (79.4%) are 
relatively subjective consequences such as disorderly conduct (29.7%), “other” infractions not 
specified in these categories (24.9%), and insubordination (24.7%). While there is not a clear 
definition of these terms set by the state, disorderly conduct and insubordination are subjective, 
catch-all type categories. Disorderly conduct could be used for any kind of disruption such as 
acting out in class, excessive noise, or running through the hallways, and insubordination is 
typically thought of as refusal to follow directions from a teacher or administrator. 
Table 3 shows the trends in the reported types of disciplinary consequences. We consider 
OSS, expulsion, and referrals to an Alternative Learning Environment as exclusionary, given that 
they remove a student from the traditional learning environment, and in the case of expulsions 
and ALE, for long periods of time. ISS is considered non-exclusionary as the student remains in 
the school building, continues to receive assignments from their regularly assigned teacher, and 
then returns to the same classroom after a relatively short period (generally one to two days). 
Over the past seven years, there has been a decrease in exclusionary discipline as a proportion of 
total infractions (about 25% in 2008-09 compared to only about 19% in 2014-15), but much of 
this drop is due to large increases in the use of “other” non-specified consequences. While we 
have concerns about the uncertainty within this “other” non-specified category, the vast majority 
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of these “other” non-specified outcomes are non-exclusionary.3 Expulsions and no actions are 
consistently rare, and ISS was the largest category in each year, until 2014-15, in which the 
“other” (non-specified) category was the most common. The number of incidences of the “other” 
(non-specified) consequence category grew by over 300% between 2008-09 and 2014-15. 
To simplify interpretation of the infraction categories, we create categories based on the 
type and length of consequences typically received for each infraction type. Table 4 indicates the 
percentage of incidences of each infraction type that result in exclusionary discipline (expulsion, 
OSS, or referral to an ALE), as well as the number of days of exclusionary discipline that 
typically result (the mean number of days of exclusionary discipline administered for each 
infraction type, if a non-zero number of days was reported). To group these infractions, as in 
Table 4, we consider, simultaneously, the percentage of incidences of that infraction type that 
result in exclusionary discipline, as well as the typical number of days of exclusionary discipline 
that results. At the same time, we consider infractions that are similar in nature (for example, 
substances that are not only illegal to have at school, but also illegal for even 18 year olds, such 
as drugs and alcohol, are somewhat different than tobacco and grouped as such).4 The distinction 
between “major” and “minor” non-violent offenses, for example, is primarily based on the 
likelihood of each offense resulting in exclusionary discipline; there is a break in the pattern 
where the three “major” non-violent offenses result in the student being excluded approximately 
30% of the time while “minor” offenses lead to exclusionary discipline around 20% of the time. 
                                                 
3 Conversations with the Arkansas Department of Education Assistant Commissioner for 
Research and Technology, Eric Saunders, indicates that the majority of these other consequences 
are detentions, bus suspensions, parent/guardian conferences, Saturday school, or warnings. 
4 It is also possible that the typical punishments for drugs and alcohol are more likely to be 
similar in a state like Arkansas, where about 33% of the population report being Baptist, relative 
to a U.S. average of about 15% (Pew Research Center, 2015). It is possible that in heavily 







Infraction Types, By Year from 2008-09 to 2014-15 (Arkansas)  
 
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Total % of Total
Disorderly Conduct 54,641   51,027   48,765   51,539   42,575   57,750   63,533   369,830    29.7%
Other 31,871   28,639   26,481   31,858   35,024   60,600   95,733   310,206    24.9%
Insubordination 47,273   46,151   45,765   38,798   34,759   43,068   51,200   307,014    24.7%
Fighting 12,378   12,456   12,471   12,136   12,434   13,128   14,576   89,579      7.2%
Truancy 9,968     11,834   11,734   10,465   9,407     12,914   14,987   81,309      6.5%
Bullying 3,455     4,099     4,363     4,483     4,515     5,496     5,856     32,267      2.6%
Tobacco 2,218     2,253     1,973     1,920     1,977     2,482     2,837     15,660      1.3%
Student Assault 1,856     1,820     1,615     1,645     2,007     2,153     2,232     13,328      1.1%
Drugs 944        996        954        1,146     1,259     1,295     1,511     8,105        0.7%
Vandalism 962        833        909        689        736        1,084     1,087     6,300        0.5%
Knife 401        419        384        396        443        532        497        3,072        0.2%
Staff Assault 292        312        277        314        354        350        487        2,386        0.2%
Alcohol 294        299        325        289        309        353        416        2,285        0.2%
Gangs 361        339        177        107        131        103        113        1,331        0.1%
Explosives 49          57          60          50          42          53          40          351           0.0%
Club 21          21          49          45          42          53          57          288           0.0%
Guns 38          18          32          26          35          33          62          244           0.0%
Total 167,022 161,573 156,334 155,906 146,049 201,447 255,224 1,243,555 100.0%





Consequence Types, By Year from 2008-09 to 2014-15 (Arkansas)
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Total %
Exlusionary Discipline
Out-of-School Suspension 41,348   39,613   36,780   37,791   40,233   42,290   47,853   285,908    23.0%
ALE 918        794        621        253        317        586        538        4,027        0.3%
Expulsion 135        322        193        95          200        249        165        1,359        0.1%
Total Exclusionary 42,401   40,729   37,594   38,139   40,750   43,125   48,556   291,294    23.4%
% of Annual Total 25.4% 25.2% 24.0% 24.5% 27.9% 21.4% 19.0% 23.4% 23.4%
Non-Exclusionary Discipline
In-School Suspension 63,018   64,760   60,052   62,532   63,019   74,169   92,084   479,634    38.6%
Other 23,120   23,858   27,600   26,482   21,850   62,972   92,865   278,747    22.4%
Corporal Punishment 36,484   30,732   29,311   27,760   19,142   19,746   19,571   182,746    14.7%
No Action 1,999     1,494     1,777     993        1,288     1,435     2,148     11,134      0.9%
Total Non-Exclusionary 124,621 120,844 118,740 117,767 105,299 158,322 206,668 952,261    76.6%
% of Annual Total 74.6% 74.8% 76.0% 75.5% 72.1% 78.6% 81.0% 76.6% 76.6%
Total 167,022 161,573 156,334 155,906 146,049 201,447 255,224 1,243,555 100.0%






Category Groups (Based on Percent Exclusionary and Typical Exclusion Days 
 
Note. The typical number of days is the mean number of days of exclusionary discipline 
administered for each infraction type, if a non-zero number of days was reported. 
 
Interestingly, in Table 4, we see that exclusionary discipline is not even used in all gun 
infractions. While expulsion is allowed for any student who brings a firearm or other weapon to 
school, the superintendent also has discretion to modify this requirement on a case-by-case basis, 
which appears to be happening in over 20% of gun-related incidents (AR Code § 6-18-507, 
2015). The ability for school district leaders to adjust consequences on a case-by-case basis is 
% Resulting in 
Exclusionary 
Discipline
Typical Number of 
Days of Exclusion
Guns 77.5 11.8
Drugs and Alcohol 87.8 8.8
Drugs 88.2 9.0
Alcohol 86.4 8.0
Major Violence/Weapons 75.1 5.2
Club 83.0 4.0
Knife 74.9 5.8
Staff Assault 74.4 4.7
Minor Violence/Weapons 59.3 3.6
Gangs 63.6 5.4
Fighting 60.8 3.5
Student Assault 49.2 3.9
Explosives 47.6 4.5




Minor Non-Violent 19.2 3.2






perhaps further evidence that there are opportunities for disproportionalities in discipline 
outcomes to occur, even for infraction types in which we expect near universal exclusion. Table 
4 simply presents the typical punishment (the average number of days, if a non-zero number of 
days was reported), but within each category, there may be variation in the type and length of 
punishment. For example, the average “explosive” incident may be considered “minor” if these 
are primarily made up of infractions such as bringing fireworks to school, rather than actually 
attempting an attack with a more dangerous explosive such as a bomb. 
 The state only codes certain types of infractions and consequences, so some categories 
used at a local level are coded as “other” at the state level. As a result, a large number of cases 
can be coded as “other” in either the infraction committed, the consequence received, or both. In 
the next section, we describe the analytic methods we employ to analyze these data and examine 
any possible disparities in disciplinary practices.  
Analytic Methods 
In our straightforward descriptive analyses presented in the previous section, we have 
described how frequently students of various subgroups are cited for various types of infractions, 
as well as how frequently students in these subgroups receive various types of consequences. 
Next, we use logistic regression and aggregated residual techniques to address our three primary 
research questions. 
Research Question 1: Across the state, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use 
of exclusionary discipline for non-White students, low-income students, special 
education students, or English language learners? 
 We begin by testing whether students of various subgroups are more or less likely to 
receive exclusionary discipline, controlling for the type of infraction committed. We first analyze 
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these disparities at a state level. Any disparities we find at this level could be due to differences 
across districts or schools, within district, or within school. We utilize logistic regression to 
predict whether certain types of students are more likely to receive exclusionary discipline 
(expulsion, OSS, or referral to an ALE), rather than another consequence (ISS, corporal 
punishment, no action, or other). The unit of analysis is the individual infraction level (there may 
be multiple observations, per student, per year). Whether or not a student receives exclusionary 
discipline ( 	for a particular disciplinary incident, i, is defined as: 
																			
1	 	 ∗ 0
0	 	 ∗ 0
       
∗                           
Where  is a vector of the student-level demographic indicators (some combination of 
race, FRL-eligibility, special education status, and LEP-status)5 for the student associated with 
the incident, i,  is a vector of 7 infraction categories, grouped by severity as in Table 4, 
 is a vector of indicators for whether the infraction was the first, second, third, etc., for 
that student that year (a total of 10 indicators for 1-9 and 10 or more),  is a vector of 
school-year indicators, and  is the infraction-level idiosyncratic error (clustered at the student 
level). 
 In this first analysis, no school-level indicators or covariates are included, so it is 
considered a model of state-wide racial or other disparities in disciplinary outcomes, conditional 
on similar infraction types, infraction history, grade level, and in some cases, other student 
demographic characteristics. 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, we do not have data on family structure (single-parent, two-parent, or other). 
FRL-eligibility serves as a rough proxy for socio-economic status and family background. 
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Research Question 2: Within schools, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use 
of exclusionary discipline for non-White students, low-income students, special 
education students, or English language learners? 
 Next, we seek to understand the disparities within schools, rather than across schools. We 
utilize similar logistic regression as in Research Question 1, but with the addition of school fixed 
effects. This within-school analytic strategy is motivated Anderson and Ritter’s (2017) work 
finding that most of the disparities in the length of punishments (e.g. number of days of 
suspensions) at the state level diminish when school fixed effects are included, indicating that 
most of the disparities are across schools rather than within schools. If, in the current study, the 
disparities diminish when school fixed effects are included in our models, this would indicate 
that a great deal of the variation exists between schools. Thus, we also ask question three which 
seeks to disentangle the particular school characteristics driving these differences. 
Research Question 3: What school characteristics are associated with harsher (longer) 
disciplinary consequences? 
 To address whether certain types of schools are more likely to assign disproportionately 
long punishments for similar types of infractions, we use a two-stage residuals analysis 
approach.6 In the first stage, we predict the number of days of exclusionary discipline as a 
function of information related to the reported infraction that could reasonably predict the type or 
length of consequence received, as well as the cumulative number of reported infractions 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, we could have used hierarchical linear modelling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), 
but this two-stage residuals approach was chosen for ease of interpretation. This analysis is 
similar in concept to the two-step aggregated residuals approach used to calculate teacher value-
added (Ehlert, Koedel, Parsons, & Podgursky, 2014). It is intended to partial out the effect of 
factors that would justifiably predict the severity of a consequence, prior to estimating how 
school-level factors influence severity.  
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associated with that student during the same school year. In this first stage, we do not include 
any student demographic information other than grade level, which could justifiably be 
associated with the type or severity of consequence used. Our first stage model utilizes ordinary 
least squares regression, with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the student level 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Huber, 1967; Rogers, 1993; White, 1980). The first stage model is: 
 
Where i indexes at the incident level,  is the total number of days of 
punishment,  is a vector of infraction categories, which can be defined two ways (using 
all 17 categories, or our 7 infraction types, grouped generally by severity),  is a vector 
of indicators for whether the infraction was the first, second, third, etc., for that student that year 
(a total of 10 indicators for 1-9 and 10 or more),  is a vector of school-year indicators, 
 is a vector of grade-level indicators, and  is the infraction-level idiosyncratic 
error (clustered at the student level). In our primary model, we focus on days of exclusionary 
discipline (expulsion, OSS, or referral to an ALE) associated with a given infraction, with all 
other consequence types coded as zero days7. 
These residuals generated by the OLS model are then averaged at a school-by-year level 
to produce a measure of whether a school, on average, meted out longer punishments (residuals 
greater than 0) or shorter punishments (residuals less than 0), relative to the state average, for a 
similar type of infraction and for a student in the same grade with a similar number of past 
disciplinary infractions. We refer to this average school-level residual as the School Severity 
Index (SSI). The school-by-year SSI values are estimated using a school-level random effects 
                                                 
7 Days of exclusion were at most 365 days. The average expulsion was 18.4 days, the average 
OSS was 3.3 days, and the average ALE was 10.6 days.  
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model, which shrinks the estimates towards zero for schools with relatively few observations. 
Schools with positive SSI values tend to give out longer punishments, and schools with negative 
SSI values tend to give out shorter punishments, relative to the state average for similar 
infraction observations. 
In the second stage, we predict the SSI as a function of school-level demographic 
characteristics to assess which school characteristics are associated with disciplinary practices: 
 
Where s indexes at the school level, and t represents years of our panel.  is a vector of 
school-by-year level characteristics (log of enrollment, an indicator for region, an indicator for 
open-enrollment charter schools, indicators for elementary, middle, high school, or other school 
grade-level types, and the percent of the student population that is FRL-eligible, of a certain race, 
receiving special education services, LEP, or gifted and talented),  is a vector of school-
year indicators, which accounts for time trends across schools, and  is the school-by-year 
idiosyncratic error. 
 Next, we present our findings, beginning with some brief descriptive statistics and 
ultimately walking through the results of each of three research questions. 
Results 
Initial descriptive analyses focused on the frequency of consequence and infraction types 
for different subgroups of students. In Figure 1, it is easy to see that non-White students are 
disproportionately receiving all types of consequences. On average, each year, there are 29.6 in-
school suspensions for every 100 Black students, but only 9.9 in-school suspensions for every 
100 White students. Each year, there are 24.6 out-of-school suspensions for every 100 Black 
students, but only 4.3 for every 100 White students. Thus, a ratio-based measure of the Black-
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White disparity in ISS indicates that Black students are about three times as likely to receive 
OSS as White students (29.6 divided by 9.9). For other consequence types such as referrals to 
ALE, this ratio is about 9.5 times, or for OSS, 5.7 times. 
Figure 1. Disciplinary Consequences by Racial Subgroup (Annual Incidences per 100 Students, 
2008-09 to 2014-15) 
 
Looking just at the disparities in Figure 1, one might come to the quick conclusion that 
students are being treated unfairly, but it is also important to connect consequences to the 
infractions for which the students were referred. Thus, we next consider whether there are 
disparate rates of referrals for certain types of infractions, and indeed, we see that there are 
disproportionalities at this level. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that disparities 
may still exist conditional on infraction type, which we address with Research Questions 1 and 2. 
First, a key take-away point from Figure 2 is that the vast majority (almost 80%) of 
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second point is that Black students are three times more likely than White students to be referred 
for misbehavior but are nearly six times more likely to be given out-of-school suspensions (24.6 
versus 4.3 incidences per 100 students, in Figure 1). These data indicate that Black students are 
being referred for discipline more often, but this only accounts for about half the difference in 
the rate of out-of-school suspensions. Our analyses in the next section, using logistic regression 
to examine incident-level data, helps us to identify more clearly whether there are disparities that 
still exist conditional on students’ reported behavior.
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Research Question 1: Across schools in Arkansas, what, if any, disproportionalities 
exist in the use of exclusionary discipline for non-White students, low-income students, 
special education students, or English language learners? 
 Logistic regression is used to determine the disparities in the likelihood of exclusionary 
discipline, controlling for the type of infraction committed, and the infraction history and grade 
level of the student. No school-level factors are taken into account, so this model indicates the 
extent to which different subgroups of students across the state are disproportionately exposed to 
exclusionary practices. Any differences by subgroup we find at this level could be due to 
differences at a variety of levels (across districts or schools, within district, or within school). 
Relative risk ratios from several logistic regressions are indicated in Table 5. It is 
important to note that all models in Table 5, using infraction-level disciplinary data, are 
conditional on a student being referred for some infraction, so even without controlling for 
infraction, we can see that, holding constant that a student was referred for any misbehavior, we 
get a better picture of disciplinary disparities than by just comparing raw numbers of suspensions 
and expulsions as in Figures 1 and 2. In columns 1-3 of Table 5, we present the results of 
relatively naïve models that are contingent only upon the student being referred for some 
disciplinary infraction, but without accounting for infraction type. The primary results, based on 
models in which we control for the type of infraction committed and for the number of 
infractions committed by the student during the school year, are presented in columns 4-8.  
If disciplinary consequences were handed out evenly across various subgroups of 
students, we would expect to see relative risk ratios for each indicator (e.g. Black) equal to one. 
The results in column 4 of Table 5 indicate that Black students are almost 2.5 times as likely to 
receive exclusionary discipline as their White peers in the same grade for similar types of 
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infractions, with a similar number of previous infractions that year. Hispanic students as well as 
other non-White students are somewhat less likely than their White peers to receive exclusionary 
discipline. These figures may represent a lower bound of the actual racial disparities in 
punishments, as they focus only on the instances of students being assigned to exclusionary  
discipline, but ignore possibly larger disparities in the number of days punished per suspension.  
Looking at columns 5, 6, and 7 of Table 5, instead of testing disproportionalities in 
exclusionary discipline using race indicators, we use other indicators of a student’s 
disadvantaged status (FRL-eligibility, Special Education status, or English proficiency). FRL-
elgible students are about 1.5 times as likely as their non FRL-eligible peers in the state to 
receive exclusionary discipline. Special education students are slightly more likely to receive 
exclusionary discipline, and LEP students are about half as likely to receive exclusionary 
discipline. The model in Column 8 includes the full combination of control variables. 
The racial disparities, indicated by the relative risk ratios on Black, Hispanic, and other 
non-White groups, are similar between columns 1 and 4 and columns 3 and 8. Also, the 
disparities based on FRL-status are similar between columns 2 and 5. This result indicates the 
racial disparities in exclusionary discipline are not driven solely by the types of infractions 
reported. While infraction type, controlled for in columns 4-8, helps explain whether a student 
receives exclusionary disipline (higher pseudo R-squared), the relative risk ratios for various 
racial groups do not decline much with the inclusion of infraction-type controls. The stability of 
these results gives us some confidence in our first key finding, that Black students are more than 
twice as likely to receive exclusionary discipline after referral for the same infraction types.8 
                                                 
8 While the pseudo R-squared values are somewhat low, they are not equivalent to the R-squared 
found in OLS regression, so while higher values represent better model fit, they cannot be 








Note: Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the student level. 
Baseline infraction category is Minor Non-Violent Infractions. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                                 
squared value is McFadden’s R-squared, which is equivalent to 1 minus the ratio of the log 
likelihood of the full model to the log likelihood of a simple intercept model (Institution for 
Digital Research and Education, 2011). 
(1) (2) (3)
Black 2.215 *** 2.132 ***
(0.021) (0.020)
Hispanic 0.795 *** 0.838 ***
(0.016) (0.022)
Other Minority 0.854 *** 0.878 ***
(0.033) (0.035)
FRL-Eligible 1.475 *** 1.224 ***
(0.014) (0.012)










School Year and Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y
Infraction Order Indicators
Constant 0.351 *** 0.363 *** 0.297 ***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.061)
Observations 1,243,555 1,243,555 1,243,555
Wald Chi-Squared 11,571      5,645     12,146   
Num. of Clusters (Students) 240,999    240,999 240,999 




Table 5, Cont’d 
 




Note: Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the student level. 
Baseline infraction category is Minor Non-Violent Infractions. 




(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Black 2.471 *** 2.378 ***
(0.024) (0.023)
Hispanic 0.888 *** 0.897 ***
(0.017) (0.023)
Other Minority 0.912 ** 0.920 **
(0.035) (0.036)
FRL-Eligible 1.518 *** 1.232 ***
(0.015) (0.012)
Special Education 1.068 *** 1.090 ***
(0.013) (0.013)
LEP 0.534 *** 0.922 **
(0.013) (0.031)
Guns 16.990 *** 16.270 *** 15.670 *** 15.760 *** 17.220 ***
(2.854) (2.621) (2.485) (2.502) (2.908)
Drugs & Alcohol 38.230 *** 29.200 *** 27.880 *** 28.610 *** 38.730 ***
(1.164) (0.885) (0.838) (0.866) (1.183)
Truancy 0.570 *** 0.517 *** 0.512 *** 0.524 *** 0.572 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Major Violence/Weapons 17.500 *** 14.810 *** 14.440 *** 14.510 *** 17.330 ***
(0.587) (0.487) (0.472) (0.477) (0.584)
Minor Violence/Weapons 6.545 *** 6.489 *** 6.500 *** 6.490 *** 6.521 ***
(0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.058)
Major Non-Violent 2.175 *** 1.898 *** 1.870 *** 1.859 *** 2.167 ***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025)
School Year and Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y
Infraction Order Indicators Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0.226 *** 0.240 *** 0.347 *** 0.348 *** 0.191 ***
(0.050) (0.053) (0.075) (0.075) (0.042)
Observations 1,243,555 1,243,555 1,243,555 1,243,555 1,243,555
Wald Chi-Squared 76,215   73,372   72,321   71,778   76,398   
Num. of Clusters (Students) 240,999 240,999 240,999 240,999 240,999 




The results for Research Question 1, discussed previously, are only representative of 
disparities in disciplinary outcomes across the state. It could be that most of these disparities only 
occur across schools, or it could be, instead, that disparities also exist within schools. In the next 
section, we utilize school fixed effects to assess what disproportionalties exist, if any, in 
disciplinary outcomes for students within the same schools. 
Research Question 2: Within schools, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use 
of exclusionary discipline for non-White students, low-income students, special 
education students, or English language learners? 
 In this section, logistic regression is again used to assess whether student demographic 
factors are associated with higher rates of exclusionary discipline, this time for students within 
the same schools. Relative risk ratios from several logistic regressions, all including school fixed 
effects, are indicated in Table 6. The results in column 1 indicate that Black students are only 
slightly more likely to receive exclusionary discipline, relative to their White peers within the 
same schools. Larger disparities can be seen based on whether the student is FRL-eligible 
(column 2) or receiving Special Education services (column 3). This result indicates, perhaps, the 
multiple tiers of privilege or disadvantage – that Black students are disproportionately exposed to 
exclusionary discipline as a function of the school that they attend, but that, within schools, other 
factors such as poverty or special education status influence the likelihood of a student receiving 
exclusionary consequences. 
The coefficients on the indicator for Black students are smaller in the school fixed effects 
models (indeed, in the fullest model, the odds ratio is not statistically different from one), relative 
to those in the models without school fixed effects, indicating that the racial disparities in 




within schools. Because these analyses revealed that the between-school differences are so 








Note: Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the student level. 
Baseline infraction category is Minor Non-Violent Infractions. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black 1.035 *** 1.007 
(0.011) (0.011)
Hispanic 0.935 *** 0.949 **
(0.016) (0.021)
Other Minority 1.011 1.023 
(0.033) (0.033)
FRL-Eligibile 1.165 *** 1.157 ***
(0.010) (0.011)
Special Education 1.191 *** 1.180 ***
(0.012) (0.012)
Limited English Proficient 0.910 *** 0.935 ***
(0.018) (0.024)
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y
Infraction Types Y Y Y Y Y
Infraction Order Indicators Y Y Y Y Y
School Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0.081 *** 0.071 *** 0.082 *** 0.082 *** 0.070 ***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021)
Observations 1,236,401 1,236,401 1,236,401 1,236,401 1,236,401
Number of Students 239,202  239,202  239,202  239,202  239,202  
Model Chi-Squared 132,531  132,473  131,941  132,507  132,333  





Research Question 3: What school characteristics are associated with harsher (longer) 
disciplinary consequences? 
 Since there are larger racial disparities across the state than within schools, it could be 
that there are differences in disciplinary policies and practices at the types of schools that serve 
large proportions of non-White students. We test this by creating a School Severity Index (SSI) 
for each school using the residuals from an infraction-level model predicting the length of 
exclusionary punishments. In this model, consequences other than exclusionary discipline (e.g. 
in-school suspension, corporal punishment, no action, or “other” actions) are coded as zero days 
of punishment, but are not removed from the model. The residuals are averaged at a school level 
to generate the school SSI: a positive SSI indicates that a school tends to give out longer (more 
exclusionary) punishments for similar types of infractions. A negative SSI indicates shorter (less 
exclusionary) punishments. These SSIs were created using school random effects to account for 
the noisy measures within schools with fewer disciplinary incidences by allocating greater 
weight to the schools with larger sample sizes and more precise measures. 
 The SSIs are then regressed on a variety of school-level characteristics. The results in 
Table 7 are based on SSIs created in the first-stage using the days of exclusionary punishment 
(OSS, expulsion, or referral to an ALE). All other (non-exclusionary) types of consequences are 
included as zero days. Importantly, the R-squared values in the models with the race percentage 
variables (columns 2, 3, 5, and 6) have about 2.5 times the predictive power of those without the 
race percentage variables (columns 1 and 4). Therefore, the racial breakdown of schools appears 
to be an important factor in explaining disciplinary outcomes within schools. The results here are 




of Black students had higher scores in the severity index and thus longer punishments; schools 
serving greater percentages of Hispanic students had lower scores.  
Other variables in Table 7 also appear to have significant relationships to the severity of 
punishment. Open-enrollment charter schools, all else equal, give out somewhat harsher 
punishments (an extra 0.4 to 1.3 days of punishment, per infraction, depending on the model). 
Importantly, the charter school coefficient is much lower in the models including controls for the 
school racial demographics than in the models without these variables. Open-enrollment charter 
schools in the state are primarily clustered in urban areas and serve a larger proportion of Black 
students (41%) than the state average (21%), and fewer White students (46%) than the state 
average (63%). Therefore, without controlling for these racial demographics, the charter school 
variable is confounded with racial demographics as well. It is possible that charter schools, 
conditional on student demographics, may use harsher punishments, if, for example, they focus 
on a so-called “no excuses” model as in the highly successful KIPP Charter Network (Arkansas 
had two locations in 2014-15, the last year in our dataset). In addition, evidence from Michigan 
indicates that students may seek out charter schools if they are already having disciplinary issues 
or other problems in the traditional public school district (Horn & Miron, 2000). 
The coefficients on the middle and high school indicators may be surprising. Based on 
these coefficients alone, middle schools and high schools appear to be administering relatively 
less severe consequences than elementary schools in the state, for the same types of infractions. 
While these coefficients are statistically significant, the magnitude is somewhat small (about 0.1 
days, per infraction). To understand this counterintuitive result, it is also important to note that 
the SSI is the average residual from a model predicting the severity (number of days) of a 




some ways, is already accounting for the increasing severity by grade-level, so we just treat these 
school-type variables as control variables. 
Table 7 
School Characteristics Associated with Harsher Punishments (Dep Var = School Severity Index 
Based on Days of Exclusionary Discipline, Units= Number of Days) 
 
 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1-3 use SSI created with all 17 infraction categories 
in the first stage. Models 4-6 use SSI created with the 7 infraction groups in the first stage. In the 
first stage, SSI were created using school random effects. Baseline school type is Elementary. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (School Enrollment) 0.144 *** -0.020 -0.079 *** 0.144 *** -0.021 -0.073 ***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
School % Black 1.392 *** 1.586 *** 1.377 *** 1.552 ***
(0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.045)
School % Hispanic -0.800 *** -0.658 ** -0.887 *** -0.761 ***
(0.266) (0.265) (0.266) (0.266)
School % Other Minority 1.716 *** 1.444 *** 1.762 *** 1.518 ***
(0.274) (0.275) (0.274) (0.276)
School % FRL 1.106 *** -0.554 *** 1.118 *** -0.499 ***
(0.064) (0.078) (0.064) (0.078)
School % Gifted and Talented 2.934 *** 2.093 *** 1.908 *** 2.925 *** 2.083 *** 1.919 ***
(0.185) (0.170) (0.172) (0.185) (0.170) (0.173)
School % Special Education -0.144 -0.112 -0.027 -0.178 -0.143 -0.064 
(0.168) (0.155) (0.154) (0.168) (0.155) (0.155)
School % LEP 0.410 *** 1.901 *** 2.116 *** 0.433 *** 2.012 *** 2.207 ***
(0.117) (0.308) (0.308) (0.116) (0.308) (0.309)
Open-Enrollment Charter 1.294 *** 0.541 *** 0.389 *** 1.292 *** 0.542 *** 0.408 ***
(0.088) (0.083) (0.086) (0.088) (0.083) (0.086)
Middle School -0.148 *** -0.085 *** -0.098 *** -0.145 *** -0.082 *** -0.094 ***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028)
High School -0.115 *** -0.057 ** -0.080 *** -0.115 *** -0.058 ** -0.079 ***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
Other School Type 0.680 *** 0.487 *** 0.431 *** 0.690 *** 0.500 *** 0.449 ***
(0.098) (0.091) (0.090) (0.098) (0.091) (0.091)
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant -1.771 *** -0.446 *** 0.195 -1.777 *** -0.434 *** 0.141 
(0.140) (0.106) (0.141) (0.140) (0.106) (0.141)
Observations 6,871 6,891 6,871 6,871 6,891 6,871




Robustness Checks  
As a robustness check, we estimated these SSI models (as in Table 7) excluding the log 
of school enrollment. The results are in Tables 8. In all cases, the coefficients on the racial 
groups in Table 8 are slightly smaller (or more negative) than those in Table 8, but generally, the 
estimated relationships in Tables 7 and 8are quite similar. 
In addition, we also conducted robustness checks using days of any type of punishment 
(not just exclusionary). The results for the primary variable of interest (school percent Black) are 
generally similar. There are some differences, however, in terms of the coefficients on the school 
percent Hispanic, which has a significantly negative relationship with SSI when created using 
only exclusionary discipline, but a non-significant relationship in terms of days of any type of 
consequence. This indicates that, all else equal, while there is no relationship between the 
proportion of Hispanic students and the length of any type of disciplinary consequence, it is the 
case that schools with a greater proportion of Hispanic students generally give out shorter 
exclusionary type punishments.  
There is a surprising result from the models that include a measure of the percent of 
students who are FRL-eligible as well as percent Black (columns 3 and 6 in Table 7). The 
coefficients on the school percent FRL are negative, despite the fact that the coefficients on FRL 
are positive in the models that do not control for percent Black (columns 1 and 4 in Table 7). 
This finding is likely due to significant correlation between the percentage of students who are 







School Characteristics Associated with Harsher Punishments (Dep Var = School Severity Index 
Based on Days of Exclusionary Discipline, Units= Number of Days) 
 
 
Note. Table corresponds to Table 7 but with exclusion of log of school enrollment as a covariate. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1-3 use SSI created with all 17 infraction categories in 
the first stage. Models 4-6 use SSI created with the 7 infraction groups in the first stage. In the 
first stage, SSI were created using school random effects. Baseline school type is Elementary. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
School % Black 1.388 *** 1.522 *** 1.373 *** 1.492 ***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042)
School % Hispanic -0.816 *** -0.745 *** -0.904 *** -0.841 ***
(0.265) (0.265) (0.266) (0.265)
School % Other Minority 1.677 *** 1.401 *** 1.722 *** 1.478 ***
(0.272) (0.275) (0.272) (0.276)
School % FRL 0.937 *** -0.403 *** 0.948 *** -0.359 ***
(0.060) (0.069) (0.060) (0.069)
School % Gifted and Talented 2.892 *** 2.093 *** 1.966 *** 2.883 *** 2.083 *** 1.973 ***
(0.186) (0.170) (0.172) (0.185) (0.170) (0.172)
School % Special Education -0.436 *** -0.061 0.110 -0.471 *** -0.090 0.063 
(0.165) (0.149) (0.151) (0.164) (0.149) (0.151)
School % LEP 0.619 *** 1.903 *** 2.064 *** 0.643 *** 2.014 *** 2.159 ***
(0.114) (0.308) (0.308) (0.114) (0.308) (0.309)
Open-Enrollment Charter 1.169 *** 0.559 *** 0.489 *** 1.166 *** 0.561 *** 0.500 ***
(0.087) (0.081) (0.083) (0.087) (0.081) (0.083)
Middle School -0.127 *** -0.089 *** -0.109 *** -0.124 *** -0.086 *** -0.105 ***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028)
High School -0.119 *** -0.058 ** -0.079 *** -0.119 *** -0.059 ** -0.077 ***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
Other School Type 0.673 *** 0.487 *** 0.447 *** 0.683 *** 0.500 *** 0.464 ***
(0.098) (0.091) (0.090) (0.098) (0.091) (0.091)
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant -0.793 *** -0.568 *** -0.356 *** -0.796 *** -0.559 *** -0.371 ***
(0.053) (0.037) (0.052) (0.052) (0.037) (0.052)
Observations 6,871 6,891 6,871 6,871 6,891 6,871




To further understand what is happening within schools in terms of both racial and 
economic demographics, we created indicators for four types of schools (Low-Income Mostly 
White, Low-Income Mostly non-White, Higher-Income Mostly White, and Higher-Income 
Mostly non-White). These four categories are based on whether a school is above or below the 
state average on two separate indicators (percent White and percent FRL). The state averages 
during the study period were about 65% White and about 60% FRL. The uneven distribution of 
observations across these groups, as in Table 9, reflects the relative presence of these types of 
schools in the state, in the sense that there are relatively few schools that are mostly-non-White 
and higher-income (8%), relative to the other three types. 
Table 9 
 
Distribution of Four School Types 
 
  Higher-Income Low-Income 
  <60% FRL 60%FRL 









According to the results in Table 10, it seems that the schools with more non-White 
students (regardless of whether those schools tend to be higher income or lower income), tend to 
administer harsher (longer) punishments than the baseline schools serving more White students 
and higher-income students. The first set of coefficients of interest indicates that schools serving 
more non-White students, who are also higher income, still receive an additional half a day 
(roughly) of exclusionary discipline, per infraction, relative to their peers in schools serving 
more White students. Similarly, the third set of coefficients of interest indicates that students in 
these relatively poor, relatively non-White schools, receive about 0.6 days of extra punishment, 




findings indicate that schools with more non-White students tend to give out longer punishments, 
regardless of the percentage of students receiving FRL in a school. 
Table 10 
 
School Characteristics Associated with Harsher Punishments (Dep Var = School Severity Index 
Based on Days of Exclusionary Discipline, Units= Number of Days) 
 
 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1-2 use SSI created with all 17 infraction categories 
in the first stage. Models 3-4 use SSI created with the 7 infraction groups in the first stage. In the 
first stage, SSI were created using school random effects. Baseline school type is Elementary. 
Baseline school type is schools serving <60%FRL and ≥65% White students. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (School Enrollment) 0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.000 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Schools serving <60%FRL, <65% White 0.479 *** 0.544 *** 0.471 *** 0.537 ***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
Schools serving ≥60%FRL, ≥65% White 0.033 0.009 0.042 0.019 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Schools serving ≥60%FRL, <65% White 0.624 *** 0.611 *** 0.619 *** 0.609 ***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026)
School % Gifted and Talented 2.235 *** 2.235 ***
(0.182) (0.182)
School % Special Education -0.270 -0.301 *
(0.165) (0.165)
School % LEP -0.062 -0.018 
(0.116) (0.116)
Open-Enrollment Charter 0.782 *** 0.599 *** 0.785 *** 0.604 ***
(0.088) (0.085) (0.088) (0.085)
Middle School -0.125 *** 0.015 -0.122 *** 0.017 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
High School -0.111 *** 0.013 -0.112 *** 0.011 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Other School Type 0.563 *** 0.526 *** 0.575 *** 0.534 ***
(0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095)
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y
Constant -0.396 *** -0.252 ** -0.404 *** -0.274 **
(0.123) (0.113) (0.123) (0.113)
Observations 6,891 6,892 6,891 6,892




One of the most interesting results, however, is that there were no significant differences 
between the length of punishments in wealthier and less wealthy schools, conditional on serving 
≥65% White students. This finding suggests that racial factors appear more important than 
income factors for predicting the severity of disciplinary consequences. This result is consistent 
with our earlier models (Table 7); the magnitude and sign on the race variable is mostly 
unchanged by the inclusion of the poverty variable in the model. On the other hand, the poverty 
result is very sensitive to the inclusion of the race variable. In Table 10, open-enrollment charter 
schools still appear to use more severe consequences (about an extra 0.6 to 0.8 days of 
punishment, per infraction). 
As an additional robustness check, we also created the SSI using days of any kind of 
punishment, rather than only the days of exclusionary discipline. The coefficients for each of the 
four school types in this additional model are nearly identical to the coefficients from the 
primary model reported in Table 10. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
There have been numerous studies over the past twenty years documenting the existence 
of racial disparities in disciplinary consequences. From this research base, we know, with some 
confidence, based on multiple studies across many years, that Black students are both referred 
for discipline more often and receive exclusionary disciplinary more often than other students 
(e.g. Skiba et al., 2002). Moreover, some more recent studies have suggested that Black students 
receive more severe and longer consequences than their peers, who have committed identical 
infractions (e.g. Skiba et al., 2002). Finally, based on a single recent study in a single state for a 
single year (Skiba et al., 2014), along with inferences we can draw from a 1998 survey and 




likely driven by differences between schools than by differential treatment of students within a 
given school.  
In this study, we aimed to build on this growing research base by analyzing all infraction-
level disciplinary data for every public school in Arkansas over a seven year time span. 
Consistent with earlier evidence, we found disproportionate use of exclusionary discipline for 
Black students, and we also found that these disparities are primarily due to differences in 
discipline practices across schools, rather than within schools. This result supports the important 
work of Skiba et al. (2014), and builds upon that work by providing analysis of an entire state 
over seven school years, rather than just one school year. 
When school fixed effects are not included, Black students are about 2.4 times as likely 
as their White peers in the state (in the same grade and with similar numbers of previous 
infractions) to receive exclusionary discipline for similar infraction types. Hispanic students are 
slightly less likely than their similar White peers in the state to receive exclusionary discipline. 
Importantly, the disparities are not only based on race. Depending on whether or not race was 
also controlled for, our results indicate that FRL students in the state are about 1.2 to 1.5 times as 
likely to receive exclusionary discipline as their non-FRL peers. 
 However, we conclude that most of the racial differences in rates of exclusionary 
discipline are across schools, because these racial disparities diminished greatly when school 
fixed effects were included. Within schools, Black students are only slightly more likely than 
White students to receive exclusionary discipline (relative risk ratio of 1.04, significant at the 
99% confidence level). Within schools, there still appear to be persistent gaps in the use of 
exclusionary discipline for FRL students and special education students (relative risk ratios of 




These results indicate that the large racial disparities tend to be across schools, and 
therefore a function of the types of schools that non-White students are likely to attend, whereas 
within schools, there may be larger concerns about disparities based on socio-economic status 
and special education status. Since the results indicate that the state-level racial disparities are 
likely a function of the school attended, we also tested which school-level factors were 
associated with a measure of school disciplinary severity (SSI), and found that the percent of the 
school that is Black or the percent of the school that is of another non-White, non-Black, non-
Hispanic group are both significant predictors of harsher (longer) consequences, which supports 
the idea that most of the racial disparities occur due to different disciplinary practices being used 
in districts/schools serving different racial compositions of students.  
When schools were split into four categories based on the proportions of FRL students 
and White students in the school, we found that schools serving more non-White students 
(regardless of the proportion of FRL students) administered longer punishments than schools 
serving mostly White and mostly non-FRL students. However, lower income, mostly White 
schools were actually quite similar to the higher income, mostly White schools, again indicating 
that differences in exclusionary practices across schools appear to be more driven by racial 
demographics than by income or poverty.  
Overall, then, there seem to be two broad conclusions from this work. First, non-White 
students are far more likely to receive exclusionary discipline for a given infraction than their 
White peers, and this disparity is driven by disciplinary practices employed at the schools non-
White students attend. Second, the differences by race are far more impactful than the 




Based on the analyses presented here, and on our interactions with state level 
policymakers, we believe there are two broad lessons for policymakers and school leaders, the 
first related to data transparency and the second to targeted reforms.  
First, we have uncovered patterns in disciplinary consequences that were previously not 
well known in the education community. Thus, we believe that a critical first step in creating 
positive change with regard to student discipline is broadly sharing discipline data with 
education stakeholders including staff, administration, families, and communities. For example, 
school leaders and state policymakers would benefit from reports that allow for comparisons of 
disciplinary practices and statistics across schools. Given that the disparities are primarily across 
schools and not within, school leaders may not be aware of a problem until they can compare 
their school to others in the state. When awareness of potential disparities is raised, school 
leaders may seek out more concrete programs or strategies to address such issues. It is possible 
that simply sharing data on school-level rates of exclusion may create awareness that serves as a 
catalyst for action within communities as well. Moreover, as Tatto et al. (2001) have shown, 
parental perceptions of unequal or overly strict disciplinary practices can undermine school 
culture. When policymakers and/or school leaders actively share discipline data, parents can be 
empowered to advocate for their children and work with school leaders to devise solutions. 
Second, the primary conclusion policymakers should draw from our analyses is that the 
clearest evidence of racial disparities in discipline occur across schools. That is, schools serving 
predominantly Black students impose more severe (longer) exclusionary consequences on 
students, even after controlling for the type of infraction. Thus, to address these disparities 
statewide, policymakers can focus on these particular schools which serve mostly Black students 




One strategy that policymakers might adopt would be to mandate reductions in 
suspensions – at least for minor non-violent infractions – in targeted schools. This sort of change 
could be impactful as nearly half (46%) of the infractions that lead to exclusionary discipline are 
minor, non-violent, and subjective. These infractions include disorderly conduct (~26%) and 
insubordination (~20%). In addition, it has been argued using OSS for truancy (another non-
violent offense which represents 3% of total infractions in our dataset) is hard to justify, as it 
further removes truant students from the learning environment (Smink & Heilbrunn, 2005; U.S. 
Departments of Education and Justice, 2014). Perhaps states might aim to eliminate these types 
of counterintuitive consequences. However, as I find in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, a state-
level policy eliminating the use of OSS for truancy was not implemented well and had very little 
impact on important school outcomes. Again, perhaps, this suggests the need for a more targeted 
approach, focusing on particular schools with the highest rates of OSS, and supplementing 
policies with programmatic interventions. 
It seems possible to address minor non-violent infractions with preventative or restorative 
alternatives to exclusionary discipline, if local school districts choose to do so. For example, 
there is some evidence that simply revising codes of conduct (or setting policies) to reduce the 
use of suspensions for minor offenses and limit the length of suspensions may be effective 
(Lacoe & Steinberg, 2016; Mader, Sartain, & Steinberg, 2016) and at little cost to school climate 
(Mader et al., 2016). 
Further, there are school-based interventions, some of which have been rigorously 
evaluated, designed to improve school climate and disciplinary outcomes. For example, there are 
non-experimental studies that find reductions in referrals or suspensions and expulsions with 




responding to behavioral issues as they arise (Fairbanks, Sugai, Guardino, & Lathrop, 2007). 
Another strategy, commonly known as restorative justice, is viewed as a movement to 
“institutionalize peaceful and non-punitive approaches for addressing harm” that in a school 
setting can serve as an alternative to exclusionary discipline (Fronius, Persson, Guckenberg, 
Hurley, & Petrosino, 2016). Essentially, restorative justice is a non-punitive approach to 
handling conflicts, but these programs can take the form of whole-school interventions or “add-
ons” to respond to specific situations (Fronius et al., 2016). Finally, School-Wide Positive 
Behavioral Interventions and Supports (SWPBIS a.k.a. PBIS) may be the most well-known 
behavioral intervention and, fortunately, has been subject to some rigorous evaluation. Indeed, 
there is some experimental evidence that indicates implementation of the PBIS framework 
improves student perceptions of school safety and test scores (Horner et al., 2009). Other non-
experimental studies have linked PBIS to fewer disciplinary incidents (Flannery, Fenning, Kato, 
& McIntosh, 2014; Freeman et al., 2015) and increased attendance (Freeman et al., 2015) in high 
schools implementing the framework with fidelity. As of June 2016, there are at least 49 
Arkansas schools implementing PBIS (Saarnio & Merten, 2016). 
While mandated reductions in exclusionary discipline may be appealing and are certainly 
simple, we have two reservations about this approach. First, it is possible that school leaders may 
respond to mandates superficially, by changing reporting patterns without substantially 
improving their disciplinary practices. For example, I find, in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, that 
when Arkansas prohibited OSS as a consequence for truancy, this policy was associated with a 
rise in “other” non-specified consequences for truancy, as well as “other” infractions. 




Our second reservation is that mandated reductions without any other supports are 
unlikely to be effective. In fact, evidence from Arkansas suggests that a reduction in OSS will 
likely not improve student achievement as measured by test scores (Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation), and that when the state eliminated OSS as a legal consequence for truancy, there 
was no policy-related change in school level outcomes such as test scores, attendance, and 
chronic absenteeism (Chapter 4 of this dissertation). I conclude that this second result was due, at 
least in part, to a lack of communication from the state to school leaders about the policy, a lack 
of accountability for compliance with the policy, and a lack of resources and capacity for schools 
with the greatest need to adequately respond. Front line educators in the schools need effective 
alternatives to exclusionary discipline if such mandates are put in place, and school culture is 
unlikely to improve if educators do not have the necessary capacity to respond to behavioral 
infractions. Thus, if state policymakers are to mandate reductions, they should also consider 
providing schools with access to more positive alternative disciplinary strategies.  
While we advocate for data transparency, we understand that there are limitations to the 
conclusions that should be drawn and there is a real potential for unintended consequences. First 
of all, it is not obvious that high numbers of disciplinary referrals and consequences are bad – or 
good. For example, a school with very few reported infractions may either be one with a great 
school climate, or one where administrators fail to address real problems related to student 
discipline. Thus, school context matters. Finally, according to Campbell’s (1979) Law, which 
states that “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the 
more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt 




data may have the unintended effect of encouraging school personnel to simply under-report or 
code disciplinary infractions and consequences in vague categories (such as “other”).  
We are not suggesting that policymakers ignore disciplinary data, but that these numbers 
be interpreted with appropriate caution and in context. While the discussion of disciplinary 
disparities has been ongoing for several decades, the practice of public reporting of school level 
discipline data is relatively new. Thus, while policymakers should pay attention to these data, we 
would argue that it is premature to attach high-stakes consequences to disciplinary outcomes. 
Ultimately, while the results presented here do not provide step-by-step solutions, they do 
provide further confidence in the early findings from the research literature that Black students 
face disciplinary disparities, even conditional on the type of infraction reported. We have also 
provided some information about which schools in Arkansas are more likely to impose relatively 
severe consequences that remove students from classrooms. The first step in addressing a 
potential problem is identifying it. It is our hope that policymakers and researchers and school 
leaders collaborate on the next step: to implement potentially effective strategies and rigorously 






American Academy of Pediatrics. (2013). Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion. Pediatrics, 
131(3). 
American Psychological Association. (2008). Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in Schools? 
An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations. American Psychologist, 63(9), 852-862.  
Anderson, K. P. & Ritter, G. W. (2017). Do school discipline policies treat students fairly? A 
second look at school discipline rate disparities. EDRE Working Paper No. 2015-11. 
Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2700707 
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J. S. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s 
Companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Arkansas Code § 6-17-112 (2016). Corporal punishment – immunity from liability. Retrieved 
from http://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2016/title-6/subtitle-2/chapter-17/subchapter-
1/section-6-17-112/ 
Arkansas Code § 6-18-502 (2016). Guidelines for development of school district student 
discipline policies. Retrieved from http://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2016/title-
6/subtitle-2/chapter-18/subchapter-5/section-6-18-502/ 
Arkansas Code § 6-18-503 (2016). Written student discipline policies required. Retrieved from 
http://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2016/title-6/subtitle-2/chapter-18/subchapter-
5/section-6-18-503/ 
Arkansas Code § 6-18-507 (2016). Suspension – Expulsion. Retrieved from 
http://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2016/title-6/subtitle-2/chapter-18/subchapter-
5/section-6-18-507/ 
Arkansas Code § 6-48-104 (2016). Department of Education responsibilities. Retrieved from 
http://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2016/title-6/subtitle-3/chapter-48/section-6-48-104/ 
Balfanz, R., Spiridakis, K., Neild, R. C., & Legters, N. (2003). High-poverty secondary schools 
and the juvenile justice system: How neither helps the other and how that could change. 
New Directions for Youth Development, No. 99. 
Beck, A. N., & Muschkin, C. G. (2012). The Enduring Impact of Race: Understanding the 
Disparities in Student Disciplinary Infractions and Achievement. Sociological 
Perspectives, 55(4), 637-662. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1525/sop.2012.55.4.637 
Campbell, D. T. (1979). Assessing the impact of planned social change. Evaluation and Program 




Caputo, I. (March 15, 2017). Bid to eliminate corporal punishment in schools fails. Arkansas 
Blog. [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2017/03/15/bid-to-eliminate-corporal-
punishment-in-schools-fails 
Children’s Defense Fund. (1975). School Suspensions: Are they Helping Children? Washington 
Research Project, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED113797.pdf 
Cornwell, P. (September 23, 2015). Seattle School Board halts suspensions for elementary 
students. The Seattle Times. Retrieved from http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/education/seattle-school-board-halts-suspensions-for-elementary-students/ 
Costenbader, V., & Markson, S. (1998). School Suspension: A Study with Secondary School 
Students. Journal of School Psychology, 36(1), 59-82. 
Curran, F. C. (2016). Estimating the Effect of State Zero Tolerance Laws on Exclusionary 
Discipline, Racial Discipline Gaps, and Student Behavior. Educational Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis, 38(4). Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3102/0162373716652728  
Ehlert, M., Koedel, C., Parsons, E., & Podgursky, M. J. (2014). The sensitivity of value-added 
estimates to specification adjustments: Evidence from school- and teacher-level models 
in Missouri. Statistics and Public Policy, 1(1), 19-27. 
Ekstrom, R. B., Goertz, M. E., Pollack, J. M., & Rock, D. A. (1986). Who Drops Out of High 
School and Why? Findings from a National Study. The Teachers College Record, 87(3), 
356-373. 
Fabelo, T., Thompson, M. D., Plotkin, M., Carmichael, D., Marchbanks, M. P., & Booth, E. A. 
(2011). Breaking Schools’ Rules: A Statewide Study of How School Discipline Relates to 
Students’ Success and Juvenile Justice Involvement. The Council of State Governments 
Justice Center & Public Policy Research Institute.  
Fairbanks, S., Sugai, G., Guardino, D., & Lathrop, M. (2007). Response to intervention: 
Examining classroom behavior support in second grade. Exceptional Children, 73(3), 
288-310. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/001440290707300302 
Flannery, K. B., Fenning, P., Kato, M. M., & McIntosh, K. (2014). Effects of School-Wide 
Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports and fidelity of implementation on 
problem behavior in high schools. American Psychological Association, 29(2), 111-124.  
Freeman, J., Simonsen, B., McCoach, D. B., Sugai, G., Lombardi, A., & Horner, R. (2015). 
Relationship between school-wide positive behavior interventions and supports and 
academic, attendance, and behavior outcomes in high schools. Journal of Positive 




Fronius, T., Persson, H., Guckenberg, S., Hurley, N., & Petrosino, A. (2016). Restorative justice 
in U.S. schools: A research review. West Ed. Retrieved from http://jprc.wested.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/RJ_Literature-Review_20160217.pdf 
Horn, J., & Miron, G. (2000). An evaluation of the Michigan charter school initiative: 
Performance, accountability, and impact. The Evaluation Center, Western Michigan 
University. Retrieved from 
http://homepages.wmich.edu/~miron/publics/michigan/Executive_Summary.pdf 
Horner, R. H., Sugai, G., Smolkowski, K., Eber, L., Nakasato, J., Todd, A. W., & Esperanza, J. 
(2009). A randomized, wait-list controlled effectiveness trial assessing school-wide 
positive behavior support in elementary schools. Journal of Positive Behavior 
Interventions, 11(3), 133-144. 
Huber, P. J. (1967). The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates under Nonstandard 
Conditions, Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and 
Probability 1, 221–233. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Institute for Digital Research and Education. (2011). UCLA. Retrieved from 
http://stats.idre.ucla.edu/other/mult-pkg/faq/general/faq-what-are-pseudo-r-squareds/ 
Lacoe, J. R., & Steinberg, M. P. (2016). Rolling back zero tolerance: The effect of discipline 
policy reform on suspension usage, school climate, and student achievement. Manuscript 
in preparation. 
Langille, S. (July 24, 2017). Texas school district approves corporal punishment ‘by way of 
paddling.’ Washington Examiner. Retrieved from 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/texas-school-district-approves-corporal-
punishment-by-way-of-paddling/article/2629258 
Losen, D., & Gillespie, J. (2012). Opportunities Suspended: The Disparate Impact of 




Losen, D., Hodson, C., Keith, M., Morrison, K., & Belway, S. (2015). Are we closing the school 
discipline gap? The Civil Rights Project, UCLA.  
Losen, D., & Skiba, R. (2010). Suspended Education: Urban Middle Schools in Crisis. Report: 
The Civil Rights Project at UCLA, The Equity Project at the Indiana University Center 
for Evaluation and Education Policy, and the Southern Poverty Law Center. 
Mader, N., Sartain, L., & Steinberg, M. (2016). When suspensions are shorter: The effects on 




Moynihan, D. P. (1965). The Negro family: The case for national action. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1965 
Nicholson-Crotty, S., Birchmeier, Z., & Valentine, D. (2009). Exploring the Impact of School 
Discipline on Racial Disproportion in the Juvenile Justice System. Social Science 
Quarterly, 90(4), 1003-1018.  
O’Connor, J. (July 29, 2015). Miami-Dade Schools eliminating out-of-school suspensions. State 
Impact, NPR. Retrieved from https://stateimpact.npr.org/florida/2015/07/29/miami-dade-
schools-eliminating-out-of-school-suspensions/ 
Pearlstein, M. (2011). From family collapse to America’s decline: The educational, economic, 
and social costs of family fragmentation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education. 
Pew Research Center. (2015). 2014 Religious Landscape Study. Interactive Tool. Retrieved from 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ 
Public Counsel. (September 27, 2014). California enacts first-in-the-nation law to eliminate 
student suspensions for minor misbehavior [Press Release]. Retrieved from 
http://www.publiccounsel.org/press_releases?id=0088 
Raffaele-Mendez, L. M. (2003). Predictors of suspension and negative school outcomes: A 
longitudinal investigation. New Directions for Youth Development, No. 99.  
Raffaele-Mendez, L. M., Knoff, H. M., & Ferron, J. M. (2002). School Demographic Variables 
and Out-of-School Suspension Rates: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of a Large, 
Ethnically Diverse School District. Psychology in the Schools, 39(3), 259-277. 
Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). Hierarchical linear models: Applications and data 
analysis methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Rogers, W. H. (1993). Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Technical Bulletin 
13: 19–23. Reprinted in Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints, Vol. 3, 88–94. College 
Station, TX: Stata Press. 
Saarnio, D. & Merten, A. (June 28, 2016). PBIS State Contacts for Arkansas. Retrieved from 
http://cce.astate.edu/pbis/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PBIS_Schools_in_Arkansas_-for-
Natl-PBIS-Center_6-28-163.pdf 
Sartain, L., Allensworth, E. M., & Porter, S. with Levenstein, R., Johnson, D.W., Huynh, M.H., 
Anderson, E., Mader, N., & Steinberg, M. P. (2015). Suspending Chicago’s Students: 
Differences in Discipline Practices across Schools. The University of Chicago 
Consortium on Chicago School Research. 




Skiba. R. J, Chung, C., Trachok, M., Baker, T., Sheya, A., & Hughes, R. (2014). Parsing 
Disciplinary Disproportionality: Contributions of Infraction, Student, and School 
Characteristics to Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion. American Educational 
Research Journal, 51(4), 640-670.  
Skiba, R., Horner, R., Chung, C. G., Rausch, M. K., May, S., & Tobin, T. (2011). Race is Not 
Neutral: A National Investigation of Black and Latino Disproportionality in School 
Discipline. School Psychology Review, 40(1), 85-107. 
Skiba, R., Michael, R., Nardo, A., & Peterson, R. (2002). The Color of Discipline: Source of 
Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment. The Urban Review, 34(4), 
317-342. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021320817372 
Skiba, R., & Peterson, R. (January 1999). ZAP Zero Tolerance. Phi Delta Kappan, 80, 372-76, 
381-82. 
Skiba, R., & Rausch, M. K. (2004). The Relationship between Achievement, Discipline, and 
Race: An Analysis of Factors Predicting ISTEP Scores. Center for Evaluation and 
Education Policy, Indiana University. 
Smink, J., & Heilbrunn, J. Z. (2005). The legal and economic implications of truancy. Clemson, 
SC: National Dropout Prevention Center/Network. Retrieved from 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED491290.pdf 
Sullivan, A. L., Klingbeil, D. A., & Van Norman, E. R. (2013). Beyond behavior: Multilevel 
analysis of the influence of sociodemographics and school characteristics on students’ 
risk of suspension. Children, Research, and Public Policy, 42(1), 99-114. 
Tatto, M. T., Rodriguez, A., Gonzalez-Lantz, D., Miller, C., Busscher, M., Trumble, D., 
Centeno, R., & Woo, A. The challegnes and tensions in reconstructing teacher-parent 
relations in the context of school reform: a case study. Teachers and Teaching: Theory 
and Practice, 7(3), 315-333. 
Tobin, T., Sugai, G., & Colvin, G. (1996). Patterns in Middle School Discipline Records. 
Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 4(2), 82-94. 
U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice. (2014). Dear Colleague Letter on 
the Nondiscriminatory Administration of School Discipline. Retrieved from 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.html 
Welch, K., & Payne, A. N. (2010). Racial threat and punitive school discipline. Social Problems, 
57(1), 25-48. 
White, H. (1980). A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct 





Understanding a Vicious Cycle: 
Do Out-of-School Suspensions Impact Student Test Scores? 
 
 
Kaitlin P. Anderson 
University of Arkansas 
 
Gary W. Ritter, Ph.D. 
University of Arkansas 
 
 
Gema Zamarro, Ph.D. 
University of Arkansas 
 
Abstract 
A vast body of research has found a correlation between exclusionary discipline (out-of-
school suspensions and expulsions) and student outcomes such as lower test scores, dropout, 
grade retention, and involvement in the juvenile justice system. However, there is no consensus 
on the causal impacts of exclusionary discipline. This study uses six years of de-identified 
demographic, achievement, and disciplinary data from all K-12 public schools in Arkansas to 
aim at estimating the causal relationship. We estimate dynamic panel data models incorporating 
student fixed effects using Anderson-Hsiao methods. We find, counterintuitively, a generally 
null (and sometimes slightly positive) impact of out-of-school suspensions on test scores. 
Therefore, while policymakers may have other reasons to limit exclusionary discipline, we 
conclude we should not expect academic gains to follow from a reduction in OSS without 





There is much discussion in the United States education community about high rates of 
exclusionary discipline such as suspensions and expulsions for students in elementary and 
secondary schools (Bowditch, 1993; Marchbanks, Blake, Smith, Seibert, & Carmichael, 2014, 
Rausch & Skiba, 2005; Skiba, Peterson, & Williams, 1997). Moreover, there is concern about 
substantial disparities in rates of suspension or expulsion between White students and students of 
color (Anderson & Ritter, 2017; Anyon et al., 2014; Losen, Hodson, Keith, Morrison, & Belway, 
2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010; Sartain et al., 2015; Skiba et al., 2014; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba, 
Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002). 
We know little about the causal effect of exclusionary discipline on student outcomes, yet 
a vast amount of prior work indicates correlational evidence. Exclusionary discipline is 
associated with several negative student outcomes including lower academic achievement 
(Arcia, 2006; Beck & Muschkin, 2012; Cobb-Clark, Kassenboehmer, Le, McVicar, & Zhang, 
2015; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Raffaele-Mendez, Knoff, & Ferron, 2002; Rausch & Skiba, 2005; 
Skiba & Rausch, 2004), school drop-out and grade retention (American Academy of Pediatrics, 
2013; American Psychological Association, 2008; Balfanz, Byrnes, & Fox, 2014; Cobb-Clark et 
al., 2015; Ekstrom, Goertz, Pollack, & Rock, 1986; Fabelo et al., 2011; Gregory & Weinstein, 
2008; Krezmien, Leone, & Achilles, 2006; Marchbanks et al., 2014; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; 
Raffaele-Mendez & Sanders, 1981; Rodney, Crafter, Rodney, & Mupier, 1999; Stearns & 
Glennie, 2006; Wald & Kurlaender, 2003), and involvement in the juvenile justice system 
(American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; Balfanz, Spiridakis, Neild, & Legters, 2003; Fabelo et 




If these relationships are causal rather than simply correlational, the economic impact of 
reducing out-of-school suspensions could be great. Marchbanks et al. (2014), for example, using 
data on three cohorts of Texas seventh grade students in 2000-01 to 2002-03, estimated that 
grade retentions associated with discipline cost the state of Texas about $76 million per year. 
Further, school suspension may predict higher rates of misbehavior, anti-social behavior, and 
subsequent suspensions (Balfanz et al., 2014; Costenbader & Markson, 1998; Hemphill, 
Toumbourou, Herrenkohl, McMorris, & Catalano, 2006; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Tobin, Sugai, 
& Colvin, 1996). 
Lower academic achievement could be a result of suspensions and other learning time 
lost (Davis & Jordan, 1994; Public Agenda, 2004; Scott & Barrett, 2004), which is consistent 
with findings that increased opportunity for learning is associated with high achievement and 
large achievement gains (Brophy, 1988; Brophy & Good, 1986; Carter, 1984; Cooley & 
Leinhardt, 1980; Fisher et al., 1981; Greenwood, Horton, & Utley, 2002; Hattie, 2002; Reynolds 
& Walberg, 1991; Stallings, Cory, Fairweather, & Needels, 1978; Wang, Haertel, & Walberg, 
1997). This argument is consistent with studies that find suspensions precede lower performance 
although these findings are not necessarily causal (Balfanz et al., 2014; Cobb-Clark et al., 2015, 
McIntosh, Flannery, Sugai, Braun, & Cochrane, 2008; Rausch & Skiba, 2005). For example, 
Balfanz et al. (2014) examined the connection between receiving an out-of-school suspension in 
ninth grade and later high school and post-secondary outcomes in Florida. In this descriptive 
work, even after controlling for demographics, attendance, and course performance, suspensions 
in ninth grade were associated with future suspensions, course failures, and chronic absenteeism. 
Suspensions may predict future suspensions if certain students are viewed by school employees 




students” or “bad kids” (Collins, 2011; Pifer, 2000; Weismann, 2015), and this presumption of 
an inherent discipline issue harms interactions between students and teachers (Kennedy-Lewis et 
al., 2014).  
However, misbehavior and suspensions do not always precede lower academic 
achievement. Several studies have found the opposite - that low academic performance predicts a 
variety of undesirable behaviors in the future (Arcia, 2006; Choi, 2007; McIntosh et al., 2008; 
Miles & Stipek, 2006). For example, Miles and Stipek (2006) find that poor literacy achievement 
in the first and third grades predicted relatively high aggressive behavior in the third and fifth 
grades. Choi (2007) found that grade point averages predicted delinquent offenses, substance 
abuse, gang initiation, and sexual activity across all racial groups. This could be due to decreased 
engagement with the school (Hawkins, Smith, & Catalano, 2004). Further, Arcia (2006) matched 
a group of suspended students to similar non-suspended peers and found the suspended students 
had lower pre-suspension achievement. 
The literature described thus far indicates many potential relationships between 
exclusionary discipline and student academic outcomes, but there is ambiguity about the actual 
causal link, and in what direction this link may occur. It could also be that the effects work both 
ways, or that other unobservable factors are causing both suspensions and poor achievement. 
Therefore, the ability to direct public policy based on correlational studies is limited. However, 
despite the ambiguity, many school districts and states are moving away from exclusionary 
discipline towards less punitive consequences. As of May 2015, 22 states and the District of 
Columbia had revised laws to “require or encourage schools to: limit the use of exclusionary 
discipline practices; implement supportive (that is, nonpunitive) discipline strategies; and 




risk students” (Steinberg & Lacoe, 2017, p. 44). Further, as of the 2015–16 school year, 23 of the 
nation’s 100 largest school districts had changed policies to require non-punitive discipline 
strategies and/or limit suspension use (Steinberg & Lacoe, 2017). 
The move away from exclusionary discipline appears to presume a causal effect of 
exclusionary discipline on these student outcomes, yet prior work is only correlational. 
Policymakers and school leaders would benefit from more rigorous, causal research on the effect 
of exclusionary discipline on student outcomes in order to make government and school policies 
more effective. For example, it may help identify the mechanism through which students are 
affected or the types of students most affected. This is no easy task, however, because of the 
potential for reverse causality. That is, it is unclear whether disciplinary issues precede and 
“cause” poor student achievement, the declining achievement of a struggling student and the 
associated disengagement from school leads to disciplinary problems, or causality works in both 
directions. Another plausible chain of events is that a negative shock outside of the school setting 
causes simultaneous problems with both behavior and academic achievement at school. Policy 
discussion around reducing suspensions requires causal evidence of the impacts on students, but 
sorting out the causal effect is a complicated task.  
In this study, we attempt to estimate the impact of out-of-school suspension on future 
academic achievement. 
The main research questions guiding this study are: 
1. What is the impact of out-of-school suspension on academic achievement in reading and 
math in the following year? 
2. Do out-of-school suspensions affect academic achievement of certain subgroups 




lunch (FRL) eligible and non-eligible students, special and regular education students, 
lower and higher performing students, and students in elementary or higher grades)? 
These research questions are limited but also an important first step toward identifying a 
causal impact of out-of-school suspension (OSS) on student outcomes. Academic achievement, 
in terms of performance on tests, is only one outcome that school disciplinary policies might 
affect. Suspensions are also associated with increased risk of drop-out and reduced on-time 
graduation rates (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; American Psychological Association, 
2008; Balfanz et al., 2014; Cobb-Clark et al., 2015; Ekstrom et al., 1986; Fabelo et al., 2011; 
Gregory & Weinstein, 2008; Krezmien, Leone, & Achilles, 2006; Marchbanks et al., 2014; 
Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Raffaele-Mendez & Sanders, 1981; Rodney et al., 1999; Stearns & 
Glennie, 2006; Wald & Kurlaender, 2003). Therefore, while this study will not examine all 
possible impacts of exclusionary discipline, it will provide evidence on at least two measures of 
academic achievement: math and English Language Arts (ELA) test scores. 
In this study, we focus on the academic impacts on suspended students, but many have 
hypothesized that disciplinary practices, which influence school culture and perceived or actual 
school safety, might affect the academic achievement of other students in the school. One study 
found that high levels of suspensions are associated with lower achievement gains on non-
suspended students (Perry & Morris, 2014). Others suggest that strict disciplinary policies could 
improve school achievement through the removal of disruptive students (Burke & Herbert, 1996; 
Kinsler, 2013). Nevertheless, causal inference from these studies is limited by the potential for 
reverse causality and confounding effects of factors that influence both school achievement and 
behavior.  




correlational studies and estimate the causal impact of OSS on student test scores. Next, we 
describe the data utilized for this study and the analytic sample. 
Data and Sample 
This study uses six years of de-identified student demographic, achievement (test score), 
and disciplinary data from all K-12 schools in Arkansas provided by the Arkansas Department of 
Education (ADE) for 2008-09 through 2013-14. Demographic data include race/ethnicity, 
gender, grade, special education status, limited English proficiency (LEP) status, and FRL status. 
Academic achievement data include standardized scores on state tests in reading and 
mathematics for six school years from 2008-09 to 2013-14. For the school years from 2008-09 to 
2013-14, state tests in reading and math were administered as part of the Arkansas 
Comprehensive Testing, Assessment, and Accountability Program (ACTAAP). Math and 
English Language Arts (ELA) exams were administered in grades 3-8, and End of Course (EOC) 
examinations were administered in Algebra I (typically 9th grade), Geometry (typically 10th 
grade), Algebra II (typically 11th grade), and 11th Grade Literacy.9 We standardized test scores 
within grade, year, test subject, and testing group (e.g. with accommodations or without) to 
account for differences in test administrations and scaling methods. 
Discipline data are provided at the individual infraction level and indicate which type of 
infraction (out of 19) was recorded, the corresponding consequence (out of 13 types), the 
infraction date, and the length of the consequence. These infraction-level data are linked to 
students and schools. To simplify the analysis, we grouped similar infraction types, resulting in 
                                                 
9 Most but not all students take the Algebra I exam in ninth grade, Geometry in tenth, and 
Algebra II in eleventh, but we standardize within grade, year, test subject, and testing group to 




12 groups.10  See Table 1 for the frequency of each infraction type. The three most common 
types of infractions, disorderly conduct (31.0%), insubordination (25.9%), and “other” non-
specified infractions (21.7%),11 represent almost 80% of all infractions during the study period. 
Furthermore, 13 consequence categories were collapsed into 7 (in school suspension 
(ISS), OSS, expulsion, referral to an alternative learning environment (ALE), corporal 
punishment, no action, and “other”). 12 See Table 2 for the frequency of each disciplinary 
consequence type. The most common consequence types during the study period were ISS 
(39.2%), OSS (24.1%), “other” non-specified consequences (18.8%), and corporal punishment 
(16.5%). Expulsions (0.1%), referrals to Alternative Learning Environments (0.4%), and no 
action (0.9%) are very rare. 
Disciplinary data were aggregated to the student-by-school-year unit level, so the 
indicators for both infractions and consequences specify the number of times in a given school 
year the student was cited for some particular type of infraction and received some particular 
type of consequence. In addition, days of each type of punishment, when applicable, were 
aggregated to a student-by-school year level. These disciplinary data are merged with the student 
level demographic and achievement data using unique student identifiers. 
                                                 
10 We grouped all infractions involving weapons (handguns, rifles, shotguns, clubs, knives, or 
explosives) into one category. We grouped staff assault and student assault into one category. 
We grouped alcohol and tobacco into one category. 
11 “Other” non-specified infractions were coded as a particular type of infraction at the school 
level, but when combined and reported by the ADE, they are grouped into an “other” category. 
This category was provided by the ADE and not researcher-created. 
12 “Other” non-specified consequences were coded as a particular type of consequence at the 
school level, but when combined and reported by the ADE, they are grouped into an “other” 
category. Conversations with the Arkansas Department of Education Assistant Commissioner for 
Research and Technology, Eric Saunders, indicates that the majority of these “other” 
consequences are detentions, bus suspensions, parent/guardian conferences, Saturday school, or 










Consequence Types, By Year (Arkansas) from 2008-09 to 2013-14 
 
The analytic samples vary by type of analysis, but, in our preferred models, we excluded 
from our analytic sample students who were expelled or received a referral to an alternative 
learning environment (ALE) during the study period. For these students, data for years prior to 
an expulsion or ALE referral were also excluded from the sample. We seek to estimate the 
impact on students who are suspended out-of-school, relative to receiving some other, non-
exclusionary consequence, so excluding expelled students and students referred to an ALE 
ensures the reference category of consequence (ISS, corporal punishment, no action, or “other”) 
is less exclusionary than OSS. Thus, we estimate the impact of OSS on a more typical (not 
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Total % of Total
Disorderly Conduct 54,641   51,027   48,765   51,539   42,575   57,750   306,297    31.0%
Insubordination 47,273   46,151   45,765   38,798   34,759   43,068   255,814    25.9%
Other 31,871   28,639   26,481   31,858   35,024   60,600   214,473    21.7%
Fighting 12,378   12,456   12,471   12,136   12,434   13,128   75,003      7.6%
Truancy 9,968     11,834   11,734   10,465   9,407     12,914   66,322      6.7%
Bullying 3,455     4,099     4,363     4,483     4,515     5,496     26,411      2.7%
Alcohol and Tobacco 2,512     2,552     2,298     2,209     2,286     2,835     14,692      1.5%
Student or Staff Assault 2,148     2,132     1,892     1,959     2,361     2,503     12,995      1.3%
Drugs 944        996        954        1,146     1,259     1,295     6,594        0.7%
Vandalism 962        833        909        689        736        1,084     5,213        0.5%
Weapons 509        515        525        517        562        671        3,299        0.3%
Gangs 361        339        177        107        131        103        1,218        0.1%
Total 167,022 161,573 156,334 155,906 146,049 201,447 988,331    100.0%
% of Total 16.9% 16.3% 15.8% 15.8% 14.8% 20.4% 100.0%
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Total %
In-School Suspension 63,018   64,760   60,052   62,532   63,019   74,169   387,550    39.2%
Out-of-School Suspension 41,348   39,613   36,780   37,791   40,233   42,290   238,055    24.1%
Other 23,120   23,858   27,600   26,482   21,850   62,972   185,882    18.8%
Corporal Punishment 36,484   30,732   29,311   27,760   19,142   19,746   163,175    16.5%
No Action 1,999     1,494     1,777     993        1,288     1,435     8,986        0.9%
ALE 918        794        621        253        317        586        3,489        0.4%
Expulsion 135        322        193        95          200        249        1,194        0.1%
Total 167,022 161,573 156,334 155,906 146,049 201,447 988,331    100.0%




extremely misbehaving) student. Excluding students who were expelled or referred to ALE for 
disciplinary purposes removed 4,353 to 8,940 observations from our samples, depending on the 
sample, representing only about 0.008% of observations. As a robustness check, we also added 
back in the students who were referred to an ALE during the study period and/or expelled during 
the study period, and estimate the combined impact of all three kinds of exclusionary discipline 
on student test scores. 
Analytic Methods 
Our preferred models exploit the panel nature of our dataset, but we first estimate a 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model as a benchmark to compare with our preferred 
dynamic panel data estimates. In the OLS model, the standard errors are clustered at the student 
level (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Huber, 1967; Rogers, 1993; White, 1980). The pooled OLS 
model estimates are meant to be understood as correlation coefficients as the model most 
probably suffers from endogeneity as the error terms  are likely correlated to other explanatory 
variables in the model due to potential reverse causation and other confounding factors. 
Our pooled OLS model (the correlational benchmark) is: 
 
																								 	 	 	 	 +	     (1)  
The variable of interest, , is defined as the number of days of out-of-school 
suspension student i receives in year	 1. Note, this variable has been included in lagged form 
to limit the potential for reverse causation in the model. Although this specification assumes that 
each day of OSS has the same effect on student outcomes, we relax this assumption in some 
model specifications. We account for a student’s behavioral history using a vector of counts for 




weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly 
conduct, bullying, or other). For example, a student may have been referred for two 
insubordination infractions and one fighting infraction in the same year. We control for 
disciplinary infraction history using these infraction counts in order to determine the impact of 
OSS in the past separately from the impact of having conducted a particular infraction in the 
same year as the suspension. For example, we estimate the impact of receiving OSS for fighting, 
relative to being written up for fighting, but receiving some other, less exclusionary 
consequence. This is important for isolating the effect of the OSS itself, not the disengagement 
from or misbehavior in school. 
We account for district time-invariant characteristics with district fixed effects, , and 
include a vector of grade level indicators, , and school year indicators, 
, with the 2008-09 school year as the reference category. The error term, , 
contains student and district time variant unobserved characteristics. This model also includes 
student characteristics, , including gender, FRL status, special education status, LEP status, 
and race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and other).  
Despite the ability to control for measures of student behavior and background 
characteristics in this OLS specification, this relatively simple model might not fully account for 
other unobservable student characteristics. Unobservable characteristics such as family 
backgrounds and community characteristics may relate to both the students’ risk of OSS and 
their academic outcomes, so omitted variable bias remains problematic for a causal interpretation 
of the OLS results. Therefore, our preferred model uses student fixed effects and is estimated 




adopting a dynamic panel data approach, we are able to relax strict exogeneity assumptions on 
our explanatory variables and allow for a certain type of unobserved heterogeneity. 
The fixed effects model allows a limited form of endogeneity through time-invariant 
student characteristics. A limitation of the fixed effects approach is that it requires adequate 
variation between states of OSS within individual students over time. Even if there is “enough” 
variation within students, biases may remain if endogeneity is driven by time-varying shocks 
with persistent effects over time. To the extent that there are time-varying factors that are related 
both to the likelihood of being suspended out-of-school, and to future academic outcomes, we 
may be concerned that  remains correlated with our variable of interest, , even 
after allowing for student fixed effects. However, by including the lagged number of days in 
OSS, as opposed to the current number, we aim to limit this potential endogeneity. It would only 
be problematic if shocks that affect OSS are more permanent in nature and, as a result, have an 
effect over multiple years. Transitory shocks would not be problematic in our specification. In 
fact, the Anderson-Hsiao (1981) method we employ is valid only under the assumption that these 
time varying shocks are temporary and not correlated across time periods. Although we 
recognize this assumption may be strong, as there may be time-persistent shocks to a student’s 
life such as divorce or death in the family, we believe it is more plausible than that of no omitted 
variable bias imposed by simple pooled OLS. 
The fixed effects are identified only for students who switch states of OSS (i.e. they must 
have variation in the days of OSS they receive in different school years). Thus, the estimates of 
interest are not identified using students never exposed to OSS, although all students remain in 




model.13 We can consider this a selected average treatment effect (SATE) rather than an overall 
treatment effect (Angrist & Imbens, 1991). Therefore, the results do not necessarily generalize to 
any randomly selected student in the state of Arkansas. Although this might seem to be a 
limitation, the students who have at least one day in OSS during the time of our study are the 
most relevant group from a policy point of view as these would be the types of students most 
affected by proposed policy changes.  
Our proposed student fixed effects specification includes the same covariates as in our 
benchmark OLS model, but rather than including student demographic variables, we include 
student fixed effects. A basic student fixed effects model would be represented by the following: 
 
										 	 	 	      (2)  
We account for student individual time-invariant heterogeneity with , which, by 
relaxing the assumption of strict exogeneity, is allowed to be correlated to our other regressors. 
With the inclusion of , we exclude the vector of student characteristics, , in Equation (1). 
Other variables in Equation (2) are the same as those included in Equation (1).  




																							            (3) 
                                                 
13 About 82% of students in our math analytical sample and about 84% of students in our ELA 
analytical sample never were exposed to OSS, so only about 16 to 18% of students in the state 





Equation (3) above makes it clear that  will be mechanically correlated to 
, introducing bias (Nickell, 1981). Similarly, ,	and 
each of our first-differenced infraction count measures in 
 would be mechanically correlated to , as we argued above that 
these variables are potentially contemporaneously endogenous. Fortunately, the bias induced 
through this endogeneity can be corrected by using prior lags of these variables as instruments 
for the first differences. We use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate our impact of out of 
school suspensions (Anderson & Hsiao, 1981). Our 2SLS models are given by: 
First Stage:  
∆  
																			 ∆ ∆ ∆        (4) 
∆ ∑ 	 ∆
																		 ∆ ∆ _                      (5) 
And k=12 equations for each infraction type: 
∆  
				 ∆ ∆ ∆      
   for each j = 1, …, 12                   (6) 
Second Stage: 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆




A valid instrumental variable requires two key assumptions: relevance (the instrument is 
correlated enough with the endogenous variable) and independence (the instrument does not 
directly affect the outcome, ∆ , and the instrument is uncorrelated to the error term, ∆ ). The 
relevance assumption is tested by looking for a clear relationship in the first stage results. In our 
case, our instruments are relevant by design. The independence assumption is based on the 
assumption that time varying shocks affecting OSS, infractions, or test scores are only temporary 
and so, they are not correlated over time with time varying unobservables that determine future 
test scores. Although this could be a strong assumption, we believe it is still more reasonable 
than the assumptions accompanying pooled OLS or other descriptive methods. 
We describe our analytic samples in Table 3. The analytic samples are similar, regardless 
of method reflective of the state population. The ELA samples are smaller due to fewer grades 
tested. While students in grades 3-8 are tested in both subjects, students typically take three math 
End of Course exams in roughly grades 9-11, but only one Literacy test in 11th grade. 
Table 3 











ELA Student FE 
(Anderson-Hsiao) 
Sample
N Observations N/A 1,033,936 660,826 839,542 512,684
N Students 470,362  367,759 275,810 324,033 235,917
Male 51.0% 51.0% 50.9% 50.7% 50.6%
FRL 60.0% 61.0% 60.7% 61.0% 60.6%
Special Education 11.0% 11.2% 11.0% 11.0% 10.6%
Limited English Proficient 7.0% 6.9% 6.8% 6.9% 6.7%
White 64.6% 65.2% 65.0% 65.5% 65.6%
Black 21.2% 21.1% 21.4% 20.8% 20.8%
Hispanic 10.1% 10.0% 10.0% 9.9% 9.9%
Other Race 4.0% 3.7% 3.6% 3.8% 3.7%
Lagged Math Z-Score 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04





The math results are in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. Column 1 presents the descriptive 
pooled OLS analysis results, which do not account for time-invariant student unobserved 
heterogeneity and cannot be interpreted as causal. The results in Column 1 indicate a statistically 
significant (at the 99% confidence level) 0.006 standard deviation decrease in math test scores 
associated with each day of OSS in the prior year. Compared to prior literature showing large 
correlations between OSS and student outcomes,14 this estimate is small and reflects the robust 
set of controls for student behavior and background characteristics in the analysis. 
In Column 2 of Table 4, we present our preferred student fixed effects models, 
instrumenting for the endogenous variables. The results of the Anderson-Hsiao model in Column 
2 indicate a slight positive impact of OSS days in the prior year on math test scores (0.004 s.d. 
per day of OSS), significant at the 99% confidence level. The results of this model imply that, 
when we are more able to control for the endogeneity of our variable of interest and identify an 
arguably causal impact, the effect of an additional day of exclusionary discipline on math test 
scores, among those who experience OSS at least once, if anything, is positive but very small. 
The results of the ELA analysis are shown in the final two columns of Table 4. Based on 
the pooled OLS model, as displayed in Column 3, each day of OSS in the prior year is associated 
with a -0.006 standard deviation decrease in ELA test score. This is similar to the math test score 
estimate in Column 1. The preferred model in Column 4 indicates a slight positive impact of 
prior year OSS days on test scores (about 0.01 s.d.) among those receiving OSS at least once. 
 
                                                 
14 For example, Arcia (2006) estimated that students with high suspension rates were roughly 
three grade levels behind their peers with no suspensions after one year and almost five grade 





Relationship between OSS Days and Student Test Scores  
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the 
student level. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
b Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, LEP-status 
and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Other). 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
 
Within-student variation over time 
One diagnostic test of whether fixed effects are appropriate in these data is to investigate 
the amount of variation in the counts of OSS days between and within students over time. 
Student fixed effects models use only within-student variation to identify the impact of OSS. 
Table 5 indicates that there is almost as much variation within students as across students, so a 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days -0.0060 ** 0.0039 ** -0.0056 ** 0.0095 **
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0019)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y
Student Demographic Controlsb Y Y
Lagged Z-Score 0.714  ** 0.208  ** 0.686  ** 0.261  **
(0.001)   (0.004)  (0.001) (0.005)  
Constant 0.330   0.403  **
(13.50)    (0.015)  
Observations 1,033,936 660,826 839,542 512,684
Number of Students 367,759 275,810 324,033 235,917
Pooled OLS
Student FE with 
Anderson-Hsiao
Dependent Variable:           
Math Z-Score
Dependent Variable:          
ELA Z-Score





fixed effects model allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, without sacrificing much 
in terms of identifying variation.  
Table 5 
Variability of Number of OSS Days (Lagged) Between and Within Students, Models Excluding 





Overall 1.644 s.d. 1.466 s.d. 
Between 1.370 s.d. 1.265 s.d. 
Within 1.071 s.d. 0.922 s.d. 
The student fixed effect approach bases its identification only on those students who 
changed levels of exposure to OSS over time. Given that 82% to 84% of students in our analytic 
samples never received any OSS, we test whether the estimated relationship between OSS days 
in the prior year and test scores is different for students whose exposure to OSS varied over time. 
We estimate the same OLS models as in Table 4 but drop students who never received OSS. The 
estimated relationships in Appendix A are similar (-0.004 s.d. in math and -0.003 s.d. in ELA) to 
those seen in columns 1 and 3 of Table 4 (approximately -0.006 s.d. in both math and ELA). 
Thus, we do not have strong evidence that the results are driven by estimating effects only for 
students with variation in exposure to OSS days.  
Testing for nonlinearities in impact of OSS days 
While we find slight positive impacts on math and ELA test scores, it could be that the 
impact of OSS is not linear. For example, longer suspensions may have a greater impact than one 
or two day suspensions, which may be similar to a typical illness-related absence. Further, in 
Arkansas, out-of-school suspensions longer than 10 days are considered expulsions (Arkansas 




OSS in a school year, it may be considered a change of placement, requiring additional 
notification and services for that child (Arkansas Department of Education, 2008). 
To test for non-linear relationships between prior year OSS days and student test scores, 
we transform the continuous variables,  and  into sets of indicator 
variables for whether the student received (in either the prior year, or the second prior year) zero 
days, 1-2 days, 3-4 days, 5-6 days, 7-10 days, or 11 or more days of OSS. In each of these 
models, student-by-school-year observations with zero cumulative days of OSS during the year 
are treated as the reference group. See Table 6 for the frequencies of each of these groups, as a 
percent of all student-by-year observations, for each of our four samples. About 95% of student-
by-school year observations in each sample had zero days of OSS in the prior year, with about 
1.5 to 2% in each of the 1-2 days and 3-4 day categories, and under 1% in each of the remaining 
categories. Instances of eleven or more days of OSS in the prior year are particularly rare. 
The overall math results using these new explanatory variables are in the left two 
columns of Table 7, and the ELA results are in the right two columns. The negative relationships 
in our descriptive, pooled OLS models are, as expected, consistent with the results in Table 4, 
but we focus on the student fixed effects models. The sign of the coefficients for the math model 
in Column 2 are generally consistent with the results in Table 4 (which included only a linear 
count of OSS days). However, not all are statistically significant. We find that 1-2 days of OSS, 
relative to none, leads to slight increases of about 0.02 s.d. in math test scores, while some longer 
suspensions (5-6 days or 11 or more days) lead to larger (yet still small) increases. Given the 
relative infrequency of high numbers of OSS days in Table 6, the lack of significance on the 3-4 
OSS days and 7-10 OSS days could be due to low statistical power. Still, the results at least 





Frequency of OSS Days in Prior Year, by Sample 
 
Note. POLS = Pooled ordinary least squares regression. Student FE = Student fixed effects 
models using Anderson-Hsiao estimation.  
 
The ELA impacts in Column 4 of Table 7 are similar to the results in Table 4 (positive in 
magnitude), with all but the impact of 1-2 OSS days statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level or higher. These results are not necessarily generalizable, however, as the 
impact of 1-2 days, for example, is estimated using the students with some years of 1-2 days, and 
some years of zero, while the impact of 7-10 days, for example, is estimated only using the 
students with similar variation (some years with zero days, and some years with 7-10 days). Still, 
these results are suggestive of whether there could be differential impacts at different thresholds. 
0 OSS Days in PY 981,242    94.9% 623,586   94.4% 803,270    95.7% 487,989 95.2%
1-2 OSS Days in PY 15,789      1.5% 10,780     1.6% 12,396      1.5% 8,149     1.6%
3-4 OSS Days in PY 17,666      1.7% 12,612     1.9% 11,946      1.4% 8,216     1.6%
5-6 OSS Days in PY 8,141        0.8% 5,811       0.9% 5,150        0.6% 3,539     0.7%
7-10 OSS Days in PY 6,639        0.6% 4,763       0.7% 3,969        0.5% 2,760     0.5%
11+ OSS Days in PY 4,459        0.4% 3,274       0.5% 2,811        0.3% 2,031     0.4%
Total Observations 1,033,936 100% 660,826   100% 839,542    100% 512,684 100%





Relationship Between OSS Days and Student Test Scores 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the 
student level. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
b Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, limited 
English proficiency, and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and 
Other). 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1-2 OSS Days in PY -0.0470 ** 0.0190 * -0.0505 ** 0.0215 
(0.0057) (0.0088) (0.0071) (0.0111)
3-4 OSS Days in PY -0.0668 ** 0.0126 -0.0551 ** 0.0380 **
(0.0058) (0.0092) (0.0075) (0.0127)
5-6 OSS Days in PY -0.0521 ** 0.0319 * -0.0552 ** 0.0461 *
(0.0084) (0.0137) (0.0113) (0.0199)
7-10 OSS Days in PY -0.0695 ** 0.0228 -0.0775 ** 0.0828 **
(0.0100) (0.0162) (0.0137) (0.0242)
11+ OSS Days in PY -0.0842 ** 0.0852 ** -0.0696 ** 0.1280 **
(0.0128) (0.0233) (0.0169) (0.0352)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y
Student Demographic Controlsb Y Y
Lagged Z-Score 0.714  ** 0.208  ** 0.685  ** 0.261  **
(0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.005)  
Constant 0.393  0.406  **
(12.00)    (0.014)  
Observations 1,033,936 660,826 839,542 512,684
Number of Students 367,759  275,810  324,033  235,917  
Dependent Variable:           
Math Z-Score
Dependent Variable:           
ELA Z-Score
Pooled OLS
Student FE with 
Anderson-HsiaoPooled OLS






We also assess whether the impact is different for certain groups of students. We present 
separate results for FRL and non-FRL eligible, White and non-White, male and female, and 
special education and regular education students. We also present results for students whose first 
observed test score was above (or below) average for their grade and school year and results for 
observations recorded in grades 2-5 and grades 6-10. 
Table 8 presents the subgroup impacts on math test scores using our preferred dynamic 
panel data methods. Recalling that the overall impact on math was about 0.004 s.d. per OSS day 
in the prior year, we see similar impacts (0.004 to 0.006 s.d.) in Table 8 for FRL students, non-
White students, male students, regular education students, below average students, and students 
in grades 6-10. There are no math impacts on the remaining groups. None of the analyses in 
Table 8 indicate heterogeneous impacts in math. For example, even though there is a slight 
positive impact on non-White students, we cannot reject (at the 95% confidence level) the null 
hypothesis that the impact for White and non-White students is the same. 
Subgroup effects on ELA scores are in Table 9. Compared to the overall ELA impact of 
about 0.01 s.d. per OSS day the prior year, we find similar impacts on certain subgroups. As with 
the math impacts, we see very small positive impacts on FRL students, non-White students, male 
students, regular education students, below average students, and students in grades 6-10, but we 
also see some slight positive ELA impacts on female students. In addition, there is evidence that 
the students who initially scored below or above average are impacted differently, although these 
effects could just be reversion to the mean if some students simply have idiosyncratically low or 






Subgroup Impacts of OSS Days on Standardized Math Scores (Anderson-Hsiao)  
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or 
below average test scores are based on the first available observation for that student. Grade-
level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on the grade 
level associated with each particular observation. 
ƚ Subgroup effects are statistically different. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Panel A: Male Female
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days 0.0040 ** 0.0029 0.0051 ** -0.0006 0.0044 ** 0.0027 
(0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0022)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-Score 0.243  ** 0.152  ** 0.213  ** 0.216  ** 0.245  ** 0.165  **
(0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Constant -0.666  0.468  -0.441  0.436  ** 0.390    0.378  **
(22.24)   (3.445)  (10.50)    (0.017)  (8.370)  (0.020)  
Observations 404,859 255,967 230,981 429,845 336,029 324,797
Number of Students 168,096 107,714 95,494   180,316 140,556 135,254 
Panel B:
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days -0.0033 0.0050 ** 0.0064 ** -0.0009 0.0052 0.0039 **
(0.0046) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0048) (0.0013)
PY Infraction Counts By Category Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-Score 0.367  ** -0.026 ** 0.283  ** 0.009 0.181  ** 0.214  **
(0.011)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.009)  (0.005)  
Constant 0.563  ** 0.312  ** 0.394  ** 0.646 0.726   ** 22.1       **
(0.047)  (0.012) (0.015)  (12.09)  (0.028)  (4.225)  
Observations 72,338 588,488 333,836 326,990 129,908 530,743
Number of Students 33,897   247,024 136,869 138,941 128,565 239,462 
Non-White WhiteFRL Non-FRL
Above Avg. 
Math Score Grades 2-5












Subgroup Impacts of OSS Days on Standardized ELA Scores (Anderson-Hsiao) 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or 
below average test scores are based on the first available observation for that student. Grade-
level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on the grade 
level associated with each particular observation. 
ƚSubgroup effects are statistically different. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
Panel A: 
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days 0.0093 ** 0.0069 0.0099 ** 0.0021 0.0083 ** 0.0145 **
(0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0037)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-Score 0.251 ** 0.266 ** 0.212 ** 0.293 ** 0.258 ** 0.284 **
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.520  0.399 ** -4.022 0.700  0.370 0.415 **
(7.620) (0.030) (31.46) (13.30)  (8.029) (0.024)
Observations 310,955 201,729 176,177 336,507 259,632 253,052
Number of Students 143,427 92,490   81,323   154,594 119,758 116,159 
Panel B: 
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days 0.0101 0.0070 ** 0.0134 **ƚ -0.0055 ƚ 0.0085 0.0092 **
(0.0067) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0021)
PY Infraction Counts By Category Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-Score 0.296 ** 0.020 ** 0.277 ** 0.139 ** 0.225 ** 0.274 **
(0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Constant 22.860 0.308 ** 0.394 0.400 0.738 ** 0.312 **
(34.220) (0.013) (17.280) (3.343) (0.029) (0.017)
Observations 54,294 458,390 233,186 279,498 128,568 384,112
Number of Students 28,087   211,684 107,377 128,540 127,284 199,859 












We conducted similar subgroup analyses using the buckets for 1-2 days, 3-4 days, 5-6 
days, 7-10 days, and 11 or more days of OSS, focusing, again, on our preferred dynamic panel 
data method. These results are not necessarily generalizable, as the 7-10 days, for example, is 
estimated only identifying off the variation within students who had zero days in some years and 
7-10 in others. The results are suggestive of differential impacts at different thresholds. As in 
Table 8, regular education students’ math scores appear to be slightly positively impacted, if 
anything by OSS, although these estimated effects are still quite small. Further, students whose 
first observed test score was below average generally have positive test score growth the year 
following OSS days, but this result could just be due to mean reversion after an idiosyncratically 
low first test score. Otherwise, subgroup effects do not indicate clear and consistent stories, 
except that there is only one coefficient (out of 60) in Table 10 that is statistically significant and 
negative (the impact of 3-4 days of OSS, relative to zero, for special education students). 
Therefore, it is just as likely that this single negative impact is a result of chance, and we 
conclude that there are generally no negative impacts of OSS on math test scores. 
Table 11 shows the same subgroup analyses, but predicting ELA test scores. As in Table 
9, there are generally slightly positive or null impacts of OSS on ELA test scores, with 
consistently positive (but very small) impacts on non-White students, regular education students, 
and students who scored below average the first time we observe their ELA score. This last 
result could be driven by reversion to the mean as described previously. While we do see two 
negative and significant impacts of students who were scoring above average the first time we 
observe their ELA score, this could be reversion to the mean for students who scored 
idiosyncratically high in their first observed year. No other estimated effects in Table 11 are 





Subgroup Impacts of OSS Days on Standardized Math Scores (Anderson-Hsiao)  
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or 
below average test scores are based on the first available observation for that student. Grade-
level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on the grade 
level associated with each particular observation. 
ƚSubgroup effects are statistically different. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Panel A: Male Female
1-2 OSS Days in PY 0.0197 0.0149 0.0327 ** -0.0039 0.0134 0.0369 *
(0.0102) (0.0184) (0.0118) (0.0133) (0.0110) (0.0152)
3-4 OSS Days in PY 0.0154 -0.0029 0.0209 -0.0079 -0.0081 ƚ 0.0538 **ƚ
(0.0105) (0.0202) (0.0120) (0.0144) (0.0117) (0.0157)
5-6 OSS Days in PY 0.0420 ** -0.0242 0.0527 ** -0.0192 0.0196 0.0602 **
(0.0154) (0.0319) (0.0171) (0.0231) (0.0173) (0.0232)
7-10 OSS Days in PY 0.0318 -0.0472 0.0227 0.0180 0.0073 0.0527 
(0.0180) (0.0409) (0.0202) (0.0278) (0.0204) (0.0278)
11+ OSS Days in PY 0.0785 ** 0.1530 * 0.1070 ** 0.0089 0.1180 ** 0.0209 
(0.0257) (0.0635) (0.0278) (0.0451) (0.0293) (0.0404)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade, School, District, and Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-score 0.242  ** 0.152 ** 0.213  ** 0.216 ** 0.245 ** 0.164 **
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.560   0.361  ** 1.187  0.438 ** 0.420 0.379 **
(10.11)    (0.026) (11.36)   (0.017) (4.554) (0.020)
Observations 404,859 255,967 230,981 429,845 336,029  324,797
Number of Students 168,096 107,714 95,494   180,316 140,556  135,254 
Panel B: 
1-2 OSS Days in PY 0.0331 0.0355 ** 0.0374 ** -0.0044 0.0358 0.0149 
(0.0324) (0.0080) (0.0113) (0.0142) (0.0253) (0.0094)
3-4 OSS Days in PY -0.0817 *ƚ 0.0514 **ƚ 0.0272 * 0.0029 0.0178 0.0142
(0.0348) (0.0083) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.0317) (0.0096)
5-6 OSS Days in PY -0.0014 0.0569 ** 0.0542 ** -0.0000 0.1340 * 0.0249 
(0.0503) (0.0124) (0.0171) (0.0236) (0.0537) (0.0141)
7-10 OSS Days in PY -0.0179 0.0470  ** 0.0444 * -0.0040 -0.0366 0.0267 
(0.0579) (0.0148) (0.0199) (0.0292) (0.0604) (0.0168)
11+ OSS Days in PY -0.0795 0.0752 ** 0.1240 ** -0.0059 0.0780 0.0886 **
(0.0914) (0.0208) (0.0282) (0.0458) (0.0892) (0.0241)
PY Infraction Counts By Category Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade, School, District, and Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-score 0.367  ** -0.026  ** 0.283  ** 0.009  0.181  ** 0.214  **
(0.011)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.005)  
Constant 0.564  ** 0.314  ** 0.421  2.781  0.727  ** 5.260   **
(0.047)  (0.011)  (7.536)  (4.788)  (0.028)  (1.724)  
Observations 72,338 588,488 333,836 326,990 129,908 530,743
Number of Students 33,897   247,024 136,869 138,941 128,565  239,462 
Grades 2-5 Grades 6-10













Subgroup Impacts of OSS Days on Standardized ELA Scores (Anderson-Hsiao) 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or 
below average test scores are based on the first available observation for that student. Grade-
level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on the grade 
level associated with each particular observation. 
ƚSubgroup effects are statistically different. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Panel A:
1-2 OSS Days in PY 0.0154 0.0585 * 0.0382 ** -0.0068 0.0233 0.0098 
(0.0129) (0.0232) (0.0146) (0.0171) (0.0137) (0.0203)
3-4 OSS Days in PY 0.0436 ** 0.0189 0.0579 **ƚ -0.0168 ƚ 0.0265 0.0637 **
(0.0146) (0.0286) (0.0161) (0.0209) (0.0159) (0.0231)
5-6 OSS Days in PY 0.0487 * 0.0233 0.0666 ** -0.0505 0.0440 0.0490 
(0.0226) (0.0476) (0.0241) (0.0365) (0.0246) (0.0369)
7-10 OSS Days in PY 0.0745 ** 0.1460 * 0.0790 ** 0.0575 0.0891 ** 0.0733 
(0.0272) (0.0618) (0.0298) (0.0425) (0.0295) (0.0468)
11+ OSS Days in PY 0.1380 ** -0.1140 0.1430 ** -0.0552 0.1040 * 0.2310 **
(0.0391) (0.0999) (0.0416) (0.0709) (0.0427) (0.0696)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade, School, District, and Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-score 0.252  ** 0.266  ** 0.212  ** 0.301  ** 0.258  ** 0.284  **
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.554  0.427  ** 0.310  ** 0.629  ** 0.416  0.420 **
(9.463) (0.030) (0.023) (0.021) (8.069) (0.024)
Observations 310,955 201,729 176,177 336,507 259,632 253,052
Number of Students 143,427 92,490   81,323   154,594 119,758 116,159 
Panel B: 
1-2 OSS Days in PY 0.0899 * 0.0267 ** 0.0451 ** -0.0098 0.0464 0.0134 
(0.0400) (0.0098) (0.0152) (0.0164) (0.0266) (0.0122)
3-4 OSS Days in PY 0.0024 0.0564 ** 0.0721 **ƚ -0.0111 ƚ 0.0367 0.0369 **
(0.0467) (0.0113) (0.0173) (0.0194) (0.0336) (0.0138)
5-6 OSS Days in PY 0.1260 0.0436 * 0.0925 **ƚ -0.0694 *ƚ 0.1400 * 0.0300 
(0.0719) (0.0177) (0.0261) (0.0340) (0.0567) (0.0213)
7-10 OSS Days in PY 0.1360 0.0653 ** 0.1440 **ƚ -0.1220 **ƚ -0.0069 0.0930 **
(0.0841) (0.0216) (0.0311) (0.0446) (0.0639) (0.0261)
11+ OSS Days in PY -0.0950 0.0887 ** 0.1700 **ƚ -0.0454 ƚ 0.1250 0.1200 **
(0.1360) (0.0308) (0.0454) (0.0642) (0.0953) (0.0378)
PY Infraction Counts By Category Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade, School, District, and Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-score 0.297  ** 0.020   ** 0.277  ** 0.134  ** 0.225  ** 0.274  **
(0.012)  (0.005)  (0.007) (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005)  
Constant 6.732  0.311  ** 0.470   0.206  ** 0.738  ** 0.316  **
(35.90)    (0.013)  (8.481)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.017)  
Observations 54,294 458,390 233,186 279,498 128,568 384,112
Number of Students 28,087   211,684 107,377 128,540 127,284 199,859 













 The results presented so far exclude students expelled or referred to an ALE for 
disciplinary reasons during the study period. We conduct similar analyses with these students 
added back in, estimating the effect of the cumulative days of exclusionary discipline (including 
OSS, ALE, and expulsion).15 The results reiterate that there is not a negative impact of 
exclusionary discipline on math or ELA test scores. Compared to the overall results in columns 2 
and 4 of Table 4 (0.0039 s.d. in math and 0.0095 in ELA), the overall results using all three 
forms of arguably exclusionary discipline are null impacts on both types of test scores (see 
Appendix Table B1). 
 In addition, while the subgroup impacts of OSS (using the linear specification of OSS 
days) in Tables 8 and 9 were always null or slightly positive, we find a negative impact of 
exclusionary discipline more generally (including ALE and expulsions along with OSS) on 
White students in math (-0.002 s.d.) and in ELA (-0.003 s.d.). The results for all other subgroups 
are still null or slightly positive (see Appendix Tables B2 and B3). 
 Further, we analyze, by subgroup, the impacts of 1-2 days, 3-4 days, 5-6 days, 7-10 days, 
and 11 or more days of exclusionary discipline (as in Tables 7, 10, and 11 but with all three types 
of exclusionary discipline, rather than just OSS). The results are in Appendix Tables B4 (for the 
math and ELA estimates for the overall sample), B5 (for the subgroup effects on math test 
                                                 
15 In some cases, the number of days of suspension or expulsion was recorded as something 
higher than the typical number of school days in an academic year (180). For example, in some 
cases, the number of days was listed as 365, which seems to indicate the intention of expelling a 
student for a full year or 180 school days, not 365. In all cases in which the number of days of 
suspension, expulsion, or ALE was greater than 180, they were recoded to equal 180 days. If no 
days were listed, it was coded as zero days. In less than 0.07% of OSS infractions, there were not 
days of OSS reported, in 2.07% of expulsion cases, no days were reported, and in 10.76% of 




scores), and B6 (for the subgroup effects on ELA test scores). No estimated math test score 
impacts were negative. In Table B6, for the ELA subgroup impacts of 1-2 days, 3-4 days, 5-6 
days, 7-10 days, and 11 or more days of exclusionary discipline (OSS, expulsion, and ALE), we 
estimate negative impacts in only two cases and only for students who scored above average the 
first time we observe them, which could indicate simply reversion to the mean. Although we 
found tiny negative impacts of prior year exclusionary discipline on White students’ math and 
ELA test scores overall (using the linear specification), none of the impacts of 1-2 days, 3-4 
days, 5-6 days, 7-10 days, and 11 or more days of exclusionary discipline are statistically 
significant. Our estimates of the subgroup impacts of prior year exclusionary discipline of all 
types (OSS, expulsion, and ALE) are generally null or very small positive impacts, so we have 
confidence that the null to slightly positive impacts of OSS are not driven by our sample 
restrictions. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
We embarked on this study with the objective of generating a better understanding of the 
impact of out-of-school suspensions on academic achievement, in light of the growing concern 
that exclusionary discipline harms the academic progress of students. Our prior assumption was 
that students would learn less when they are not in school. However, it is also possible that the 
kinds of students who receive OSS – perhaps disaffected or disengaged students – are exactly the 
students who would already experience academic declines because of that disengagement. In this 
situation fraught with endogeneity concerns, estimating causal relationships is quite challenging.  
Using dynamic panel data methods, we aimed to identify the causal impact of OSS days 
on a student’s academic achievement in the following year. The use of student fixed effects, with 




most previous work on this topic. The use of student fixed effects controls for the time-invariant 
characteristics of students, and predicting test scores in a future year helps us avoid the likely 
impact of contemporary shocks on OSS and test scores in the same year. A remaining concern 
for a causal interpretation of these results is that there may be time-varying shocks to students 
that affect discipline and student test scores over time. However, the remaining assumptions 
needed for causal interpretation in this case are certainly less strict and more realistic than those 
imposed by OLS, so these findings are still an important contribution to the field. 
In general, we find that OSS days have a very small positive impact on the following 
year’s test scores in math (about 0.004 s.d. per day of OSS) and in ELA (about 0.010 s.d. per day 
of OSS). When we test for nonlinearities in the impacts, we find null to slightly positive effects, 
with no evidence of negative impacts on test scores. When we analyze the effects of OSS across 
various different models, there are only three negative and statistically significant impacts, (out 
of 156 different coefficients reported), so this could be due to mere chance. In general, any 
positive impacts we do find are quite small, but still significant due to high analytic power, so we 
interpret the results less as an indication of positive impacts and more as a rejection of negative 
impacts of OSS on test scores.  
Our primary estimates are derived from a sample that is very representative of the state as 
a whole, but that excludes some of the most extreme disciplinary offenders (the students expelled 
or referred to an ALE for disciplinary reasons during our study period). In addition, the impact of 
OSS on student test scores is only estimated using variation in exposure to OSS of students who 
had at least one day of OSS. While this is a limitation, the students with at least one day of OSS 
during the study period are arguably the most relevant group from a policy point of view as these 




ensure comparison of OSS with non-exclusionary consequences such as in-school suspension, 
corporal punishment, no action, or “other,” these primary estimates refer to the impacts of OSS 
on a more typical, perhaps less high-risk type of student. Even in our robustness checks, where 
we include the most highly disciplined students (those who were expelled or referred to an ALE 
for disciplinary reasons), the general finding is of null to small positive impacts, with very few 
(and inconsistently) statistically significant negative impacts. 
Overall, the results were surprising to us. While our prior assumption was that OSS most 
likely depresses the academic achievement of suspended students, we find, at least in this one 
state, no evidence that OSS negatively impacts student test scores. Why might this be? One 
possibility is that disciplinary consequences are doing what they are, at least in part, intended to 
do: encourage students to get back on track. It could be that students with many suspension days 
receive additional supports at home or from the community to reinvest them in their education, 
and that this translates into positive growth in the next year. It could also be that other school-
based interventions follow suspensions and precede academic gains. For example, students in 
Arkansas who receive exclusionary discipline in eighth grade are more likely to be retained in 
ninth grade, compared to similar peers who received no exclusionary discipline (Swanson, 
Erickson, & Ritter, 2017). While holding back a student is certainly not an educational 
intervention to be used to improve test scores, perhaps we observe a slight test scores benefit in 
some students if they are suspended out of school, retained a grade, and then receive an extra 
year of math or ELA instruction in a course in which they were previously struggling. However, 





These results are important given the trend toward reining in the use of OSS in schools. 
According to Steinberg and Lacoe (2017), as of May 2015, 22 states and the District of 
Columbia had revised their laws in order to “require or encourage schools to: limit the use of 
exclusionary discipline practices; implement supportive (that is, nonpunitive) discipline 
strategies that rely on behavioral interventions; and provide support services such as counseling, 
dropout prevention, and guidance services for at-risk students.” In addition, as of the 2015–16 
school year, 23 of the nation’s 100 largest school districts changed policies to require 
nonpunitive discipline strategies and/or limit suspension use (Steinberg & Lacoe, 2017). Based 
on our results, if policymakers continue to push for reductions in exclusionary discipline, they 
should not expect improvements in academic impacts to follow. 
In fact, recent experiences in states and cities implementing suspension reduction policies 
indicate that these policies might not work as planned, and unintended negative consequences 
could occur. For example, Loveless (2017) documents efforts in California to reduce out-of-
school suspensions. The California reforms were of two types: 1) outlawing suspensions in third 
grade and below for willful defiance (a.k.a. insubordination) and 2) incorporating restorative 
justice. While the report argues that this push to reduce OSS use was largely out of concern 
about racial disparities, the reforms have reduced the rate of suspensions overall without actually 
closing the gap between OSS usage for different racial groups. California middle schools and 
schools serving high proportions of poor or black students tended to have elevated suspension 
rates for Black students, and some educators have expressed concerns about declines in safety 




 Eden (2017) reports on changes in school climate in NYC, using student and teacher 
surveys conducted over a ten year period in which two sets of discipline policy reforms occurred: 
one during the Bloomberg mayoral administration, and one under Mayor Bill de Blasio. 
Bloomberg’s reforms were two-fold: 1) prohibiting the use of suspensions for first-time, low-
level offenses such as ‘uncooperative/noncompliant” behaviors or ‘disorderly behavior” and 2) 
setting the maximum number of days (5) for suspensions in kindergarten through grade three for 
mid-level offenses such as “disruptive behavior,” shoving, using racial slurs, or inappropriate 
physical contact. Eden argues that school climate measures based on survey responses stayed 
relatively constant during Bloomberg’s reforms, but that school climate deteriorated following a 
different type of reform during de Blasio’s time as mayor. Beginning under de Blasio, principals 
were required to obtain written permission from the Office of Safety and Youth Development 
(OSYD) to suspend a student for “uncooperative/ noncompliant” and “disorderly” behavior. 
According to Eden, following de Blasio’s reform, teachers reported less order and discipline, and 
students reported more violence, drug use, alcohol use, and gang activity, as well as lower 
mutual respect among their peers. Echoing Loveless’ (2017) concerns about differential impacts 
on certain types of schools, Eden (2017) finds that schools with high concentrations of non-
White students experienced the worst declines in climate. 
While the issues highlighted in Loveless (2017) and Eden (2017) focus on systemic 
effects on schools, it is clear from the current study that even the expected impacts on the actual 
students suspended may be minimal, at least in terms of student test scores. Therefore, as some 
have argued, the case against the use of suspensions is weaker than advocates have often led 
themselves to believe (Griffith, 2017). We should not necessarily expect better test scores or 




this dissertation reports on a study utilizing eight years of data from Arkansas in which I find that 
a policy prohibiting the use of OSS as a consequence for truancy had low implementation 
fidelity, particularly in high-minority schools with high truancy and OSS rates, and that the 
policy may not have had any impact on school level outcomes such as math and ELA test scores, 
student attendance, and chronic absenteeism. (Anderson, 2017). Given the lack of a clear benefit 
from reducing exclusionary discipline, some have argued that school districts are changing 
discipline policies too quickly (Mathews, 2017), referring to the changes as “sickening rides on 
the out-of-school-suspension roller coaster.” 
Still, there could be valid reasons (beyond improving test scores) for school leaders to use 
exclusionary discipline sparingly. Exclusionary discipline disproportionately affects students of 
color (Anderson & Ritter, 2017; Anyon et al., 2014; Losen et al., 2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010; 
Sartain et al., 2015; Skiba et al., 2014; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et al., 2002), and these 
documented disparities suggest that the use of exclusionary discipline should at least be 
evaluated and researched further. Perhaps, regardless of the lack of a negative impact on student 
test scores, the use of exclusionary discipline, if perceived as overly harsh or unfair, could still 
lead to negative school climate or distrust in a school community.  
Where does this leave us? On its own, reductions in OSS may not be effective, but there 
are non-trivial reasons to reevaluate the use of OSS in schools. However, if states or school 
districts seek to reduce reliance on exclusionary discipline, they should do so while improving 
access to preventative and supportive systems at the same time. School-Wide Positive 
Behavioral Interventions and Supports (SWPBIS a.k.a PBIS), for example, is a framework that 




students. There is experimental evidence indicating that implementation of a PBIS framework 
can have a positive impact on perceptions of school safety and test scores (Horner et al., 2009).  
In this study, we find a counterintuitive result that OSS does not harm student test scores, 
which suggests that educators and policy makers should think carefully about policies designed 
solely with the goal of reducing suspensions for the sake of increasing test scores. Therefore, 
while there may be some promising alternatives to OSS, it is not clear what we should expect 
from reductions in OSS, particularly if high-level policy changes are not supported by capacity 
building at the local level. In addition, while large-scale policy changes may achieve the narrow 
goal of reducing suspensions, future research is needed to determine systemic impacts on all 
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Appendix A– Comparing OLS Results Excluding Students who Never Received OSS 
Appendix Table A1 
OLS Models Comparing Full Sample to Sample Excluding Students Who Never Received OSS 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the 
student level. Robustness check sample excludes students who never received OSS. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
b Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, limited 
English proficiency, and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and 
Other). 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days -0.0060 ** -0.0039 *** -0.0056 ** -0.0033 ***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects
Student Demographic Controlsb Y Y Y Y
Lagged Z-Score 0.714  ** 0.672  *** 0.686  ** 0.681  ***
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  
Constant
Observations 1,033,936 183,848 839,542 137,795
Number of Students 367,759 61,425 324,033 52,053
Dependent Variable:           
Math Z-Score










Appendix B – Robustness Check to Include Students Expelled and/or Referred to ALE 
Appendix Table B1 
Overall Impacts Including Students Expelled and/or Referred to ALE (Comparable to Table 4) 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the 
student level. Exclusion days includes Out of School Suspension, expulsion, and referrals to 
ALE. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
b Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, limited 
English proficiency, and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and 
Other). 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior Year (PY) Exclusion Days -0.0038 ** 0.0010 -0.0031 ** 0.0012 
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y
Student Demographic Controlsb Y Y
Lagged Z-Score 0.715  ** 0.208  ** 0.687  ** 0.260   **
(0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.005)  
Constant 0.375  ** 0.403  **
(0.012)  (0.014)  
Observations 1,042,876 666,665 846,583 517,037
Number of Students 370,744 278,171 326,672 237,906
Dependent Variable:            
Math Z-Score
Dependent Variable:          
ELA Z-Score
Student FE with 
Anderson-HsiaoPooled OLS Pooled OLS





Appendix Table B2 
Subgroup Impacts in Math Including Students Expelled and/or Referred to ALE (Comparable to 
Table 8)  
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or 
below average test scores are based on the first available observation for that student. Grade-
level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on the grade 
level associated with each particular observation. 
ƚSubgroup effects are statistically different. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Panel A: Male Female
Prior Year (PY) Exclusion Days 0.0015 -0.0012 0.0029 **ƚ -0.0021 *ƚ 0.0011 0.0005 
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-Score 0.242  ** 0.152  ** 0.212  ** 0.217  ** 0.245  ** 0.164  **
(0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Constant -0.718  0.360    ** 0.297  ** 0.435  ** 0.375  ** 0.383  **
(13.04)   (0.026)   (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.020)  
Observations 409,955 256,710 235,038 431,627 340,237 326,428
Number of Students 170,147 108,024 97,115   181,056 142,284 135,887 
Panel B:
Prior Year (PY) Exclusion Days -0.0023 0.0012 * 0.0022 **ƚ -0.0022 ƚ -0.0019 0.0014 *
(0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0007)
PY Infraction Counts By Category Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-Score 0.365  ** -0.027   ** 0.283  ** 0.009  0.183  ** 0.214  **
(0.011)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.005)  
Constant 0.399  0.308  ** 0.405  ** 0.304  ** 0.726  ** 0.299  **
(24.16)    (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.014)  
Observations 73,284 593,381 338,404 328,261 130,841 535,646
Number of Students 34,327   249,027 138,715 139,456 129,481 241,596 
Above Avg. 
Math Score Grades 2-5












Appendix Table B3 
Subgroup Impacts in ELA Including Students Expelled and/or Referred to ALE (Comparable to 
Table 9)  
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or 
below average test scores are based on the first available observation for that student. Grade-
level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on the grade 
level associated with each particular observation. 
ƚSubgroup effects are statistically different. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Panel A: 
Prior Year (PY) Exclusion Days 0.0016 -0.0006 0.0036 **ƚ -0.0027 *ƚ 0.0013 0.0008 
(0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0016)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-Score 0.250   ** 0.264  ** 0.210   ** 0.293  ** 0.257  ** 0.283  **
(0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Constant 0.399  ** 0.396  ** 0.321  ** 0.467  ** 0.388  ** 0.436  **
(0.017)  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.024)  
Observations 314,794 202,243 179,271 337,766 262,765 254,272
Number of Students 145,167 92,739   82,712   155,194 121,201 116,705 
Panel B: 
Prior Year (PY) Exclusion Days -0.0031 0.0013 0.0021 * -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0013 
(0.0026) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0009)
PY Infraction Counts By Category Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-Score 0.293  ** 0.017   ** 0.276  ** 0.135  ** 0.225  ** 0.273  **
(0.012)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005)  
Constant 0.646  ** 0.306  ** 1.466  0.307  ** 0.738  ** 0.314  **
(0.055)  (0.013)  (13.93)    (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.017)  
Observations 54,985 462,052 236,546 280,491 129,469 387,562
Number of Students 28,435   213,377 108,901 129,005 128,169 201,629 












Appendix Table B4 
Overall Impacts Including Students Expelled and/or Referred to ALE (Comparable to Table 7) 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the 
student level. Reference group is 0 days of OSS in prior year.  
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
b Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, limited 
English proficiency, and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and 
Other). 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1-2 Exclusion Days in PY -0.0553 ** 0.0191 ** -0.0642 ** 0.0106 
(0.0034) (0.0058) (0.0044) (0.0075)
3-4 Exclusion Days in PY -0.0762 ** 0.0443 ** -0.0759 ** 0.0286 **
(0.0042) (0.0072) (0.0055) (0.0098)
5-6 Exclusion Days in PY -0.0845 ** 0.0365 ** -0.0921 ** 0.0507 **
(0.0062) (0.0104) (0.0083) (0.0145)
7-10 Exclusion Days in PY -0.1150 ** 0.0417 ** -0.1060 ** 0.0328 
(0.0069) (0.0122) (0.0096) (0.0173)
11+ Exclusion Days in PY -0.1210 ** 0.0714 ** -0.1270 ** 0.0395 
(0.0088) (0.0164) (0.0122) (0.0235)
PY Infraction Counts By Categorya Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y
Student Demographic Controlsb Y Y
Lagged Z-Score 0.714  ** 0.207  ** 0.686  ** 0.260   **
(0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.005)  
Constant 0.375  ** 0.405  **
(0.012)  (0.014)  
Observations 1,042,876 666,665 846,583 517,037
Number of Students 370,744   278,171   326,672   237,906   
Dependent Variable:          
Math Z-Score
Dependent Variable:           
ELA Z-Score
Pooled OLS
Student FE with 
Anderson-Pooled OLS





Appendix Table B5 
Subgroup Impacts in Math Including Students Expelled and/or Referred to ALE  
(Comparable to Table 10)  
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the 
student level. Reference group is 0 days of OSS in prior year. All models include PY Infraction 
Counts by Category and Grade, School, District, and Student Fixed Effects. 
ƚSubgroup effects are statistically different. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
b Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, limited 
English proficiency, and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and 
Other). 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Panel A: Male Female
1-2 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0269 ** -0.0046 0.0363 **ƚ -0.0005 ƚ 0.0161 * 0.0273 **
(0.0070) (0.0109) (0.0088) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0097)
3-4 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0495 ** 0.0237 0.0505 ** 0.0276 ** 0.0326 ** 0.0678 **
(0.0083) (0.0148) (0.0099) (0.0104) (0.0091) (0.0121)
5-6 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0385 ** 0.0325 0.0500 ** 0.0099 0.0271 * 0.0528 **
(0.0119) (0.0222) (0.0139) (0.0156) (0.0130) (0.0181)
7-10 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0456 ** 0.0236 0.0505 ** 0.0153 0.0274 0.0684 **
(0.0137) (0.0279) (0.0158) (0.0193) (0.0152) (0.0212)
11+ Exclusion Days in PY 0.0843 ** 0.0040 0.1070 **ƚ -0.0148 ƚ 0.0646 ** 0.0777 **
(0.0184) (0.0390) (0.0209) (0.0266) (0.0203) (0.0290)
Lagged Math Z-score 0.242  ** 0.152  ** 0.212  ** 0.217  ** 0.245  ** 0.162  **
(0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Constant 1.352  5.890   0.299  ** 0.434  ** 0.375  ** 0.384  **
(11.25)    (14.58)    (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.020)  
Observations 409,955 256,710 235,038 431,627 340,237 326,428
Number of Students 170,147 108,024 97,115   181,056 142,284 135,887 
Panel B: 
1-2 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0195 0.0425 ** 0.0274 ** 0.0171 * 0.018  0.0177 **
(0.0230) (0.0052) (0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0167) (0.0062)
3-4 Exclusion Days in PY -0.0045 ƚ 0.0795 **ƚ 0.0624 ** 0.0305 ** 0.0194 0.0467 **
(0.0279) (0.0065) (0.0093) (0.0114) (0.0236) (0.0075)
5-6 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0159 0.0734 ** 0.0547 ** 0.0189 0.0544 0.0335 **
(0.0389) (0.0094) (0.0131) (0.0173) (0.0356) (0.0108)
7-10 Exclusion Days in PY -0.0078 0.0853 ** 0.0569 ** 0.0354 -0.0296 0.0459 **
(0.0452) (0.0110) (0.0151) (0.0213) (0.0418) (0.0127)
11+ Exclusion Days in PY -0.0010 0.0948 ** 0.1170 **ƚ -0.0359 ƚ 0.0088 0.0753 **
(0.0612) (0.0148) (0.0202) (0.0293) (0.0533) (0.0172)
Lagged Math Z-score 0.366  ** -0.028   ** 0.282  ** 0.009   0.182  ** 0.213  **
(0.011)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.005)  
Constant 0.548  ** 0.309  ** 20.95  0.304  ** 0.725  ** 0.300   **
(0.047)  (0.011)  (12.82)    (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.014)  
Observations 73,284 593,381 338,404 328,261 130,841 535,646
Number of Students 34,327   249,027 138,715 139,456 129,481 241,596 
Grades 2-5 Grades 6-10












Appendix Table B6 
Subgroup Impacts in ELA Including Students Expelled and/or Referred to ALE (Comparable to 
Table 11) 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the 
student level. Reference group is 0 days of OSS in prior year. All models include PY Infraction 
Counts by Category and Grade, School, District, and Student Fixed Effects. 
ƚSubgroup effects are statistically different. 
a PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of 
infractions of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, 
gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year. 
b Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, limited 
English proficiency, and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and 
Other). 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Panel A:
1-2 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0180 * 0.0020 0.0372 **ƚ -0.0106 ƚ 0.0113 -0.0103 
(0.0090) (0.0139) (0.0112) (0.0102) (0.0094) (0.0132)
3-4 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0397 ** 0.0107 0.0500 ** -0.0022 0.0317 ** 0.0014 
(0.0114) (0.0204) (0.0132) (0.0146) (0.0122) (0.0178)
5-6 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0644 ** 0.0177 0.0691 ** 0.0204 0.0467 ** 0.0406 
(0.0167) (0.0311) (0.0191) (0.0221) (0.0177) (0.0275)
7-10 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0402 * 0.0354 0.0437 * 0.0133 0.0424 * -0.0163 
(0.0197) (0.0405) (0.0221) (0.0281) (0.0211) (0.0331)
11+ Exclusion Days in PY 0.0570  * -0.0517 0.0613 * -0.0343 0.0549 -0.0215 
(0.0266) (0.0557) (0.0300) (0.0375) (0.0282) (0.0472)
Lagged ELA Z-score 0.250   ** 0.264  ** 0.211  ** 0.292  ** 0.257  ** 0.283  **
(0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Constant 0.402  ** 0.396  ** 0.323  ** 0.466  ** 0.389  ** 0.437  **
(0.017)  (0.029)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.024)  
Observations 314,794 202,243 179,271 337,766 262,765 254,272
Number of Students 145,167 92,739   82,712   155,194 121,201 116,705 
Panel B: 
1-2 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0725 * 0.0277 ** 0.0303 ** 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0096 
(0.0285) (0.0066) (0.0108) -0.0101 (0.0176) (0.0083)
3-4 Exclusion Days in PY 0.0308 0.0546 ** 0.0674 **ƚ -0.0115 ƚ -0.0061 0.0305 **
(0.0360) (0.0087) (0.0135) (0.0143) (0.0248) (0.0107)
5-6 Exclusion Days in PY 0.1030 * 0.0667 ** 0.1050 **ƚ -0.0423 ƚ 0.1500 **ƚ 0.0278 ƚ
(0.0521) (0.0129) (0.0195) (0.0225) (0.0375) (0.0157)
7-10 Exclusion Days in PY 0.1360 * 0.0387 * 0.0937 **ƚ -0.0864 **ƚ -0.0155 0.0329 
(0.0620) (0.0154) (0.0228) (0.0290) (0.0442) (0.0189)
11+ Exclusion Days in PY 0.0471 0.0316 0.0936 **ƚ -0.0835 *ƚ 0.0330 0.0281 
(0.0813) (0.0210) (0.0308) (0.0396) (0.0563) (0.0258)
Lagged ELA Z-score 0.292  ** 0.0169 ** 0.275  ** 0.135  ** 0.224  ** 0.273  **
(0.019)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005)  
Constant 0.646  ** 0.309  ** 0.408  0.307  ** 0.737  ** 0.316  **
(0.055)  (0.013)  (9.363)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.017)  
Observations 54,985 462,052 236,546 280,491 129,469 387,562
Number of Students 28,435   213,377 108,901 129,005 128,169 201,629 
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Exclusionary discipline such as out-of-school suspension (OSS) and expulsion is 
associated with lower student achievement, higher risk of drop-out or grade retention, and 
involvement in the juvenile justice system. Further, there is concern about higher rates of 
exposure to exclusionary discipline for students of color and special education students. In 
response, many schools, districts, and states are moving toward less exclusionary consequences. 
In 2013, the Arkansas state legislature passed a bill prohibiting the use of OSS as a consequence 
for truancy. Yet, even after three school years, there has not been a full reduction in the use of 
OSS for truancy. If the policy did not succeed in eliminating the use of OSS for truancy, what 
did happen? 
In this paper, I use eight years of student- and infraction-level data for all K-12 students 
in Arkansas public schools to assess descriptively which school-level factors are associated with 
the use of OSS as a consequence for truancy in the year the law was passed, and which are 
associated with policy compliance. In addition, I utilize a comparative interrupted time series 
analysis to estimate whether school-level outcomes (test scores, attendance, chronic absenteeism, 




I find schools that served more minority students, schools that had higher rates of 
truancy, and schools that had higher rates of OSS were less likely to comply with the policy, 
all else equal. Combined, these results suggest that the types of schools likely targeted by 
this policy are the same ones not fully complying with it. Combined with a lack of evidence 
that the policy was associated with improved student achievement, attendance, or chronic 
absenteeism, these findings suggest that the potential impact of state-level policies, which 
sound beneficial prima facie, may be limited if policy changes are not communicated well to 
schools, if there is not accountability to ensure compliance, and if there is not school 





Introduction and Literature Review 
There is growing concern in the education community about chronic absenteeism, which 
the U.S. Department of Education (2016) has called a “hidden educational crisis.” Absenteeism 
refers to any period of not attending school, while chronic absenteeism is defined as student 
absenteeism representing over 10% of the school year (Gottfried, 2015). Across the country, 10-
15% of students are chronically absent in a typical school year (Balfanz & Byrnes, 2012), but the 
problem is even greater in urban areas such as New York City, where over 23 percent of 
elementary school students were chronically absent in 2009 (Nauer, Mader, Robinson, & Jacobs, 
2014). The picture is even worse within particularly low-income parts of the city, with almost 40 
percent of students chronically absent in some areas (Nauer et al., 2014). 
Chronic absenteeism is related to truancy, which has been linked to negative outcomes 
such as gang activity, burglary, auto theft, and vandalism (Bell, Rosen, & Dynlacht, 1994; 
Dryfoos, 1990; Garry, 1996; Huizinga, Loeber, & Thornberry, 1995; Rohrman, 1993). Adults 
who were frequently truant earlier in life are more likely to have poor physical and mental 
health, lower paying jobs, increased reliance on welfare, children who exhibit problem 
behaviors, and an increased risk of incarceration (Bell et al., 1994; Dryfoos, 1990; Ingersoll & 
LeBoeuf, 1997; Rohrman, 1993).  
Some researchers consider absenteeism and truancy to be distinct in that absenteeism is 
defined as periods of not attending school, while truancy is an unexcused and unlawful absence 
from school without parental knowledge or consent, with the student typically spending time 
away from home (Bell et al., 1994; Lee & Miltenberger, 1996). Other scholars have argued that 




students) and when absenteeism accompanies other risky behaviors (Gottfried, 2015). It is very 
likely that different schools and districts have varied definitions for what constitutes truancy. 
 Schools recognize truancy as a problem and use a variety of methods to respond to 
truancy including automatically failing students who miss a designated amount of school, 
disciplinary consequences such as in-school suspension (Kube & Ratigan, 1992) or out-of-school 
suspension (OSS) (Pell, 2000), and legal consequences for parents (Smink & Heilbrunn, 2005).16 
Regardless of whether OSS is an appropriate consequence for truancy, many in the educational 
community are troubled by the general use of OSS and other types of exclusionary discipline for 
several reasons. 
OSS and expulsions are the two main types of exclusionary discipline, which remove the 
student from the traditional learning environment. In Arkansas, out-of-school suspensions longer 
than 10 days are considered expulsions (Arkansas Code § 6-18-507). Exclusionary discipline has 
been linked to lower academic achievement (Arcia, 2006; Beck & Muschkin, 2012; Cobb-Clark, 
Kassenboehmer, Le, McVicar, & Zhang, 2015; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Raffaele-Mendez, 
Knoff, & Ferron, 2002; Rausch & Skiba, 2005; Skiba & Rausch, 2004), school drop-out and 
grade retention (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; American Psychological Association, 
2008; Balfanz, Byrnes, & Fox, 2014; Cobb-Clark et al., 2015; Fabelo et al., 2011; Gregory & 
Weinstein, 2008; Krezmien, Leone, & Achilles, 2006; Marchbanks, Blake, Smith, Seibert, & 
Carmichael, 2014; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Stearns & Glennie, 2006; Swanson, Erickson, & 
Ritter, 2017; Wald & Kurlaender, 2003), and involvement in the juvenile justice system 
(American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; Fabelo et al., 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, Birchmeier, & 
                                                 
16 For example, parents can be held civilly or criminally liable for their children’s misbehavior 




Valentine, 2009). There is particular concern about the disparate use of exclusionary discipline 
for students of color and special education students (Anderson & Ritter, 2017; Anyon et al., 
2014; Losen, Hodson, Keith, Morrison, & Belway, 2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010; Sartain et al., 
2015; Skiba et al., 2014; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002; U.S. 
Departments of Education and Justice, 2014). 
To date, very little of this research is causal. One study (Chapter 3 of this dissertation) 
estimates a causal impact, using rigorous dynamic panel data methods within a student fixed 
effects framework, and concludes there is no evidence of a negative impact of OSS on student 
test scores (Anderson, Ritter, & Zamarro, 2017). That study suggests a reduction in suspensions - 
if not accompanied by other reforms - may not improve student academic achievement. 
Despite a lack of causal evidence that suspensions harm students, many states and school 
districts have tried to reduce the use of exclusionary discipline. As of May 2015, 22 states and 
the District of Columbia had revised laws to limit exclusionary discipline and implement less 
punitive strategies, and as of the 2015-16 school year, 23 of the 100 largest school districts had 
implemented similar reforms (Steinberg & Lacoe, 2017). These reforms include reducing the 
length of suspensions as in Chicago (Stevens et al., 2015), limiting suspension for certain minor 
misbehaviors as in California (Public Counsel, 2014), reducing suspensions for young students 
as in Seattle (Cornwell, 2015), or even completely eliminating the use of suspensions as in 
Miami-Dade (O’Connor, 2015). However, while OSS has officially been eliminated in Miami-
Dade, some students are still reportedly sent home from school, and teachers have concerns that 
the reduction was attempted without sufficient staff buy-in and support (Gerety, 2016). 
Choosing to exclude students from school as a consequence for truancy is certainly 




hard to justify using OSS as a response to truancy given that the consequence for not attending 
school further removes the student from school (U.S. Departments of Education and Justice, 
2014). However, because the students who are truant or chronically absent often are the same 
ones with disciplinary issues (Baker, Sigmon, & Nugent, 2001; Balfanz et al. 2014; Huizinga, 
Loeber, Thornberry, & Cothern, 2000), the causal relationship between disciplinary policies and 
absenteeism is difficult to untangle. Truancy is found to predict exclusionary discipline, but the 
reverse is true as well. Excluding students from school for disciplinary reasons is related to lower 
attendance, higher risk of course failure, and a path of disengagement from school (Balfanz et 
al., 2014). Truancy is a major risk factor for multiple suspensions, expulsions, and school 
dropout (Baker et al., 2001; Huizinga et al., 2000), and students may begin to disengage from 
school through nonattendance at very early ages (Alexander, Entwisle, & Kabanni, 2001; Epstein 
& Sheldon, 2002). In addition, there is potential for confounding factors to influence both 
truancy and discipline referrals. However, no evidence identifies a clearly causal relationship 
between truancy and other disciplinary outcomes. 
Despite a lack of causal evidence, there is support for the idea that exclusionary 
discipline should not be used for truancy (Smink & Heilbrunn, 2005; U.S. Departments of 
Education and Justice, 2014). The U.S. Departments of Education and Justice (2014) wrote: 
“policies that impose out-of-school suspensions or expulsions for truancy also raise concerns 
because a school would likely have difficulty demonstrating that excluding a student from 
attending school in response to the student’s efforts to avoid school was necessary to meet an 
important educational goal” (p. 12). Truancy and dropout prevention groups recommend that 
schools never assign OSS as a punishment for truancy (Smink & Heilbrunn, 2005). However, 




recently adopted legislation to remove OSS as a legal consequence for truancy (Arkansas § 6-18-
507; O’Donnell, 2016). Arkansas is the focus of this study. 
In March 2013, the Arkansas state legislature passed a bill prohibiting OSS as a 
consequence for truancy (Arkansas Code § 6-18-507). This policy was a single sentence in a 
longer Act outlining, among other things, a requirement for the state to produce an annual report 
on disciplinary outcomes for various subgroups of students. There was not a full reduction in the 
use of OSS as a consequence for truancy, as the law intended, even by the 2015-16 school year. 
While 14% of truancy cases resulted in OSS during the 2012-13 school year, this figure only fell 
to 10% in 2013-14 and about 9% in 2014-15 and 2015-16. In February 2016, the Arkansas State 
Board of Education was notified that some schools were still using OSS as a consequence for 
truancy, but additional communication reminding schools of this change was not distributed until 
January 2017 (after the study period). Thus, the implementation failure may indicate a lack of 
communication about the law, an inability on the part of schools to respond fully, or that schools 
had full knowledge and ability to respond but chose not to. In Appendix A, I document the 
timeline of events relevant to this policy change in more detail. 
This paper addresses the implementation fidelity and outcomes of this state-level 
policy-based solution prohibiting the use of OSS as a consequence for truancy. Specifically, I 
ask three key research questions: 
1. What school-level factors predict whether a school was using OSS as a consequence for 
truancy in the baseline year, 2012-13? 
2. What school-level factors predict whether a school, among those using OSS as a 
consequence for truancy in 2012-13, complies with the policy in the following years? 




attendance, chronic absenteeism, and disciplinary outcomes change in “policy-affected” 
schools (i.e., those using OSS as a consequence for truancy in 2012-13)? 
Little is known currently about how these types of state-level policies are implemented at 
a local level, or their impact. Thus, this work fills a significant gap in our knowledge base 
regarding whether these types of broad-based policy solutions are feasible or effective. In the 
next section, I describe the data used in this study. Then, I describe the analytic methods. Finally, 
I present the results and discuss what they imply for future policy design. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This study uses eight years (2008-09 through 2015-16) of de-identified student 
demographic, achievement, attendance, and discipline referral data from all K-12 schools in 
Arkansas provided by the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE). Demographic data include 
race, gender, grade level, special education status, limited English proficiency (LEP) status, and 
free-and reduced-price lunch (FRL) status. Academic achievement data include standardized 
scores on state tests in ELA and mathematics for eight school years from 2008-09 to 2015-16. 
From 2008-09 to 2013-14, state tests in ELA and math were administered in grades 3-8, and End 
of Course (EOC) examinations were administered in Algebra I, Geometry, Algebra II, and 11th 
Grade Literacy as part of the Arkansas Comprehensive Testing, Assessment, and Accountability 
Program (ACTAAP). During the 2014-15 school year, and again in 2015-16, there was a change 
in standardized testing. In 2014-15, the state administered the Partnership for Assessment of 
Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC) tests aligned with the Common Core State 
Standards (CCSS). Under PARCC, literacy exams were administered in grades 3-10, grade level 
math exams were administered in grades 3-8, and end of course exams were administered for 




assessments in math and ELA in grades 3-10. Student achievement test scores are standardized 
within grade, year, test subject, and testing group (e.g. with accommodations or without) to 
account for differences in test administrations and scaling methods. 
Student-level attendance data are reported quarterly. In a small minority of cases, the sum 
of the days present and days absent for a quarter was unreasonable. For example, about 0.01% of 
cases had more than 65 days in total, which would be roughly equal to the maximum number of 
days per quarter if there were no breaks for weekends or holidays.17 In 2.3% of cases, there were 
more than 50 days, and in 3.4% of cases, there were more than 45 days, which would be a typical 
quarter-length given Arkansas’s normal 180 school-day calendar. To remove the impact of 
outliers, I use the Winsorization technique introduced by Charles P. Winsor (1895-1951) to 
replace the top five percent of values with the value at the 95th percentile.18 In these cases, an 
adjusted days absent was calculated so that the student-by-quarter-level percent of days absent 
remained constant pre- and post-Winsorization. 
Discipline data are at the individual infraction level and specify, for each incident, the 
infraction type (out of 19 types) and the corresponding consequence (out of 13 types). I group 
                                                 
17 These outliers were not clustered in particular schools, so I assume these outliers are not due to 
certain schools having a long or irregular school calendar. Rather, these outliers are likely due to 
some students being counted in more than one school (which is possible as some students switch 
schools during the school year, and school attendance counts may not accurately reflect the exact 
entry and exit dates for each student). Unfortunately, the attendance data files did not include 
school or district indicators, so it was impossible to determine whether duplicate entries for the 
same student and school year are due to multiple schools reporting for the same student. 
18 Winsorization is different from censoring, in that it replaces extreme values with less extreme 
values, rather than “trimming” or dropping the observations altogether (Locker, 2001). The 
choice between Winsorization and trimming is data- and context-specific, but Winsorization is 
used in this case, because the outliers are assumed to be real observations for real students that 
should not be dropped, but for some reason include too many days. Particularly in the case of 
non-symmetrical censoring (only censoring at one end of the distribution), statistical efficiency is 




handgun, rifle, and shotgun infractions into one category for gun-related infractions. I collapse 
13 consequence categories into 7: in school suspension (ISS), OSS, expulsion, referral to an 
alternative learning environment (ALE), corporal punishment, no action, and “other.”19 The most 
common consequences (for any infraction type) during the study period are ISS (38.3%), “other” 
consequences (24.9%), OSS (22.2%), and corporal punishment (13.3%). The “other” 
consequences do not fit into a state-designated reporting category and indicate a range of 
consequences such as morning, lunch, or after-school detentions, Saturday school,20 or other. 
Expulsions (0.10%), referrals to ALE (0.31%), and no action (0.85%) are rare. The focus of this 
study is on the interaction between truancy infractions, representing 6.4% of all infractions, and 
OSS, which was used in 11.4% of truancy cases during the study period. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for school-level truancy rates (incidents per 100 
students) for each year from 2008-09 to 2015-16. This time period includes four school years 
prior to the policy change, the year of the policy change (2012-13), and three outcome years. 
These statistics are presented for all schools, as well as for the set of schools with at least one 
truancy incident in the year observed. Between 60% and 66% of schools report zero truancy.21 
Generally, over time, fewer schools report zero truancy, indicating that either truancy is a 
growing concern, schools are increasing their reporting, or both. Some schools report high 
                                                 
19 “Other” non-specified consequences were coded as a particular type of consequence at the 
school level, but when combined and reported by the state, they are grouped into an “other” 
category. This group was labeled as “other” when we receive the data, and is not a researcher-
created group of consequences. There is a similar “other” category for infractions. 
20 It is unknown whether days of Saturday school are included in reported attendance data. 
21 About 80% of the schools reporting no truancy are elementary schools, which typically 
represent less than 50% of all schools. Schools reporting no truancy are proportionally 
distributed across the state’s five regions. Schools with no truancy are slightly poorer on average 
(the average school with no truancy is 66-67% FRL instead of 64-65% for the average school in 
the state). Finally, schools with no reported truancy serve a similar share of black students (20% 




truancy rates, with a maximum of 179.7 infractions per 100 students in 2011-12. It is possible 
that high truancy rates in some schools in 2011-12 were a factor leading to the state pursuing this 
policy change, although the average school’s truancy rate in this year (1.6 truancy infractions per 
100 students) was not particularly high relative to other years. On average, schools report 1.4 to 
2.4 incidents per 100 students per year, but among the schools that report at least some truancy, 
the typical rate is about 4.1 to 6.2 truancy incidents per 100 students.22 
Table 1 
School-Level Truancy Rates (Infractions per 100 Students) 
 
The trends in truancy and the consequences used in response are in Table 2. Following 
the passage of Act 1329, there was a small dip in the use of OSS as a consequence for truancy. In 
the school year in which Act 1329 was passed (2012-13), 13.8% of truancy cases resulted in 
OSS, and by 2015-16 this figure had decreased to 8.7%. At the same time, there was an increase 
in the use of “other” consequences which are specified at the local level, but then roll up to an 
“other” category at the state level. Combined, these two trends suggest that some schools are 
                                                 
22 These rates include multiple incidents per student, if applicable. Thus, given that there are 
some students with multiple truancy incidents per year, the percent of students written up for 
truancy in an average school is less than 4.1 percent per year. 
School 
Year





% of Schools 
with Zero 
Truancy Mean SD Min Max
n  of 
Schools Mean SD Min Max
2008-09 1,090  705 65% 1.58 4.54 0.00 57.82 385     4.47 6.74 0.09 57.82
2009-10 1,085  719 66% 1.81 6.12 0.00 98.10 366     5.38 9.60 0.07 98.10
2010-11 1,073  703 66% 1.76 5.67 0.00 91.93 370     5.10 8.74 0.09 91.93
2011-12 1,071  700 65% 1.61 6.89 0.00 179.74 371     4.65 11.10 0.07 179.74
2012-13 1,063  689 65% 1.44 3.95 0.00 43.69 374     4.08 0.06 0.08 43.69
2013-14 1,065  666 63% 1.81 5.68 0.00 81.09 399     4.83 0.08 0.08 81.09
2014-15 1,055  659 62% 2.32 7.48 0.00 136.71 396     6.19 0.11 0.12 136.71
2015-16 1,044  629 60% 2.36 7.78 0.00 111.84 415     5.93 0.11 0.11 111.84




shifting away from OSS towards these “other” types of consequences. There is also evidence of a 
shift away from using ISS, and this shift accounts for more of the increase in the “other” 
consequences than the shift away from OSS. For example, while between 2012-13 and 2013-14, 
the “other” consequences share increased by 17.1 percentage points, the ISS share dropped 13.3 
percentage points, and the OSS share only dropped 3.9 percentage points. 
Table 2 
Consequences Administered for Truancy, All Arkansas Schools 
 
Note. Number of schools indicates the number of schools that reported at least one truancy 
incident. Pre-policy 4-year average represents the weighted average from 2008-09 to 2011-12, or 
in other words, the percent of all truancy cases over those four years that resulted in each 
consequence type. Post-policy 3-year average represents the weighted average from 2013-14 to 
2015-16, or in other words, the percent of all truancy cases over those three years that resulted in 
each consequence type. 
 
Understanding what these “other” consequences represent is important for interpreting 
whether these shifts represent a meaningful change for students. Very limited qualitative 
evidence indicates these are primarily non-exclusionary consequences.23 
                                                 
23 I contacted an assistant superintendent/former principal, a principal, and a former teacher in 
three of the school districts with the largest number of instances of “other” consequences 
administered for truancy in the past two years (2014-15 and 2015-16). The 
superintendent/former principal stated that the response to truancy typically is ISS, but the 
Policy 
Passed
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
4-Year 
Average 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16
3-Year 
Average
Pct. Of Truancy Cases Resulting in:
ISS 71.4% 67.3% 68.5% 67.1% 68.5% 74.9% 61.5% 56.3% 51.9% 56.3%
Other Action 8.3% 16.7% 14.5% 17.4% 14.4% 9.0% 26.1% 31.7% 36.5% 31.7%
OSS 14.9% 12.1% 12.8% 12.6% 13.0% 13.8% 10.0% 9.1% 8.7% 9.2%
Corporal Punishment 4.9% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 3.3% 2.1% 1.6% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8%
No Action 0.3% 1.0% 1.3% 0.1% 0.7% 0.1% 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9%
ALE 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Expulsion 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Truancy Cases 9,968   11,834 11,734 10,464 44,000 9,407  12,914 14,987 15,598 43,499 





The trends in Table 2 and the apparent replacement of ISS and OSS as consequences for 
truancy with “other” consequences represent the trends for the entire state, including schools that 
never used OSS for truancy. To look more closely at the schools likely to be affected by the 
policy change, I assess the trend in disciplinary practices in the subset of 192 schools that were 
using OSS as a consequence for truancy in the baseline year, 2012-13 (Table 3). For each year 
from 2008-09 to 2015-16, I report the relative frequencies of each consequence type used for 
truancy. In these schools, 18.3% of truancy cases in 2012-13 resulted in OSS. Following the 
policy change, this rate decreased gradually to 10.7% in 2015-16. At the same time, there was an 
increase in “other” consequences from 5.7% in the baseline year to a high of 34.8% by 2015-16. 
There was also a continuous decline in the use of ISS for truancy from 74.0% in 2012-13 to 
51.6% by 2015-16. Thus, across all schools (Table 2), as well as among the schools that used 
OSS as a consequence for truancy in 2012-13 (Table 3), schools were shifting away from using 
ISS for truancy. This decline in the use of ISS as a consequence for truancy suggests there may 
be trends in discipline policy other than the passage of Act 1329 that are affecting how schools 
handle truancy cases, since this Act did not mention the use of ISS for truancy. In the schools 
that did not use OSS as a consequence for truancy in 2012-13, there was a similar decline in the 
use of ISS for truancy from 77.5% of truancy cases in 2012-13 to 52.3% of cases in 2015-16. 
Thus, there was a general trend away from ISS and towards “other” consequences in both types 
of schools (those that were using OSS for truancy in 2012-13 and those that were not). 
                                                 
“other” consequences may include loss of course credit or credit recovery (making up missed 
instructional time). For example, seniors may be required to come in extra days after they would 
usually be required to be at school. The high school principal indicated that his school primarily 
uses after school suspension and Saturday school as a consequence for truancy, practices which 
do not exclude the truant student from the regular learning environment. A former teacher from 
another high school indicated that some of the “other” consequences are likely a mix of morning 




Histograms of school-level use of OSS as a consequence for truancy during the baseline 
year (2012-13) and the three outcome years are presented in Figure 1. The corresponding 
descriptive statistics for these four years, as well as the prior four years, are in Table 4. In each 
year, about half of schools with at least one truancy incident did not use OSS as a consequence 
for truancy. In 2012-13, 12% of schools with at least one truancy incident used OSS in 100% of 
truancy cases. This figure was lower previously, and decreased slightly in later years, but was 
still as high as 9% in 2015-16. This group of schools using OSS exclusively as a consequence for 
truancy is evident in the far right of the bimodal distributions in Figure 1. 
Table 3 
Consequences Administered for Truancy, Arkansas Schools using OSS for Truancy in 2012-13 
 
Note. Number of schools indicates the number of schools that reported at least one truancy 
incident. Pre-policy 4-year average represents the weighted average from 2008-09 to 2011-12, or 
in other words, the percent of all truancy cases over those four years that resulted in each 
consequence type. Post-policy 3-year average represents the weighted average from 2013-14 to 
2015-16, or in other words, the percent of all truancy cases over those three years that resulted in 




2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
4-Year 
Average 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16
3-Year 
Average
Pct. Of Truancy Cases Resulting in:
ISS 68.1% 66.6% 67.5% 67.8% 67.4% 74.0% 58.1% 54.5% 51.6% 54.6%
Other Action 7.3% 14.7% 12.7% 13.6% 12.3% 5.7% 27.4% 31.6% 34.8% 31.4%
OSS 20.6% 15.8% 16.9% 16.4% 17.3% 18.3% 12.0% 11.1% 10.7% 11.2%
Corporal Punishment 3.6% 1.8% 1.7% 2.0% 2.2% 1.9% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
No Action 0.4% 0.7% 1.1% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 1.2%
ALE 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Expulsion 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Truancy Cases 5,976 7,532 7,658 7,110 28,276 7,134 8,843 9,696 9,814 28,353





This study focuses on school-level analyses,24 so infraction- and student-level data are 
aggregated to the school-by-year level. In the next section, I outline the analytic methods used. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of School-level Use of OSS as a Consequence for Truancy (Schools with 
at Least One Truancy Incident) 
 
 
                                                 
24 I focus on school-level analyses here, because a) this was a broad-based state-level policy that 
theoretically school leaders chose to either comply with or not, and thus, the level of intervention 
is not the student level, and b) the lack of implementation failure suggested a need for 
understanding what happens at a school-level. In the future, estimating student-level impacts on 
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Percentage of Truancy Infractions Resulting in OSS 
 
Note. Sample only includes schools with at least one truancy incident in the year reported. 
Analytic Methods 
Research Question 1: What school-level factors predict whether a school was using OSS 
as a consequence for truancy in the baseline year, 2012-13? 
 For this question, I exclude schools with zero truancy incidents in 2012-13, (which, as 
indicated in Table 1, represent about 65% of schools). While this is a large proportion of schools, 
it is not reasonable to compare the rate of OSS as a response for truancy among schools with and 
without truancy incidents. Using school-by-year level data, I predict, using a probit model, 
whether a school used OSS as a consequence for truancy at least once during 2012-13, denoted 
by  and defined as: 
																			
1	 	 ∗ 0
0	 	 ∗ 0
       














2008-09 385 0.19 0.32 196 51% 33 9%
2009-10 366 0.17 0.30 179 49% 28 8%
2010-11 370 0.15 0.27 197 53% 21 6%
2011-12 371 0.19 0.32 197 53% 36 10%
2012-13 374 0.21 0.34 182 49% 44 12%
2013-14 399 0.19 0.33 203 51% 45 11%
2014-15 396 0.14 0.28 218 55% 29 7%
2015-16 415 0.15 0.30 220 53% 37 9%
Schools Using OSS for Truancy:





											             (1)          
∗  is a latent variable representing the propensity for school s to have used OSS as 
a consequence for truancy in 2012-13. 
Many of the included explanatory variables such as the truancy rate are likely 
endogenous. To limit endogeneity concerns, these explanatory variables are lagged. However, 
despite using lagged variables, there could still be constant unobservable school characteristics 
that are correlated with these variables, so the results should be interpreted as descriptive, not 
causal. For example, although I control for school-level demographic characteristics to capture 
some information about the family and community background of students in each school, 
truancy rates might be correlated with unobservable characteristics about families and 
communities that also are related to a preference to use OSS for truancy.  
The explanatory variables include , the number of truancy 
infractions per 100 students in 2011-12, because it may be that schools struggling with high rates 
of truancy have a different propensity to use OSS as a consequence for truancy. The explanatory 
variables also include , , , 
, , , and 
, which are variables representing the number of infractions per 100 
students resulting in each of the seven consequence types in school s in the previous school year 
(2011-12). These variables are included to capture the school’s typical rates of disciplinary 
consequences, which is important given that discipline practices are clearly different in the types 
of schools that do or do not use OSS as a consequence for truancy. In addition, it is probable that 




consequence for truancy or that the types of schools that generally rely on non-exclusionary 
consequences such as ISS, would be less likely to use OSS as a consequence for truancy. In total, 
these seven consequence types also represent the total number of infractions in the school. 
 is a vector of lagged school level characteristics including the log of school 
enrollment and the percent of students who are FRL-eligible, receiving special education 
services, Black, Hispanic,25 or of another non-white race. This vector also includes indicators for 
open-enrollment and district conversion charter schools (with traditional public schools as the 
reference group), as well as indicators for high schools and middle schools (with elementary as 
the reference group).  also includes the percent of students disciplined and school-level 
academic indicators including school-average math and ELA test scores in standard deviation 
units. To capture remaining time-invariant unobservable regional differences, I include a set of 
region fixed effects for the five regions in the state, , with the largest region, Northwest 
Arkansas, as the omitted group. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level.26 
In the primary model, a school is included if it had at least one truancy case in 2012-13, 
which could be an outlier or a data reporting issue. As a robustness check, I estimate models 
among the schools with at least five truancy cases.27 
                                                 
25 The percent of students who are identified as limited English proficient in each school was not 
included as an explanatory variable due to its high correlation with Hispanic (r = 0.946). 
26 As of 2015-16, there were 259 districts in Arkansas, 192 represented in the models restricted 
to schools with at least one truancy incident, and 140 represented in the models restricted to 
schools with at least five truancy incidents. 
27 Using a cut-off of five truancy cases was admittedly arbitrary. Future iterations of this work 
will test the sensitivity of this choice using a variety of cut-offs, both in terms of the number of 




Research Question 2: What school-level factors predict whether a school, among those 
using OSS as a consequence for truancy in 2012-13, complies with the policy in the 
following years? 
 I address this research question with two analyses: 1) separate probit models for each 
outcome year (2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-16) and 2) an ordered probit model predicting 
whether a school complied in zero, one, two, or three of the outcome years. 
Year-by-year Analyses 
To examine what school-level factors predict compliance in each of the outcome years, I 
estimate three separate models and restrict the sample to schools that used OSS as a consequence 
for truancy at least once in the baseline year (2012-13) and schools with at least one truancy 
incident in the outcome year. The goal is to see which types of schools are likely to comply in a 
given year, regardless of whether the school complied in other years. Thus, a school that 
complied in 2013-14 would remain in the 2014-15 model. Some schools switch back to non-
compliance after complying, so given my interest in modelling which types of schools comply in 
a particular year, I conduct a series of probit models rather than a hazard or duration model. 
I estimate one model for each outcome year (2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-16). Whether 
or not a school complies with the policy in year t ( ) is defined as: 
																			
1	 	 ∗ 0
0	 	 ∗ 0       
∗ 	 	
											 	 	
											 	 	 	  +         (2)  
Where ∗  is a latent variable representing the propensity to comply with the policy in year t. 




using OSS in zero of these cases.  equals zero if school s had truancy incidents in year t and 
reported using OSS in at least one of these cases. Thus,  can be interpreted as an indicator for 
full compliance in year t. The explanatory variables are similar to those in Equation 1 and are 
lagged one year. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level.  
As in Equation 1, many variables are potentially endogenous, even though they are 
lagged, so the results cannot be interpreted as causal. As a robustness check, I also estimate 
models where I limit the sample to schools that had at least five truancy cases. 
Ordered Probit Models 
In addition to the three separate year models, I estimate an ordered probit model 
predicting whether a school complied with the policy in zero, one, two, or three of the outcome 
years. For this model, I only include the schools that used OSS for truancy at least once in the 
baseline year, 2012-13, and schools that reported at least one truancy incident in all three 
outcome years. Of the 132 schools included in this model, 65 schools (49%) complied in zero 
years, 32 (24%) complied in one year, 21 (16%) complied in two years, and 14 schools (11%) 
complied in all three outcome years. These schools represent a relatively small portion of all 
schools in the state. For example, in 2012-13 there were 1,063 schools in the state, so the 132 
schools represented in Table 9 represent only 12.4% of all schools.  
Ordered probit models are used to estimate a series of outcomes with a natural order. The 
outcomes are assumed to arise sequentially as a latent variable, ∗, crosses progressively higher 
thresholds, . It is assumed that the thresholds are the same for all schools in the sample. In this 
case, there are four possible outcomes (0, 1, 2, or 3 years of compliance), where the observed 
outcome, , is equal to some value,  j, if and only if, the latent variable ∗ passes threshold  




	 ⟺ 	  ∗  ; j = 0, 1, 2, 3 
Where ∞, ∞         (3) 
The latent variable ∗	is modeled as: 
 ∗ 	 	
											 	 	
											
										                                 (4) 
Research Question 3: How did school-level outcomes such as average math and ELA 
test scores, school attendance, chronic absenteeism, and disciplinary outcomes change 
in “policy-affected” schools (i.e., those using OSS for truancy in 2012-13)? 
To estimate whether the policy was related to changes in treatment schools relative to 
comparison schools, I rely on a comparative interrupted time series (CITS) analysis.28 This CITS 
compares changes between schools that would theoretically be affected by the policy because 
they were using OSS as a consequence for truancy in the baseline year and those that would 
theoretically not be affected because they were not using OSS as a consequence for truancy in 
the baseline year. CITS, an interrupted time series with a non-equivalent comparison group, has 
been used to estimate the impacts of school accountability policies (Dee & Jacob, 2011; Wong, 
Cook, & Steiner, 2011) as well as programs such as Reading First (Somers, Zhu, Jacob, & 
Bloom, 2013) and Jobs-Plus (Bloom & Riccio, 2005). Despite its relative rigor, CITS is used less 
                                                 
28 I estimate the policy-related change in outcomes at a school-level, because a) this was a broad-
based state-level policy that theoretically school leaders chose to either comply with or not, and 
thus, the level of intervention is not the student level, and b) the lack of implementation failure 
suggested a need for understanding what happens at a school-level. In the future, estimating 
student-level impacts on students who were truant or on the peers of truant students would both 




frequently in program or policy evaluation than difference-in-differences (DD), because it 
requires at least four time points before the intervention or policy change (Somers et al., 2013). 
The goal of this approach is to compare deviations in trends between a set of “treatment” 
schools affected by the policy and a set of theoretically unaffected “comparison” schools. The 
CITS approach is similar in concept to a DD design, but the CITS assesses whether the treatment 
group deviates more than the comparison group from its baseline trend, whereas DD assesses 
whether the treatment group deviates more than the comparison group from its baseline mean 
(Somers et al., 2013). According to Somers et al. (2013), CITS is generally more rigorous than 
DD, because it controls for differences in the baseline mean and trends between the treatment 
and comparison groups, whereas DD assumes the baseline trends in the treatment groups and 
comparison groups to be similar. In other words, CITS accounts not only for differences in the 
levels between treatment and comparison groups, but also for differences in their natural growth 
rates. This is important because the types of schools that were or were not using OSS for truancy 
prior to the policy change likely had other unobservable differences affecting trends in 
disciplinary outcomes, test scores, or attendance in different ways. In addition, CITS was found 
to be better able to estimate long-term impacts than DD (Somers et al., 2013). 
However, causal inference from CITS relies on the assumption that deviations from prior 
trends in the comparison schools provide a valid counterfactual for what would have happened in 
the treatment schools in the absence of the policy change. This is a strong assumption, because 
schools that did use OSS as a consequence for truancy in 2012-13 may be very different from the 
schools that did not and perhaps in ways that cannot be accounted for with observable 
characteristics. While it is possible to estimate a model comparing treatment schools and 




procedure cannot ensure that I have accounted for unobservable characteristics. Given the 
relatively limited set of covariates typically available in administrative data (e.g. FRL, special 
education, race/ethnicity, school size, school type, school grade span, disciplinary outcomes, 
etc.), this is a key limitation for causal inference from CITS in this case. 
I define treatment schools as those that used OSS as a consequence for truancy at least 
once in 2012-13 and comparison schools as those that did not, and therefore had no changes to 
make with respect to this one particular policy. I exclude schools that reported no truancy at all 
in 2012-13 as it would not be reasonable to compare treatment schools to these schools. 
The following regression illustrates the CITS design following Dee and Jacob (2011): 
	 	 _ _ 	
										 _ _ 	 	 	 	    (5) 
Where  is a school-by-year level outcome such as average test scores in math or ELA, school 
overall non-attendance (student days absent as a percent of total instructional days),29 the school 
chronic absenteeism rate, defined as the percent of students missing at least 10% of instructional 
days in a particular school year, or disciplinary outcomes hypothesized to be affected by the 
policy.	  is a time-trend variable starting with 1 for the first year in the analytic dataset, 
2008-09,  is an indicator variable equal to 1 for any time period after the policy change 
(i.e. in 2013-14 and later) and 0 for each earlier time period, and _ _  is a time 
trend variable defined such that it equals zero in all periods prior to and including the year of the 
policy-change (through 2012-13), one in 2013-14, two in 2014-15, and three in 2015-16. 
                                                 
29 Total instructional days is the sum of all student’s days absent and days present, which 
estimates the total number of days the student theoretically should have been present, even if it 
was not a full school year, as some students may enter and exit schools within the year. For more 




 is a vector of school-level characteristics varying within schools over time such as the 
log of enrollment, the percentage of students that are FRL-eligible, Black, Hispanic, another non-
white race, or eligible for special education services, etc.30 In some models, I include only a few 
of the key variables identified as predictors of using truancy for OSS in the baseline year (based 
on results from Research Question 1), as these variables predict selection into treatment. These 
variables include the log of school enrollment, school percent Black, region indicators, and 
truancy frequency (incidents per 100 students). In other models, I also include seven controls for 
the frequency of the seven consequence types (counts per 100 students). As with my previous 
analyses, these variables control for the school’s overall discipline practices and collectively 
represent the level of general misbehavior, as reported by disciplinary consequences. For my 
fullest specification, I add other observable school-level control variables (school percent special 
education, school percent FRL, school percent Hispanic, school percent other minority, and 
indicators for middle schools and high schools (with elementary schools as the omitted group). 
These variables are all included to further account for school-level characteristics that may be 
associated with whether a school complies with the policy in the future. To control for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics of schools and regions, I include school fixed effects, , 
and region fixed effects, . The idiosyncratic random error term is indicated by . 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level. 
In the first specification,  is a time-invariant variable that identifies whether a school 
was using OSS as a consequence for truancy in the baseline year, 2012-13, and defines the 
treatment (  = 1) and comparison (  = 0) schools. Utilizing interactions with the other 
                                                 
30 The percent of students who are identified as limited English proficient in each school was not 




variables,  allows the effect of the policy to be reflected in both a level shift (i.e. ) and a shift 
in trend (i.e. ). Thus, the total estimated effect of the policy after three years (by 2015-16), 
would be ( 3 . The term  indicates whether there was a statistically significant 
difference between the treatment and comparison schools’ baseline trends. I do not report these 
coefficients here, but their statistical significance is not problematic, as it simply indicates that 
using CITS rather than a DD is important, because CITS is able to account for these baseline 
trend differences. 
 In this first specification of Equation 5,  simply indicates whether a school used OSS as 
a consequence for truancy at least once in the 2012-13 school year. It is possible, however, that 
the effect size may be influenced by the degree to which a school was “subject” to the policy. 
Schools with very few cases of truancy resulting in OSS may experience little impact relative to 
schools that use OSS frequently as a consequence for truancy. Alternatively, schools that 
exclusively or almost exclusively administer OSS for truancy may be less likely to change 
practices in response to the policy. Therefore, I also estimate models where treatment is defined 
as the school’s percentage of truancy cases in 2012-13 resulting in OSS.  
 Outcome measures for this analysis are of two main types: end outcomes such as average 
ELA and math test scores and intermediate outcomes such as student attendance, chronic 
absenteeism, and disciplinary outcomes theoretically related to the policy.  
I estimate policy-related changes in three disciplinary outcomes. One disciplinary 
outcome that may change following this policy reform is the percent of truancy cases that result 
in “other” consequences. Perhaps the policy caused treatment schools to use “other” 
consequences as an alternative to OSS, but given that there was also a decline in the use of ISS 




broader trend. In addition, it is unclear whether this shift towards “other” consequences is 
occurring more in treatment schools than in comparison schools. Thus, this analysis address 
whether the policy was associated with this trend. 
In addition, the policy could potentially influence how schools report truancy-type 
incidents: if schools seek to continue administering OSS for truancy-type infractions, but without 
raising red flags, they could potentially code these cases as “other” infractions instead of as 
truancy. Therefore, I test whether there are policy-related changes in the number of reported 
truancy and “other” infractions per 100 students. 
 In addition to the CITS model utilizing a full set of comparison schools, I also conduct a 
separate analysis using propensity-score matched schools. Under the assumption that potential 
outcomes are independent of treatment status, conditional on the included covariates, X, it can be 
assumed that potential outcomes are also independent of treatment, conditional on propensity 
score, .	 In other words, if you are able to account for all the covariates that predict 
treatment, treatment selection behaves as if it has been conditionally randomized, and if this is 
the case, the only covariate needed to control for selection into treatment is the propensity score, 
defined as the likelihood of being in the treatment group given the observable baseline 
characteristics (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1984). For propensity score matching to produce 
consistent estimates, the distribution of covariates must be the same for treatment and 
comparison groups, conditional on estimated propensity score. The advantage of propensity-
score matching is that it can test whether the estimates are robust to a model in which 
comparison and treatment schools are similar in terms of their propensity to be in the “treatment” 




excluded, the results may not generalize to the entire population. In addition, given the limited 
set of observable characteristics, propensity-score matching does not ensure causal estimates. 
I conduct propensity-score matching using a probit model to predict whether or not a 
school used OSS as a consequence for truancy in 2012-13 (which defines treatment status) as a 
function of the school’s log of enrollment, percent FRL, percent Black, percent Hispanic, percent 
other minority, percent special education, average math scores, average ELA scores, percent of 
students chronically absent, and percent of student days absent. The results from this probit 
model are used to estimate a propensity score for each school, and each treatment school is 
matched, using nearest neighbor matching, to one comparison school, without replacement. A 
caliper of 0.1 is used, so that each matched school is within a 10 percentage point propensity 
score of its matched partner. Units without common support are excluded. The sample includes 
228 schools or 61% of the full analytic sample for Research Question 3. Baseline equivalence for 
this matched sample is in Table 5. There are no statistically significant differences in observable 
characteristics between the treatment and comparison schools within this matched sample. 





Baseline Equivalency for Matched Sample 
 
Note: All variables are from baseline year (2012-13). 
Results 
Research Question 1: What school-level factors predict whether a school was using OSS 
as a consequence for truancy in the baseline year, 2012-13? 
 The first question descriptively assesses which schools were administering OSS as a 
disciplinary consequence for truancy in the baseline year (i.e. exhibiting the behavior Act 1329 
sought to address). In addition, Question 1 addresses which schools would have theoretically 
been affected by the policy in the sense that, at the time the policy was passed, they were using 
OSS as a consequence for truancy. Thus, these results also provide evidence on which school-
level factors are associated with treatment status. I estimate probit models, following Equation 1, 
among two samples of schools: schools with at least one case of truancy in 2012-13 (columns 1 
and 2), and schools with at least five truancy cases in 2012-13 (columns 3 and 4). 
The results, in Table 6, indicate that larger schools were more likely to use OSS as a 
consequence for truancy at least once in 2012-13. In columns 2 and 4, which control for the 
Treatment Comparison Diff. p
Math Z-score -0.025 -0.052 0.028 0.572
ELA Z-score -0.048 -0.067 0.019 0.661
School Enrollment 489 509 -20 0.638
School % FRL 58.7% 59.1% -0.4% 0.856
School % Black 15.4% 17.9% -2.6% 0.377
School % Hispanic 8.4% 9.4% -1.0% 0.529
School % Other Minoirty 3.7% 3.9% -0.2% 0.736
School % Special Education 10.8% 11.3% -0.5% 0.277
Percent of Students Chronically Absent 13.8% 14.1% -0.3% 0.850
School Percent of Days Absent 5.2% 5.3% 0.0% 0.899




lagged frequencies of the seven consequence categories, schools with higher rates of truancy, 
higher rates of OSS, and lower rates of “other” actions in the prior year were more likely to use 
OSS as a consequence for truancy in 2012-13. In only column four, there is evidence that the 
rates of corporal punishment use and ISS use in the prior year negatively predict whether OSS 
was used as a consequence for truancy, but this is marginally significant for ISS. In only column 
one, there is a positive relationship between the lagged school percent black and whether that 
school used OSS for truancy in 2012-13. Among schools with at least five truancy infractions 
(columns 3 and 4), there is a negative relationship between the lagged proportion of other (non-
Black, non-Hispanic) minorities and the likelihood of administering OSS for truancy in 2012-13. 





Probit Models: Use of OSS as a Consequence for Truancy at Least Once in 2012-13 
 
Note. Estimates are marginal effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether OSS was used as a 
consequence for truancy at least once in 2012-13. Explanatory variables are lagged. Variables 
omitted due to perfect collinearity: open enrollment charter school and, in some models, district 
conversion charter school. Five region indicators with largest region (NW) as omitted region. 
Omitted school type is elementary. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Truancy Per 100 Students 0.003 0.014 *** 0.003 0.014 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Percent of Students Disciplined 0.151 0.033 0.207 0.665 
(0.263) (0.507) (0.316) (0.516)
ln(school enrollment) 0.162 *** 0.171 *** 0.277 *** 0.265 ***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.070) (0.067)
School % FRL -0.021 0.121 -0.005 0.077 
(0.280) (0.261) (0.341) (0.299)
School % Black 0.348 ** 0.040 0.218 -0.076 
(0.161) (0.159) (0.217) (0.220)
School % Hispanic 0.413 0.278 0.192 -0.020 
(0.304) (0.334) (0.355) (0.414)
School % Other Minority -1.030 -0.583 -3.177 ** -2.440 **
(1.112) (0.970) (1.241) (1.197)
School % Special Education 0.881 0.939 1.035 0.797 
(0.845) (0.850) (1.067) (1.055)
District Conversion Charter School 0.295 0.059 
(0.265) (0.260)
High School 0.119 0.074 0.018 -0.014 
(0.080) (0.075) (0.166) (0.141)
Middle School -0.019 -0.0599 -0.009 -0.041 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.159) (0.137)
Average Math Z-score -0.143 -0.082 -0.11  -0.042 
(0.104) (0.094) (0.118) (0.108)
Average ELA Z-score 0.095 0.146 0.017 -0.005 
(0.118) (0.116) (0.148) (0.142)
ALE Per 100 Students 0.158 0.176 
(0.232) (0.313)
Corporal Punishment Per 100 Students -0.000 -0.004 **
(0.001) (0.002)
Expulsion Per 100 Students -0.121 -0.293 
(0.194) (0.193)
ISS Per 100 Students -0.002 -0.003 *
(0.002) (0.002)
No Action Per 100 Students -0.005 -0.038 
(0.012) (0.033)
Other Action Per 100 Students -0.002 ** -0.002 **
(0.001) (0.001)
OSS Per 100 Students 0.014 *** 0.013 ***
(0.003) (0.004)
Region Indicators Y Y Y Y
Observations 361 361 219 219
Schools with ≥ 1 Truancy Incident Schools with ≥ 5 Truancy Incidents 





Research Question 2: What school-level factors predict whether a school, among those 
using OSS as a consequence for truancy in 2012-13, complies with the policy in the 
following years? 
 First, I study the schools that, as of 2012-13, were using OSS as a consequence for 
truancy, and assess what school-level characteristics are associated with whether those schools 
fully comply (use OSS for zero truancy cases) in each of the three following years. Results for 
three probit models, one for each outcome year, are in Table 7. The sample in Table 7 only 
includes schools with at least one truancy case in the outcome year. 
In the first year following the passage of Act 1329 (2013-14), schools with higher truancy 
rates in the prior year were less likely to comply. In addition, schools with higher proportions of 
minority students were generally less likely to comply in 2013-14. For example, a 10 percentage 
point increase in the proportion of students in the school who are Black is associated with a 4.1 
to 6.1 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of full compliance in 2013-14. Schools with 
higher proportions of Hispanic and other minority students also have a lower likelihood of 
compliance, although the coefficient on percent Hispanic is not significant in column 2. High 
schools were 22.8 to 27.1 percentage points less likely to comply in 2013-14, relative to 
elementary schools. In column 2, which includes the rates of each consequence type, schools that 
used ISS more frequently in the prior year were slightly more likely to comply, and schools that 
used OSS more frequently in the prior year were less likely to comply. 
 The results from the models predicting full compliance in 2014-15 are somewhat 
different. The percent of students who are Black or Hispanic are still generally negatively 
associated with compliance, however the percent of students who are other minorities (Asian, 




compliance in 2014-15. These other minority groups represent only about 5% of Arkansas’s 
public school students, so I do not focus much on this result. In column 3 only, there is 
suggestive evidence that schools with more FRL students were more likely to comply, all else 
equal, although it is possible this estimated positive relationship is due in part to the correlation 
between school percent Black and school percent FRL (r = 0.4867). In column 4 only, there is 
evidence that larger schools were less likely to comply in 2014-15, schools with a higher 
proportion of students in special education were more likely to comply in 2014-15, and schools 
with higher truancy rates, higher OSS rates, lower “other” consequence rates, or lower corporal 
punishment rates in 2013-14, all else equal, were less likely to comply in 2014-15. 
 In columns 5 and 6, schools with higher 2014-15 truancy rates were less likely to comply 
in 2015-16. In one model (column 6), high schools and middle schools were less likely to 
comply in 2015-16 than elementary schools, and schools with higher prior-year ALE rates, 
higher prior-year “no action” rates, or lower prior-year OSS rates were more likely to comply in 
2015-16. The relationship between the prior year frequency of ALE referrals and policy 
compliance in column 6 is quite large, but the direction of this relationship does not appear 
consistent across years. In addition, this result is not consistent with the results from the ordered 
probit models that I discuss later in this section. Furthermore, only 0.31% of all the disciplinary 
consequences in Arkansas during this time period were ALE referrals, so I do not emphasize this 
result and treat the ALE rate primarily as a control variable. 
In Table 7, the primary consistent drivers of compliance are truancy rates and OSS rates. 
Schools with higher prior year truancy rates were slightly less likely to comply in 2013-14 and 
2015-16, and perhaps in 2014-15 as well, although this last result was not significant in column 




outcome years. Schools that use consequences other than OSS more frequently generally appear 
to be as likely or more likely to comply with the policy, all else equal. These results are not 
consistent across all years, but may indicate that schools that do not rely as much on OSS are 
better able to respond to a policy change that seeks to reduce the use of OSS. Another takeaway 
from Table 7 is that racial demographics predicted compliance in the first two years, but not the 
final outcome year. Instead, in the final year, compliance is predicted by school type, truancy 
rates, and OSS rates, suggesting that the schools struggling to comply even after three years are 
likely the ones targeted by the policy (high schools, middle schools, schools with more truancy, 
and schools with greater reliance on OSS). 
To reduce the possibility that these results are driven by schools with very few truancy 
cases, I estimate the same models but limit the sample to schools with at least five truancy cases 
in the outcome years. The results, in Table 8, are generally robust to this restriction, although 
many relationships lose or gain statistical significance, compared to Table 7. Given that the 
results from Table 7 include some schools with very small numbers of truancy (1-4), the results 
in Table 8 may be more representative of schools that struggle with truancy at a significant level. 
I do not discuss all the differences between Tables 7 and 8 here, but a few are worth highlighting.  
First, the inconsistent coefficient on school percent other minority from Table 7 (negative 
in 2013-14 but positive in 2014-15) tells a more consistent story in Table 8 (negative or null 
across all models). Further, while in Table 7, the only significant coefficients for high schools 
and middle schools are negative, in Table 8, these coefficients are estimated to be positive in 
2014-15. Thus, there is an inconsistent story about what types of schools (in terms of grade 





Probit Models of Compliance (Schools with at Least One Truancy Incident) 
 
Note. Estimates are marginal effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in 
parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged except for region and school type variables. 
Percent variables on a 0-1 scale. Variables omitted due to perfect collinearity include other 
school type (not elementary, middle, or high), and in some models, indicators for open 
enrollment and district conversion charter schools. Five region indicators with largest region, 
NW, as omitted group. Omitted school type is elementary.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Truancy Per 100 Students -0.024 ** -0.029 ** -0.002 -0.012 ** -0.024 *** -0.026 ***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Percent of Students Disciplined -0.092 -0.808 -0.094 -0.497 0.126 1.073 
(0.303) (0.709) (0.341) (0.460) (0.333) (0.683)
ln(school enrollment) -0.032 -0.106 -0.089 -0.142 * -0.066 -0.113 
(0.062) (0.066) (0.078) (0.074) (0.058) (0.074)
School % FRL 0.285 0.033 0.849 * 0.484 0.503 0.260 
(0.414) (0.464) (0.449) (0.452) (0.411) (0.453)
School % Black -0.607 *** -0.412 * -0.823 *** -0.208 -0.264 -0.063 
(0.197) (0.220) (0.278) (0.308) (0.247) (0.262)
School % Hispanic -0.784 ** -0.529 -1.348 *** -1.271 *** -0.027 0.223 
(0.363) (0.395) (0.365) (0.389) (0.379) (0.367)
School % Other Minority -3.546 ** -3.082 ** 2.601 ** 3.299 *** -1.667 -1.547 
(1.396) (1.417) (1.104) (1.163) (1.107) (1.049)
School % Sped -0.464 -0.210 0.664 2.560 ** -0.369 -1.124 
(1.026) (1.146) (1.238) (1.238) (1.087) (1.081)
Open Enrollment Charter 0.327 0.131 0.371 0.068 - -
(0.215) (0.234) (0.277) (0.265)
District Conversion Charter - - -0.202 0.152 - -
(0.247) (0.325)
High School -0.228 * -0.271 ** 0.030 0.126 -0.102 -0.184 *
(0.130) (0.129) (0.180) (0.141) (0.117) (0.111)
Middle School -0.008 -0.074 0.149 0.191 -0.118 -0.185 *
(0.113) (0.115) (0.181) (0.144) (0.112) (0.106)
Average Math Z-score -0.143 -0.133 0.165 0.165 0.096 0.121 
(0.119) (0.112) (0.164) (0.138) (0.148) (0.143)
Average ELA Z-score 0.145 0.117 0.038 -0.010 0.143 0.042 
(0.140) (0.130) (0.235) (0.194) (0.188) (0.184)
ALE Per 100 Students 0.054 -0.214 0.154 ***
(0.113) (0.209) (0.059)
Corporal Punishment Per 100 Students 0.001 0.004 ** -0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Expulsion Per 100 Students -0.093 0.001 -0.259 
(0.117) (0.099) (0.271)
ISS Per 100 Students 0.006 ** 0.002 0.000 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
No Action Per 100 Students 0.149 -0.014 0.041 *
(0.154) (0.015) (0.022)
Other Action Per 100 Students 0.000 0.003 *** -0.003 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
OSS Per 100 Students -0.007 * -0.014 *** -0.011 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Region Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 160 160 154 154 152 152






Probit Models of Compliance (Schools with at Least Five Truancy Incidents) 
 
Note. Estimates are marginal effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in 
parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged except for region and school type variables. 
Percent variables are on a 0-1 scale. Variables omitted due to perfect collinearity include other 
school type (not elementary, middle, or high) and indicators for open enrollment and district 
conversion charter schools. Five region indicators with largest region, NW, as omitted group. 
Omitted school type is elementary.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Truancy Per 100 Students -0.022 * -0.033 *** 0.002 -0.005 -0.016 ** -0.018 **
(0.013) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Percent of Students Disciplined -0.030 -0.753 0.030 -0.383 0.136 1.115 
(0.366) (0.779) (0.334) (0.450) (0.358) (0.720)
ln(school enrollment) 0.082 0.014 0.090 0.049 -0.007 -0.033 
(0.065) (0.070) (0.106) (0.086) (0.066) (0.087)
School % FRL 0.482 0.089 1.263 ** 0.925 ** 0.357 -0.023 
(0.391) (0.403) (0.564) (0.460) (0.444) (0.531)
School % Black -0.436 ** -0.319 -0.769 *** -0.123 -0.374 -0.091 
(0.206) (0.217) (0.285) (0.280) (0.246) (0.268)
School % Hispanic -1.212 *** -0.549 -1.707 *** -1.859 *** -0.235 0.036 
(0.404) (0.414) (0.446) (0.471) (0.390) (0.420)
School % Other Minority -4.804 ** -4.155 ** -1.086 1.347 -2.350 * -1.903 
(1.882) (1.842) (1.945) (1.356) (1.322) (1.289)
School % Sped 1.112 1.016 0.886 3.058 * -0.902 -1.796 
(0.954) (0.962) (1.657) (1.775) (1.154) (1.215)
High School -0.124 -0.212 * 1.530 *** 1.336 *** -0.123 -0.253 *
(0.133) (0.126) (0.187) (0.137) (0.108) (0.139)
Middle School -0.040 -0.155 1.688 *** 1.456 *** -0.077 -0.207 
(0.108) (0.118) (0.184) (0.161) (0.121) (0.153)
Average Math Z-score -0.154 -0.172 0.280 0.206 0.004 0.041 
(0.121) (0.105) (0.195) (0.158) (0.157) (0.145)
Average ELA Z-score 0.354 ** 0.318 ** 0.120 -0.034 0.173 0.017 
(0.157) (0.147) (0.265) (0.215) (0.194) (0.185)
ALE Per 100 Students 0.377 *** -0.068 0.133 **
(0.105) (0.114) (0.064)
Corporal Punishment Per 100 Students 0.003 0.003 * -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Expulsion Per 100 Students -0.056 -0.246 ** -0.201 
(0.098) (0.110) (0.297)
ISS Per 100 Students 0.008 *** 0.001 0.000 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
No Action Per 100 Students -0.051 -0.005 0.041 **
(0.100) (0.016) (0.020)
Other Action Per 100 Students -0.005 ** 0.003 *** -0.003 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
OSS Per 100 Students -0.009 ** -0.017 *** -0.012 ***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Region Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 130 130 119 119 123 123





Another key relationship that gained significance in Table 8 is that schools with higher 
ELA scores positively predict compliance in 2013-14. Some of the coefficients on rates of 
different consequence types gained significance in Table 8 (relative to Table 7), such as the 
coefficients on ALE rates and “other” action rates in 2013-14, and the coefficient on expulsion 
rates in 2014-15. In addition, the coefficients on truancy rates and log of school enrollment in the 
2014-15 model lost their significance in Table 8, relative to Table 7. The relationship between 
school percent black and compliance in column 2 was not significant in Table 8 (although it was 
in Table 7), and the relationship between school percent FRL and compliance in column 4 of 
Table 8 gained significance. Other estimates were not substantively changed. 
 Thus, summarizing the results from Tables 7 and 8, the most consistent results are that 
OSS rates and truancy rates generally negatively predict compliance. Minority rates also 
negatively predict compliance, but primarily in the first two outcome years. These results suggest 
that the schools failing to comply, even after three years, are likely the types of schools targeted 
by this policy (those with high truancy rates and high OSS rates). 
Given that some schools return to non-compliance after a year of compliance, I also 
estimate ordered probit models predicting whether a school complied in zero, one, two, or three 
of the outcome years. Here, as elsewhere, compliance is defined as administering OSS in zero 
percent of truancy cases, and non-compliance is defined as administering OSS as a consequence 
for truancy in at least one truancy case. The results are in Table 9. 
According to Table 9, schools with more frequent truancy and more frequent use of OSS 
in the baseline year are found to be more likely to comply in zero of the three outcome years and 
less likely to comply in two or three outcome years. These results are consistent with the findings 





Ordered Probit Results (Schools with at Least one Truancy Incident) 
 
Note. Estimates are marginal effects. Explanatory variables are from the baseline year (2012-13). 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. Five region indicators 
with the largest region (NW) as the omitted group. Omitted school type is elementary school, 
and one K-12 school was included in this omitted group, as it was the only school in the sample 
that was not classified as an elementary, middle, or high school. The results are generally robust 
to whether this one school is indicated with a separate school type indicator (except that the 
significant marginal effects for School % FRL were not significant). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Truancy Per 100 Students 0.013 * 0.020 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 * -0.007 ** -0.006 * -0.011 **
(0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Pct of Students Disciplined 0.137 0.052 -0.019 -0.004 -0.051 -0.020 -0.068 -0.028 
(0.385) (0.782) (0.052) (0.066) (0.144) (0.297) (0.191) (0.420)
ln(school enrollment) 0.077 0.084 -0.011 -0.007 -0.028 -0.032 -0.038 -0.045 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.009) (0.007) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.033)
School % FRL -0.693 ** -0.451 0.095 0.038 0.257 ** 0.171 0.342 * 0.242 
(0.340) (0.330) (0.059) (0.038) (0.130) (0.126) (0.183) (0.185)
School % Black 0.707 *** 0.452 ** -0.097 ** -0.038 -0.262 *** -0.171 * -0.348 *** -0.242 *
(0.204) (0.215) (0.045) (0.030) (0.088) (0.089) (0.120) (0.125)
School % Hispanic 1.076 *** 0.911 *** -0.148 ** -0.077 -0.398 *** -0.346 *** -0.530 *** -0.489 ***
(0.271) (0.264) (0.067) (0.058) (0.116) (0.114) (0.171) (0.169)
School % Other Minority 1.011 0.964 -0.139 -0.081 -0.374 -0.366 -0.498 -0.517 
(0.820) (0.776) (0.117) (0.082) (0.315) (0.310) (0.416) (0.423)
School % Sped -1.212 -1.200 0.166 0.101 0.449 0.455 0.597 0.644 
(0.974) (0.948) (0.157) (0.111) (0.361) (0.357) (0.489) (0.527)
High School 0.010 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000 
(0.138) (0.140) (0.019) (0.012) (0.051) (0.053) (0.068) (0.075)
Middle School -0.179 -0.199 0.025 0.017 0.066 0.076 0.088 0.107 
(0.128) (0.138) (0.021) (0.019) (0.050) (0.056) (0.063) (0.072)
Average Math Z-score 0.014 0.016 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 
(0.128) (0.124) (0.018) (0.011) (0.047) (0.047) (0.063) (0.067)
Average ELA Z-score -0.302 ** -0.139 0.041 0.012 0.112 * 0.053 0.149 * 0.075 
(0.145) (0.160) (0.026) (0.016) (0.057) (0.060) (0.076) (0.088)
ALE Per 100 Students 0.230 ** -0.019 -0.087 ** -0.123 *
(0.104) (0.016) (0.039) (0.064)
Corporal Pun. Per 100 Stud. -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Expulsion Per 100 Stud. 0.108 -0.009 -0.041 -0.058 
(0.077) (0.009) (0.031) (0.042)
ISS Per 100 Stud. -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
No Action Per 100 Stud. -0.008 0.001 0.003 0.004 
(0.148) (0.012) (0.056) (0.079)
Other Action Per 100 Stud. -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OSS Per 100 Stud. 0.010 ** -0.001 -0.004 ** -0.006 **
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Region Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Marginal Effects Predicting Likelihood of:




In addition, schools with greater proportions of Black and Hispanic students are more 
likely to comply in zero years, and generally less likely to comply in one, two, or three years. 
These race percentage variables are on a 0-1 scale, so a ten percentage point increase in the share 
of Black students in the school is associated with a 4.5 to 7.1 percentage point higher likelihood 
of complying in zero of the outcome years and a 2.4 to 3.5 percentage point lower likelihood of 
complying all three years, for example. The marginal effects for Hispanic share are even larger, 
but given the lower Hispanic share in the state overall (12% versus 21% for Black students), it is 
important to note that moving Hispanic share by ten percentage points represents a very large 
change. As seen in previous models, school percent FRL appears to predict compliance in the 
opposite direction as these minority variables, but given the correlation between school percent 
FRL and school percent Black (r = 0.4867), and the relative inconsistency of this estimated 
relationship, I recommend interpreting this with caution.  
Table 9 also indicates that higher ELA test scores are associated with a higher likelihood 
of compliance, a relationship suggested in Table 8, but not in Table 7. In Table 9, higher ELA 
test scores are associated with a lower likelihood of compliance in zero years and a higher 
likelihood of compliance in two or three years. However, these results are only significant in the 
models that do not control for baseline levels of each consequence type, which are correlated 
with school academic achievement. Still, this is suggestive evidence that underperforming 
schools, which tend to also be the ones with high discipline rates, struggle with compliance.  
Finally, in Table 9, the baseline rate of ALE use is negatively associated with 
compliance. This is the only major result in Table 9 that is clearly inconsistent with the results 
from the year-by-year models in Table 7 and 8, in which I estimated that higher ALE rates 




to using 2012-13 ALE rates for the models in Table 9 and the prior year rate for each of the 
models in Tables 7 and 8. Regardless, given the inconsistency of this result across models, and 
the relatively low prevalence of ALE rates overall, I do not place much focus on this result. 
So far, the results from these models suggest that the schools likely targeted by this 
policy continue to struggle with compliance in future years. However, there is evidence, in Table 
3, that some schools do change how they report handling truancy. As a result, it is important to 
measure what school-level outcomes may have changed along with this policy. 
Research Question 3: How did school-level outcomes such as average math and ELA 
test scores, school attendance, chronic absenteeism, and disciplinary outcomes change 
in “policy-affected” schools (i.e., those using OSS for truancy in 2012-13)? 
  The results of the CITS, used to test whether, after the policy, there was a differential 
change in key outcomes in treatment schools, relative to comparison schools, are in Tables 10 
through 13. Panel A in each of these four tables shows the results for the simple definition of 
treatment status, , indicating whether a school used OSS as a consequence for truancy at least 
once ( =1) or not at all ( =0) in 2012-13. Panel B shows the results for an alternative definition 
of treatment status defined as the school’s percentage of truancy cases in 2012-13 that resulted in 
OSS. It is theorized that schools with a high percentage of truancy resulting in OSS would 
potentially have been affected more by the policy. I report  and , the coefficients on 
 and _ _ , respectively, as well as the linear combination 
3 	which is an estimate of the total effect by 2015-16 (after three years). The models 
without the matched comparison group are in the left of each table, and the results from the 




Table 10 presents the results from models predicting two measures of student 
absenteeism: the percent of days absent (the sum of all student days absent divided by the sum of 
total school days) as well as the percent of students chronically absent (missing 10% or more of 
school days) in a given year. Theoretically, the impact of this policy could be positive or 
negative: perhaps students are more likely to be absent if truancy is effectively decriminalized. 
Or, if the interventions replacing OSS are reengaging truant students in the school community, 
perhaps their effect would be positive. The estimated relationship of the policy to these two 
attendance-related outcomes after three years is null, except that, among the propensity-score 
matched sample, there was a marginally significant increase in the percent of days absent in 
treatment schools, relative to comparison schools. The dependent variable is on a 0-1 scale, so 
these estimates are small (about 0.7 days of additional absences per 100 days of school). 
Table 11 indicates the policy-related change in the use of “other” consequences for 
truancy. Tables 2 and 3 indicate that schools were shifting away from OSS and ISS towards 
these “other” consequences, but the CITS analysis estimates the size of the policy-related change 
by using the comparison schools as the counterfactual for what theoretically would have 
happened in the treatment schools in the absence of the policy. The results in Panel A indicate a 
policy-related increase in the use of “other” consequences for truancy of about 11 percentage 
points in the non-matched sample, and 16 to 19 percentage points in the matched sample.  
The total “effect” in Panel B of Table 11 represents the policy-related change, after three 
years, for a school using OSS for 100% of truancy cases in 2012-13, compared to a school using 
OSS for 0% of truancy cases in 2012-13. As hypothesized, the schools administering OSS for 
100% of truancy cases appear to have a larger change post-policy than the average treatment 






Estimated Policy-related Change in Attendance and Chronic Absenteeism  
 
Note. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression. All models include school fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school level. Dependent variables are on a 0-1 scale. Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance include: log of 
enrollment, percent Black, region indicators, and truancy frequency (incidents per 100 students). Full controls for school-level chars. 
add: percent special education, FRL, Hispanic, and other minority, as well as indicators for middle and high schools (with elementary 
schools as the omitted group). 
a Total “effect” by 2015-16 represents the “effect” for schools with 100% OSS for truancy, compared to a school with 0% OSS for 
truancy, in 2012-13. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
Panel A: Ts = used OSS for truancy at least once in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt 0.006 ** 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.011 *** 0.023 ** 0.024 ** 0.027 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Ts ×  Years since policy -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Total "effect" by 2015-16 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 * 0.007 * 0.007 * 0.012 0.011 0.014 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 1959 1959 1959 1959 1959 1959
Adjusted R-squared 0.032 0.050 0.057 0.051 0.068 0.078 0.041 0.057 0.066 0.059 0.085 0.101
Panel B: Ts = percent of truancy cases resulting in OSS in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt 0.006 * 0.008 ** 0.008 ** 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.013 ** 0.013 ** 0.015 ** 0.022 0.024 0.029 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Ts ×  Years since policy -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.016 ** -0.016 ** -0.017 ** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.014 -0.016 * -0.018 *
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
-0.001 0.0005 0.0002 -0.037 -0.032 -0.034 0.010 0.010 0.010 -0.021 -0.024 -0.023 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959
Adjusted R-Squared 0.032 0.051 0.057 0.053 0.070 0.080 0.046 0.063 0.071 0.061 0.087 0.102
Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Seven cons. types (freq. per 100 stud.) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Full controls for school-level chars. Y Y Y Y
Total "effect" by 2015-16 a
Without Matching With Propensity-Score Matched Smaple




Table 11  
Estimated Policy-related Change in the Use of “Other” Consequences for Truancy 
 
Note. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression. All models include 
school fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Dependent variables are on 
a 0-1 scale. Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance include: log of enrollment, percent Black, 
region indicators, and truancy frequency (incidents per 100 students). Full controls for school-
level chars. add: percent special education, FRL, Hispanic, and other minority, as well as 
indicators for middle and high schools (with elementary schools as the omitted group). 
a Total “effect” by 2015-16 represents the “effect” for schools with 100% OSS for truancy, 
compared to a school with 0% OSS for truancy, in 2012-13. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
I also estimate whether the policy was related to changes in reports of truancy or “other” 
infractions not included in a state-reported infraction category31 (Table 12). There is suggestive 
evidence (null or marginally significant) that there was a reduction of 2-3 truancy cases per 100 
                                                 
31 Like “other” consequences, “other” infractions are coded by schools, but when reported by the 
state, grouped into an “other” category. This is not a researcher-created group of infractions. 
Panel A: Ts = used OSS for truancy at least once in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt 0.069 * 0.065 * 0.066 * 0.124 ** 0.125 ** 0.127 **
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Ts ×  Years since policy 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.020 0.020 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Total "effect" by 2015-16 0.113 *** 0.113 *** 0.115 *** 0.159 *** 0.186 *** 0.187 ***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.058) (0.054) (0.054)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 228 228 228
Observations 2,631 2,631 2,631 1,645 1,645 1,645
Adjusted R-squared 0.177 0.249 0.249 0.186 0.241 0.240
Panel B: Ts = percent of truancy cases resulting in OSS in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt 0.058 0.063 0.066 0.173 0.162 0.168 
(0.061) (0.059) (0.059) (0.111) (0.109) (0.109)
Ts ×  Years since policy 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.047 0.053 0.053 
(0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055)
0.134 * 0.143 ** 0.150 ** 0.314 *** 0.321 *** 0.326 ***
(0.070) (0.067) (0.067) (0.110) (0.106) (0.106)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 228 228 228
Observations 2,631 2,631 2,631 1,645 1,645 1,645
Adjusted R-Squared 0.173 0.245 0.245 0.192 0.245 0.243
Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance Y Y Y Y Y Y
Seven cons. types (freq. per 100 stud.) Y Y Y Y
Full controls for school-level chars. Y Y
Total "effect" by 2015-16 a
Without Matching With Propensity-Score Matched Smaple




students, depending on the model and sample. Fewer truancy reports could indicate either a real 
reduction in truancy behavior, or a change in reporting behavior. Unfortunately, I cannot directly 
test this with the available data. The relationship between the policy and truancy rates was not 
significant in Panel B, however, so the estimated effect is sensitive to treatment definition, and 
there is not consistent evidence that the policy was related to a decline in reports of truancy. 
I also test whether there was a policy-related change in reports of “other” infractions. 
Some schools may code truancy-type incidents as something else in order to comply with this 
policy. I estimate, in some models, a policy-related increase in “other” infractions of about 10 
incidents per 100 students after three years. Given the size of this estimate, relative to the small 
reduction in truancy, it appears something else is happening besides the new policy. Further, the 
same estimates are not significant in Panel B, suggesting this increase may not be policy-related. 
Indeed, the rise in “other” infractions was occurring even before the policy change. “Other” 
infractions represented 19.1% of total infractions in 2008-09 and had risen to 24.0% by the 
baseline year (2012-13). Overall, these results suggest that, around the time of the policy change, 
treatment schools - more so than comparison schools - started having more of these types of 
infractions or started increasing their reporting of these types of behaviors. 
Finally, I estimate whether there was a policy-related change in test scores. Perhaps when 
schools use OSS as a consequence for truancy, there is a dampening effect on student 
achievement. If this is the case, and if the policy keeps truant students in school, it is possible 
that student achievement could improve. Alternatively, if truant and potentially disruptive 
students remain in schools as a result of this policy, these students could disrupt their peers and 
negatively impact overall test scores. I estimate, across both definitions of treatment status and 






Estimated Policy-related Change in Disciplinary Infractions (Truancy and “Other”) 
 
Note. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression. All models include school fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school level. Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance include: log of enrollment, percent Black, region indicators, 
and truancy frequency (incidents per 100 students). Full controls for school-level chars. add: percent special education, FRL, Hispanic, 
and other minority, as well as indicators for middle and high schools (with elementary schools as the omitted group). 
a Total “effect” by 2015-16 represents the “effect” for schools with 100% OSS for truancy, compared to a school with 0% OSS for 
truancy, in 2012-13. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Panel A: Ts = used OSS for truancy at least once in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt 0.208 0.118 0.019 1.265 2.097 1.980 0.047 0.004 -0.114 4.757 3.931 3.855 
(0.799) (0.771) (0.762) (4.880) (2.972) (2.989) (0.818) (0.967) (0.939) (4.429) (3.389) (3.423)
Ts ×  Years since policy -0.766 -0.744 -0.746 2.522 2.594 * 2.706 * -1.049 -0.880 -0.850 1.366 2.208 2.248 
(0.494) (0.487) (0.483) (2.221) (1.474) (1.463) (0.646) (0.691) (0.695) (2.862) (1.930) (1.968)
Total effect by 2015-16 -2.089 -2.113 * -2.220 * 8.831 9.880 ** 10.100 ** -3.099 * -2.635 * -2.663 8.854 10.550 * 10.600 *
(1.355) (1.165) (1.184) (6.457) (4.693) (4.678) (1.740) (1.556) (1.633) (7.862) (5.627) (5.832)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959
Adjusted R-squared 0.012 0.181 0.183 0.097 0.588 0.589 0.008 0.133 0.134 0.105 0.447 0.447
Panel B: Ts = percent of truancy cases resulting in OSS in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt -1.101 -0.457 -0.579 -10.940 ** -3.600 -3.779 -0.850 -1.066 -1.285 0.557 -0.520 -0.780 
(0.806) (0.855) (0.846) (5.232) (3.315) (3.332) (1.046) (1.369) (1.332) (5.629) (4.131) (4.159)
Ts ×  Years since policy 0.056 0.057 0.064 0.778 0.858 1.077 0.038 0.001 0.101 2.584 1.741 1.958 
(0.515) (0.486) (0.484) (2.502) (1.822) (1.805) (0.777) (0.802) (0.780) (3.433) (2.553) (2.595)
-0.933 -0.287 -0.386 -8.606 -1.027 -0.547 -0.735 -1.064 -0.982 8.309 4.702 5.095 
(1.351) (1.093) (1.106) (7.758) (4.905) (4.926) (1.854) (1.489) (1.530) (8.726) (6.427) (6.749)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959
Adjusted R-Squared 0.009 0.179 0.181 0.097 0.588 0.590 0.005 0.131 0.132 0.105 0.446 0.447
Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Seven cons. types (freq. per 100 stud.) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Full controls for school-level chars. Y Y Y Y
Truancy Per 100 Students "Other" Infractions Per 100 Students
Without Matching With Propensity-Score Matched Smaple
"Other" Infractions Per 100 Students
Total effect by 2015-16 a






Estimated Policy-related Change in School-Level Average Test Scores 
 
Note. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression. All models include school fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school level. Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance include: log of enrollment, percent Black, region indicators, 
and truancy frequency (incidents per 100 students). Full controls for school-level chars. add: percent special education, FRL, Hispanic, 
and other minority, as well as indicators for middle and high schools (with elementary schools as the omitted group). 
a Total “effect” by 2015-16 represents the “effect” for schools with 100% OSS for truancy, compared to a school with 0% OSS for 
truancy, in 2012-13. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p< 0.1.
Panel A: Ts = used OSS for truancy at least once in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.038 0.035 0.032 0.044 0.042 0.036 0.023 0.019 0.015 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Ts ×  Years since policy -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 -0.035 -0.032 -0.032 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Total "effect" by 2015-16 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.015 0.015 0.018 -0.061 -0.054 -0.061 0.004 0.011 0.007 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,860 2,860 2,860 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752
Adjusted R-squared 0.017 0.019 0.023 0.029 0.037 0.053 0.022 0.029 0.037 0.034 0.051 0.066
Panel B: Ts = percent of truancy cases resulting in OSS in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt 0.034 0.033 0.028 0.062 0.057 0.052 0.096 0.095 0.083 0.079 0.076 0.071 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Ts ×  Years since policy -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.048 -0.043 -0.040 -0.025 -0.020 -0.017 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
0.010 0.008 0.011 0.045 0.039 0.044 -0.048 -0.035 -0.037 0.003 0.016 0.021 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.065) (0.063) (0.062)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,860 2,860 2,860 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752
Adjusted R-Squared 0.020 0.023 0.027 0.028 0.037 0.053 0.023 0.030 0.037 0.035 0.051 0.067
Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Seven cons. types (freq. per 100 stud.) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Full controls for school-level chars. Y Y Y Y
Without Matching
Math Z-scores ELA Z-scores
With Propensity-Score Matched Smaple







 A key threat to causal inference is the assumption that deviations from trend within the 
comparison schools serve as a valid counterfactual for what would have happened in the 
treatment schools in the absence of the policy. This is a strong assumption and would be 
invalidated if unobservable factors changed around the time of the policy in different ways in the 
treatment and comparison schools. For example, if, independent of this policy, treatment schools 
or comparison schools were making other changes to discipline policies (or both types of schools 
were making changes but in different ways), this would prohibit a causal interpretation. 
 While it is impossible to directly test any unobservable factors, I can test whether 
observable factors appear to be “affected” by the policy. I estimate regressions as in Equation 5 
but predict school-by-year measures of observable traits that may influence our outcome 
measures. Specifically, I estimate whether the policy “impacted” school-by-year percent of 
students who are FRL, percent of students who are special education, percent of students who are 
Black, percent of students who are Hispanic, and school enrollment size. The explanatory 
variables are the same, except that, for each model, the dependent variable (or a derivation there 
of) is not included as an explanatory variable. For example, in the model predicting school 
enrollment, I remove the log of enrollment as an explanatory variable. 
These models provide evidence on whether factors that may determine important school 
outcomes vary along with the policy change in ways that would confound the estimates of the 
policy-related change. If these models indicate the policy “impacts” these measures, I would 
have evidence against the identifying assumption. However, passing this test is not sufficient 






Robustness Check: Policy-related Change in Other Outcomes 
 
Note. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression. All models include school fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school level. Dependent variables are on a 0-1 scale. Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance include: log of 
enrollment, percent Black, region indicators, and truancy frequency (incidents per 100 students). Full controls for school-level chars. 
add: percent special education, FRL, Hispanic, and other minority, as well as indicators for middle and high schools (with elementary 
schools as the omitted group). However, percent special education is not a covariate in the model predicting percent special education. 
a Total “effect” by 2015-16 represents the “effect” for schools with 100% OSS for truancy, compared to a school with 0% OSS for 
truancy, in 2012-13. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Panel A: Ts = used OSS for truancy at least once in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ts ×  Years since policy 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Total effect by 2015-16 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.028 * -0.027 * -0.028 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959
Adjusted R-squared 0.0593 0.0647 0.0731 0.155 0.183 0.210 0.0718 0.0882 0.0938 0.220 0.222 0.244
Panel B: Ts = percent of truancy cases resulting in OSS in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.015 -0.014 -0.018 *
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Ts ×  Years since policy 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.039 -0.036 -0.033 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0686 0.0733 0.0814 0.155 0.183 0.210 0.0708 0.0873 0.0932 0.218 0.220 0.241
Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Seven cons. types (freq. per 100 stud.) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Full controls for school-level chars. Y Y Y Y
School % Special Education School % FRL
Total effect by 2015-16 a





Table 14, Cont’d 
Robustness Check: Policy-related Change in Other Outcomes, Cont’d 
 
Note. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression. All models include school fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school level. Dependent variables are on a 0-1 scale. Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance include: log of 
enrollment, percent Black, region indicators, and truancy frequency (incidents per 100 students). Full controls for school-level chars. 
add: percent special education, FRL, Hispanic, and other minority, as well as indicators for middle and high schools (with elementary 
schools as the omitted group). However, dependent variables (or their corresponding variables) are not included as covariates. 
a Total “effect” by 2015-16 represents the “effect” for schools with 100% OSS for truancy, compared to a school with 0% OSS for 
truancy, in 2012-13. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Panel A: Ts = used OSS for truancy at least once in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 * 0.003 0.004 0.006 * 0.003 0.003 0.004 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ts ×  Years since policy -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 * -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004 * -0.005 ** -0.004 ** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total effect by 2015-16 -0.008 * -0.008 * -0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.009 -0.011 * -0.007 0.001 0.001 0.003 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.021 0.101 0.323 0.330 0.353 0.006 0.045 0.132 0.343 0.348 0.373
Panel B: Ts = percent of truancy cases resulting in OSS in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.011 * 0.007 0.008 0.010 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ts ×  Years since policy -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 * -0.009 ** -0.010 ** -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Number of Schools 374 374 374 374 374 374 228 228 228 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959
Adjusted R-Squared 0.004 0.021 0.100 0.325 0.332 0.353 0.012 0.050 0.139 0.346 0.352 0.377
Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Seven cons. types (freq. per 100 stud.) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Full controls for school-level chars. Y Y Y Y
School % Black School % Hispanic School % Black School % Hispanic




Table 14, Cont’d 
Robustness Check: Policy-related Change in Other Outcomes, Cont’d 
 
Note. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression. All models include 
school fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Dependent variables are on 
a 0-1 scale. Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance include: percent Black, region indicators, 
and truancy frequency (incidents per 100 students). Full controls for school-level chars. add: 
percent special education, FRL, Hispanic, and other minority, as well as indicators for middle 
and high schools (with elementary schools as the omitted group). 
a Total “effect” by 2015-16 represents the “effect” for schools with 100% OSS for truancy, 
compared to a school with 0% OSS for truancy, in 2012-13. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
Panel A: Ts = used OSS for truancy at least once in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt 5.454 4.048 2.729 8.646 7.446 6.504 
(9.068) (8.932) (8.785) (11.38)  (11.38)  (11.22)  
Ts ×  Years since policy 1.414 2.250 2.363 -1.077 -0.301 0.505 
(5.500) (5.533) (5.513) (5.985) (6.013) (6.005)
Total effect by 2015-16 9.696  10.800  9.818 5.416 6.544 8.018 
(14.63)   (14.81)   (14.67)  (18.19)  (18.35)  (18.22)  
Number of Schools 374 374 374 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 1,959 1,959 1,959
Adjusted R-squared 0.013 0.017 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.024
Panel B: Ts = percent of truancy cases resulting in OSS in 2012-13
Ts × Policyt -2.857 -4.475 -6.226 -0.680 -1.869 -4.161 
(9.410) (9.352) (9.294) (13.72)  (13.78)  (13.26)  
Ts ×  Years since policy 7.469 7.729 8.306 9.822 10.690 13.020 *
(6.426) (6.433) (6.401) (7.760) (7.812) (7.766)
19.550 18.710 18.690 28.790 30.200 34.890 
(17.89)  (17.83)  (17.63)  (22.94)  (23.06)  (23.03)  
Number of Schools 374 374 374 228 228 228
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 1,959 1,959 1,959
Adjusted R-Squared 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.019 0.021 0.025
Sch. chars. predicting baseline compliance Y Y Y Y Y Y
Seven cons. types (freq. per 100 stud.) Y Y Y Y
Full controls for school-level chars. Y Y
Total effect by 2015-16 a





In general, these results (in Table 14) indicate that the policy did not “impact” these 
characteristics. The exception is slight evidence (only marginally significant) that the school 
percent black may have been “impacted” as a result. Given that this was the only variable 
“affected” by the policy, we do not have a clear rejection of the identifying assumption. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The state of Arkansas pursued a policy prohibiting the use of OSS for truancy, 
theoretically in an effort to positively impact students. For example, it is logical that part of the 
state’s goal was to encourage reasonable consequences so that punishments “fit the crime” and 
ultimately prevent future misbehavior. In general, this policy was not associated with differential 
changes in important school outcomes such as percent of total student days absent, the percent of 
students chronically absent, or math and ELA test scores. The only estimated relationship of the 
policy to one of these four outcomes (percent of days absent) was small, marginally significant, 
and sensitive to model specification. However, the lack of changes in school-level outcomes may 
not be very surprising given that in each year, less than 2% of students are written up for truancy, 
so future research could estimate the impact on individual students instead. 
I do find that, after the policy, there was an increase in the use of “other” consequences 
for truancy in treatment schools, relative to comparison schools. It is unclear what schools are 
really using within this “other” category, so in order to understand the impact of this policy 
change, the state needs to increase reporting capabilities and accountability for what 
consequences or interventions schools are actually using. 
There is also suggestive evidence that treatment schools had a slight decline in truancy 
reports per 100 students, relative to comparison schools, but it is unclear whether the estimated 





practices. In addition, I estimate a policy-related increase in “other” infractions per 100 students, 
although the pattern of evidence suggests this rise in “other” infractions is not solely due to this 
policy change. Rather, the findings suggest there may be other (non-policy related) changes in 
reports of these “other” infractions. 
Why did this policy not affect school-level absenteeism or student achievement? First of 
all, there was much variation in compliance across schools, and the types of schools that the state 
was likely intending to impact with this policy (schools with high rates of truancy, high 
proportions of minority students, and frequent use of OSS), are also the types of schools that fail 
to comply with the policy. A few factors may have contributed to a lack of a clear relationship 
between the policy and school outcomes: 1) insufficient communication to schools including the 
reasons for the change, an indication of how schools will be held accountable, and suggested 
alternatives to using OSS 2) a lack of accountability for adherence to the policy and 3) a lack of 
capacity or resources for schools to comply. I was unable in this study to empirically test 
whether these factors were present and influenced the policy-related outcomes, but theoretically, 
these three items (communication, accountability, and resources) are necessary - but not 
necessarily sufficient - for producing the intendent effect. 
While there was an apparent lack of accountability for compliance with this policy, it is 
unclear what the ideal form of accountability would be. A set of rules distributed by the 
Arkansas Department of Education (2012) indicates that the Department “shall monitor 
compliance” with its rules, and that if schools fail to file their policies with the state, the school 
district “shall have all state aid funds withheld until such disciplinary policy is filed with the 
Department of Education.” This set of rules, however, does not explicitly indicate that state 





it is implied. Certainly, if the Arkansas Department of Education has the right to withhold state 
funds for failure to comply with this policy, there is no evidence that it has done so or has plans 
to do so. Rather, it appears the state has taken a very hands-off approach to compliance so far. 
Another type of accountability could come from parents taking legal action against the 
school district, although parents would have to be aware of this law, which is unlikely given that 
there was apparently very little communication about the policy, and taking legal action could 
potentially be very costly as well. Legal action against a school could be quite burdensome in 
some of the communities where schools are failing to comply. 
 More research should be conducted to understand the impacts of this policy on students. 
It could be that there are impacts on particular types of students or in particular types of schools, 
but that there is no apparent overall impact when looking at outcomes in the entire school. Future 
research could address whether there are impacts only on the truant students, for example, or on 
the peers of truant students who now remain in school. 
Arkansas may need to pursue more in depth, qualitative research to understand how 
schools are reacting to this policy, and more broadly, what alternatives to OSS schools are using. 
It is not clear that the desired impact will occur if the only change is a reduction in the use of 
OSS, without replacing it with other supports for students (Anderson, Ritter, & Zamarro, 2017).  
It is also possible that focusing on consequences is not as effective as preventing truancy 
in the first place, so more work should be done to study the effectiveness of truancy interventions 
in the state. For example, there are “promising interventions” available for reducing truancy 
(Sutphen, Ford, & Flaherty, 2010). There are a variety of school-based, court-based, and 
community-based approaches to handling truancy, and evidence suggests that educators should 





Weilbrunn, 2005). OSS may not be an effective practice for dealing with truant students because 
schools need to address the underlying reasons behind the absence in order to interrupt the 
student’s decline towards delinquency (Baker et al., 2001). However, large-scale experimental 
evaluations on the effectiveness of truancy interventions are lacking. Two experimental studies, 
limited in size and scope, found truancy could be reduced through contingency management 
including a token economy and group contracts (Brooks, 1975) or through threat of losing public 
assistance for frequent non-attendance (Jones, Harris, & Finnegan, 2002). However, in one of 
these studies, attendance declined over the course of the intervention (Jones, Harris, & Finnegan, 
2002). 
Another school-based approach that focuses on a variety of student behaviors is School-
Wide Positive Behavior Interventions and Supports (SWPBIS). SWPBIS includes three tiers of 
support. Tier I is school-wide, Tier II is targeted, small group support that can focus on study 
skills, social skills, behavior, attendance, or dropout prevention, and Tier III is individualized 
support for the students with greatest need. Experimental evidence finds that implementing 
SWPBIS can improve student perceptions of school safety and test scores in elementary schools 
(Horner et al., 2009). Experimental studies at the high school level are lacking, but when 
implemented with fidelity, this framework has been linked to improvement in disciplinary 
incidents (Flannery, Fenning, Kato, & McIntosh, 2014; Freeman et al., 2015) and attendance 
(Freeman et al., 2015) in high schools. 
In conclusion, this study provides evidence on implementation fidelity and outcomes 
related to a state-level policy prohibiting the use of OSS as a consequence for truancy, 
theoretically with the goal of aligning disciplinary consequences to infractions and improving 





policy to influence student discipline in ways that improve student outcomes, at least if there is 
insufficient communication, accountability, and school resource capacity. The schools that 
theoretically were the key targets of the policy are found to be the ones that fail to comply even 
three years after the policy changed, and perhaps as a result, there was no apparent improvement 
in school-level test scores, attendance, and chronic absenteeism. While this conclusion is 
troubling, is may not be surprising, as it is often difficult to change human behavior. For 
example, we might also expect that following a ban on sugary soft drinks, people who previously 
consumed large amounts of these drinks would likely be the ones that struggle to comply.  
Of course, I acknowledge that these three necessary conditions (communication, 
accountability, and school resource capacity) are not necessarily sufficient to produce 
improvements in student outcomes, and more work is needed to fully understand the key factors 
for ideal policy design. Looking forward, it will be interesting to see how schools in Arkansas 
react to a recent policy change banning OSS and expulsion in kindergarten through fifth grade 
except in cases of “physical risk” or “serious disruption that cannot be addressed through other 
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Appendix A – Arkansas Timeline of Events 
March 11, 2013: Arkansas legislature passes Act 1329, “An Act to Evaluate the Impact of 
School Discipline on Student Achievement; and for Other Purposes,” which is codified as §6-18-
507 (b). This law states “The board of directors of a school district may suspend or expel any 
student from school for violation of the school district's written discipline policies, except that a 
school district shall not use out-of-school suspension as a discipline measure for truancy.” 
Feb 11, 2016: University of Arkansas researchers present a report at the Arkansas State 
Board of Education (SBE) (Ritter & Anderson, 2016), indicating that as of 2014-15, 9% of 
truancy cases in the state (and 14% of truancy cases for African American students) resulted in 
OSS. The report also reminds the SBE that schools shall not use OSS as a consequence for 
truancy according to Act 1329 of 2013, but that over 100 districts were still doing this as of 
2014-15. The report notes that 29 schools used OSS for 100% of truancy cases during 2014-15. 
November 10, 2016: University of Arkansas researchers present to the SBE a report on 
the impact of exclusionary discipline on students (Anderson & Ritter, 2016). 
January 10, 2017: The Arkansas Department of Education (ADE, 2017) distributed 
Memo Number COM-17-036 to the attention of superintendents and principals stating that 
during the November 10 meeting, “State Board members requested the department remind 
districts that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-507(b) prohibits school districts from imposing out-of-
school suspension as a discipline measure for truancy.” Attached to this memo was a copy of the 







 The three studies within this dissertation have helped fill several distinct gaps in the 
evidence base regarding the implementation and outcomes of student discipline policies. Yet, 
there are limitations to these studies, and there is still a need for more, particularly causal, 
evidence on these topics. In this concluding chapter, I reiterate some of the key findings from 
each paper, the limitations surrounding the data and analytic approach, and what policy 
implications follow as a result. 
Summary of Findings 
 In the first paper (Chapter 2), Dr. Gary Ritter and I find that, at least in Arkansas, racial 
disparities in the use of exclusionary discipline, even after accounting for the nature and 
frequency of disciplinary actions, as well as a variety of student characteristics, are quite large 
and evident primarily across schools rather than within schools. This work also shows that the 
racial composition of schools is a stronger driver of the severity of punishments than is free-and 
reduced-price lunch (FRL) status. These findings suggest that policies designed to encourage fair 
administration of discipline may need to focus on particular schools and contexts. 
 Findings from Chapters 3 and 4 suggest it is not necessarily the case that reducing or 
eliminating exclusionary discipline will improve student- or school-level outcomes. In Chapter 3, 
Dr. Gary Ritter, Dr. Gema Zamarro, and I attempt the first causal estimate of the impact of out-
of-school suspension (OSS) on student test scores in math and English Language Arts (ELA). 
While a vast amount of prior literature has shown troubling correlations between exclusionary 
discipline and a variety of negative student outcomes, we find virtually zero evidence of a 





indicates that, without other interventions or supports, a reduction in OSS may not have the 
intended effect of improving student achievement, at least for the suspended students themselves. 
 The third paper focuses on the implementation and outcomes from a state-level policy 
prohibiting the use of OSS as a disciplinary consequence for truancy. There was a partial decline 
in the use of OSS as a consequence for truancy from 13.8% in 2012-13, the year the policy was 
passed, to 8.7% in 2015-16, but this was also accompanied by a large increase in the use of 
“other” non-specified consequences for truancy, which makes it difficult to understand or 
interpret what this means for students. Further, I find that the schools that the policy likely 
intended to target, those with high truancy rates and high OSS rates in general, were the types of 
schools that still fail to fully comply after three years. I speculate that this implementation failure 
is due, in large part, to three key factors: 1) a lack of communication from the state to school 
leaders about the importance of the policy change and how it would be carried out, 2) failure to 
hold schools accountable for this change, and 3) a lack of information or resources to carry out 
other alternatives to OSS. Perhaps as a result, this lack of implementation was also accompanied 
by no measurable policy-related change in school outcomes such as average math and ELA test 
scores, student attendance, and chronic absenteeism. There was a small policy-related reduction 
in reported truancy rates and a somewhat larger policy-related increase in “other” infraction 
rates, but this latter finding was sensitive to treatment definition, and thus I conclude it is likely 
not entirely driven by the policy. 
Study Limitations 
While these three papers fill gaps in the knowledge base, there are several limitations to 
the generalizability of these findings and the implications that follow. First, all three of these 





these papers are only the disciplinary infractions and consequences that were reported by 
schools. Thus, in Chapter 2, in which my co-author and I estimate the across- and within-school 
racial disproportionalities in exclusionary discipline, we are not accounting for any racial 
disparities in how student behaviors are actually observed and/or reported. For example, if 
certain students misbehave but never receive an office referral, we do not see that in our dataset. 
In addition, even if an infraction is reported to the office, it is not guaranteed that the school will 
record the incident in a way that is officially reported to the state. While the within-school 
analysis utilizes school fixed effects, and thus controls for time-invariant school characteristics 
which may include reporting practices, the across-school estimates may be influenced by 
differences in how schools or school districts report their disciplinary infractions. 
This data limitation is also a factor in Chapter 3, in which we estimate the impact of OSS 
on student test scores. To account for differences in reporting across school districts, we utilize 
district fixed effects. While this helps account for constant district-level differences, if schools 
within districts report disciplinary incidents very differently, this would affect the interpretation 
of these results.  
In Chapter 4, to account for school-level differences in how incidents are reported over 
time, I include lagged measures of reported disciplinary incidents in the descriptive analyses 
predicting whether a school used OSS as a consequence for truancy in the baseline year and 
predicting compliance with the policy in future years. When I estimate the policy-related change 
in school-level outcomes, the fullest model specifications also include these disciplinary 
measures for each time period, to account for differential trends in disciplinary practices in 
treatment and comparison schools. To further account for time-invariant school characteristics, 





Each paper has its own additional limitations. A key limitation in Chapter 2, which 
measured racial disproportionalities in exclusionary discipline, relates to how we can interpret 
the results and use them to inform policy. While we advocate for data transparency as a way to 
make key stakeholders aware of disciplinary outcomes in their local public schools and perhaps 
create advocates for change, there is potential for unintended consequences if a rise in public 
reporting encourages school personnel to simply under-report or code disciplinary infractions in 
vague or non-transparent ways. In addition, even if student discipline data are publicly reported, 
whether high numbers of disciplinary referrals are a bad thing or a good thing is likely very 
context dependent, making comparisons across schools difficult. 
The key limitations of Chapter 3, which assesses the impact of OSS on student test 
scores, relate to the outcome measures available, as well as the key identifying assumptions for 
causal inference. This study only looks at the impact of exclusionary discipline on student math 
and ELA test scores, so it could be that there is a causal impact on other important outcomes that 
we are not able to measure. The estimates are based only on within-student variation for students 
who have varied amounts of exposure to OSS over time. While this may seem like a limitation, 
this was an intentional choice because it allows us to control for student time-invariant 
unobservable characteristics, and additionally, these students comprise what is likely the most 
policy-relevant population. A remaining concern for a causal interpretation of these results is that 
there may be time-varying shocks to students that affect both discipline and student test scores 
over time. For example, if there are unobservable events in a student’s life such as divorce or a 
death in the family, this could constitute a time-persistent shock. Another limitation of Chapter 3 
is that it focuses only on the outcomes for students suspended rather than the systemic impacts 





Finally, Chapter 4, which assesses the implementation of and school-level outcomes 
following a state-level policy, utilizes data from a single state where all schools were technically 
subject to the policy change. Thus, a key limitation relates to the selection of a comparison 
group. Ideally, a very similar state, but one not subject to the policy change, could have been 
used as a comparison group. However, using the data available, I created a set of treatment and 
comparison schools in the state, assuming that schools using OSS as a consequence for truancy 
in the baseline year would theoretically be affected, while others would not. School participation 
in these groups is clearly not exogenous, so the comparison schools are likely not a good 
counterfactual for what would have happened in the treatment schools in the absence of the 
policy. Thus, it is unlikely that the estimated relationships between the policy and school-level 
outcomes are causal. A further limitation of Chapter 4 is that I cannot directly test my hypothesis 
that a lack of implementation fidelity was due, in part, to three factors: 1) a lack of 
communication from the state, 2), a lack of accountability, and 3) a lack of information about 
reasonable and effective alternatives to exclusionary discipline. 
Important Lessons for Policy 
Regardless of the limitations, these three studies still make meaningful contributions to 
the policy debate surrounding the use of exclusionary discipline. In fact, combining the results of 
all three indicates the type of policies or reforms that states may want to pursue. The persistence 
of racial gaps in exclusionary discipline, coupled with the failure of a state-level policy to 
eliminate exclusionary discipline as intended and a lack of causal evidence that this exclusionary 
discipline actually harms student achievement, provides support for the idea that simply aiming 
to reduce OSS, without providing additional interventions or supports for at-risk students, may 





across schools and that high-discipline schools tend to struggle the most with compliance 
following a state-level policy change, these findings suggest the need for a more targeted 
approach to reform. 
Further, the findings from these three studies suggest a need for more careful use of 
evidence in the debate over discipline reform. Some researchers have decried the recent efforts 
as ineffective and potentially harmful for teacher morale (Eden, 2017; Loveless, 2017), but 
others use the troubling disproportionalities as their battle cry for reform (Losen, Hodson, Keith, 
Morrison, & Belway, 2015). Other commentators are seeing the need for a “third way that 
integrates a school’s approach to discipline with high-quality, culturally competent school 
cultures, teaching and learning practices, and student supports,” while also building school 
capacity to actually achieve the intended outcomes (Anderson, 2017). 
The policy implications from these three papers suggest the need for a middle ground. 
The evidence on racial disproportionalities in Chapter 2 highlights the disparate exposure to 
harsh and exclusionary discipline, but is also useful for helping design state policies, as it 
suggests that efforts need to focus on between-school differences, and thus must take into 
account the types of schools that minority students are residentially assigned to attend. In 
addition, there may be a middle ground needed in data transparency and public reporting. 
Schools likely need to be able to compare how their discipline outcomes stack up with other 
similar (or dissimilar) schools in the state if they are to identify whether there is a problem or a 
need for change. However, Campbell’s Law warns us that we also should be concerned about the 






The results of Chapter 3 suggest what we should expect to happen to student test scores if 
OSS is reduced: not very much. Here, our estimate of the impact of exclusionary discipline on 
student test scores attempts to isolate the impact of the suspension itself by carefully controlling 
for the frequency and type of behaviors a student is reportedly engaging in. We find a null to 
slightly positive impact of OSS on student test scores, depending on the model and analytic 
sample, which indicates that reductions in OSS, without any additional supports, interventions, 
or resources, are not expected to improve student achievement, as measured by test scores. This 
result does not mean that we should not care about reducing the misbehavior that led to the 
suspension to begin with. In fact, it may be more beneficial to focus on interventions that build 
cultural competency for teachers and staff, improve school climate and safety, and generally 
prevent disruptive or dangerous behaviors in schools. 
This same implication follows from the findings of Chapter 4, in which a high-level 
policy reform seeking to eliminate the use of OSS for truancy not only failed to improve student 
outcomes, but also was not implemented with fidelity. In addition, we learn from Chapter 4 that 
implementation may be low, and outcomes will likely not be as intended, if policies are 
implemented in a way that does not encourage real change. It is a cautionary tale about what we 
might expect from state-level policies that prohibit certain behaviors, without additional 
communication, accountability, or supports. 
Looking forward, it is unclear how Arkansas and other states will focus their future 
policy initiatives related to student discipline. Under the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) of 
2015, state education agencies are now required by federal law to describe in their Title I state 
plan how they plan to support local education agencies (LEAs) in reducing “the overuse of 





behavioral interventions that compromise student health and safety” (Sec. 1111(g)(1)(C)). 
Further, under ESSA, schools are encouraged to implement a “schoolwide tiered model to 
prevent and address problem behavior” which could reasonably include frameworks such as 
School-wide Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (SWPBIS) (Sec. 
1114(b)(7)(A)(iii)(III)). 
 Arkansas has described, in the March 2017 draft of its ESSA state plan, efforts to 
improve the usefulness of discipline data in schools and the development of SWPBIS modules 
and training materials (Arkansas Department of Education, 2017). In addition, the state has 
passed another state-level policy to reduce reliance on exclusionary discipline. In April 2017, 
Arkansas Act 1059, “An Act to Amend Provisions of Title 6 of the Arkansas Code Concerning 
Discipline of Students in Public Schools; And for Other Purposes” further limited the use of out-
of-school suspension in Arkansas public school districts. In particular, the law states: “the school 
district shall not use out-of-school suspension or expulsion for a student in kindergarten through 
grade five (K-5) except in cases when a student’s behavior: poses a physical risk to himself or 
herself or to others; or causes a serious disruption that cannot be addressed through other means” 
(Arkansas Code § 6-18-507). As with Act 1329, which banned OSS for truancy, there is little 
guidance about the reasons for this change, the accountability system to ensure compliance, or 
guidance on disciplinary alternatives to meet this requirement. As of August 2017, there is no 
indication that the Arkansas Department of Education has distributed any further guidance on 
these changes. As a result, I am not very hopeful about what impact this will actually have on 
Arkansas students. While certain high-functioning school districts with excellent leadership will 





to continue to be the schools left behind without the knowledge or resources about available 
alternatives. 
 As state and local education agencies continue to design policy, three things are 
abundantly clear. First, policy needs to be informed by facts and by causal evidence whenever 
possible, and asking the right questions is an important first step in the right direction. Secondly, 
the impact of high-level policies may be limited, and unintended consequences are a real 
possibility, so policy design, implementation, and assessment of progress are critically important. 
Finally, removing ideology and moving towards a middle ground based on facts and evidence is 
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